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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the idea of realism in Western Marxism through 
the comparative approaches of Georg Lukacs, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, 
Bertolt Brecht, Jean-Paul Sartre and Fredric Jameson in relation to non-Marxist 
theorists such as Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. The issue of realism suffers 
from the controversial terminology of realism and reality. This is the reason why 
realism can be better viewed by Marxist perspectives that are firmly based on the 
category of the subject-object dialectic. This Marxian principle, thereby pertaining to 
the reality existing outside of subjectivity, substantiates the issue of realism as a 
continuing social and aesthetic project. By focusing on the category of real ity in 
relation to the idea of realism in Western Marxist debates, this study explores the way 
in which the Marxist theorists understand the relationship between culture and 
society, and respond to the change of socio-economic conditions in each historical 
moment. These various discourses revolving around the issue of realism produce a 
similar agenda to explain the place of the artwork in the realm of culture. Such a 
similarity arises from their attempt to retain the idea of realism, even when they argue 
for an aesthetic of anti-realism. In this respect, my thesis questions the distinction 
between realism and modernism in Western Marxist discourses, and argues that such 
differentiation had been articulated by a political intention to sever Western Marxism 
from Stalinism. Their idea of realism is paradoxical in the sense that their 
formulations of realism aspire to a utopian project. This is the very way in which their 
idea of realism can be grasped as another facet of their political programme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I would like to examine the idea of realism and anti-realism in 
the development of Western Marxism. This involves an analysis and critique of 
Marxist theorists such as Lukacs, Benjamin, Adorno, Brecht. Sartre and Jameson as 
well as non-Marxist theorists such as Barthes and Foucault. My contention is that 
Lukacs is a symbolic figure centred in the Marxian idea of realism and prompts a 
series of debates revolving around the problem of representation. 
Descriptions of realism in the field of aesthetic discourse are notoriously 
slippery. The difficulty describing the whole contour of realism is a consequence of 
its ambiguity: realism has both an aesthetic and an epistemological dimension all at 
once. The simplest way to define realism is to describe it as a historical mode of 
representation mainly belonging to the nineteenth century. However, my initial 
intention in this study does not reside in a historically oriented approach. This study 
rather aims at revitalising the category of realism not as 'a form or period that we 
rightly ifalso repeatedly put behind us' but as 'a continuing social project that (in 
some form) one might still want to sign onto'. 1 This is the reason why my discussion 
focuses on the ideas of realism in Western Marxism that produced influential debates 
about the social function of realism in the field of aesthetic and cultural production. 
Needless to say, this aim can be achieved through a presentation and a reformulation 
of Marxist aesthetics. 
My presupposition is that realism is not so much a specific method or style of 
a work of art, but the fundamental problem of aesthetic and cultural production in 
I Bruce Robbins, 'Modernism and Literary Realism: Response', in Realism ilnd Representation: £ssay.l' 
on the Problem of Realism in Relation to Science, Literature, and Culture, ed. bv George Levine 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 225. .-
general; realism is not only a representational system but also an ongoing 
epistemological claim to the real. What must be stressed is that the possibility of 
realism designates not the name of an aesthetic object. but a problem. Realism is an 
aesthetic striving to push our perception beyond the conventional code system of 
reality. In this way, realism can be said to be a continuing aesthetic project to realise 
utopian imaginations towards an alternative social system by changing the category of 
reality. 
The Marxian idea of realism is necessarily related to the concept of ideology, 
in the sense that it always demands the dialectic between the epistemological and the 
aesthetic: the aesthetic is the living experience that produces criticism of the gi ven 
category of reality. According to the classical Marxist understanding of ideology, 
ideology is the result of alienation in the material dimension. This means that, as 
Terry Eagleton puts it ideology is 'a text, woven of a whole tissue of different 
conceptual strands'.2 In other words, ideology is nothing other than the problem of 
representation, the main issue of realism revolving around the dialectic between the 
epistemological and the aesthetic. However, I would like to formulate ideology as 
necessary for cognition and activity; ideology is not empirical representation, but 
rather active relations. As Eagleton says, 'ideology cannot be substantially 
transformed by offering individuals true descriptions in place of false ones,.3 In this 
sense, ideology is crucially related to collective practice; the problem is not to 
2 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991). p. I. Eagleton recounts the 
ambivalent notions of ideology as follows: '(a) the process of production of meanings, signs and values 
in social life; (b) a body of ideas characteristic ofa particular social group or class; (c) ideas which help 
to legitimate a dominant political power; (d) false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political 
power; (e) systematically distorted communication; (t) that which offers a position for a subject; (g) 
forms of thought motivated by social interests; (h) identity thinking: (i) socially necessary illusion; (j) 
the conjuncture of discourse and power; (k) the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of 
their world; (I) action-oriented sets of beliefs; (m) the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality; 
(n) semiotic closure; (0) the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to a 
social structure; (p) the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality'. 
J Ibid., p. 30. 
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straighten the ideological distortion so as to restore the original truth, but rather to 
analyse the logic of ideological form dialectically. From this perspective. I formulate 
the notion of ideology as an imaginary form in which the truth of the material world is 
symptomatically inscribed. It does not mean that ideology is fallacy, but rather false 
understanding; just as Marx defines ideology as false consciousness with his well-
know metaphor of camera obscura. Considering ideology as a necessary 
consequence of the subject-object dialectic, my thesis reformulates the aesthetic of 
representation through reconsidering the Marxian idea of realism. 
My approach is twofold: first, I challenge the widespread inclination that 
opposes realism to modernism in the discourse of Marxist aesthetics. I maintain that 
formulations that draw a clear distinction between realism and modernism were 
constituted by political orientations that strove to separate Western Marxism from 
Stalinism. My presupposition is that there is an antithetical logic to doctrines in the 
Western Marxist articulation of anti-realism. It seems to me that this tendency 
precludes the possibility that there could have been any positive aspect expounding 
the aesthetic of realism. Second, I revitalise the crucial aspect of realism, the category 
of mediation in which the subject-object dialectic still retains its usefulness against the 
postmodern relativistic ideas of culture. 
For this purpose, I describe Lukacs' aesthetic formulation of realism in the 
light of his political strategy against Stalinism in Chapter 1. This is accompanied by 
the reconsideration of Adorno's attack on Lukacsean realism. Alongside this, I put an 
emphasis on the Hegelian feature of Lukacsean realism, in order to defend the 
category of mediation in the process of aesthetic production, which is criticised by 
Althusserian Marxism. This chapter aims at relocating the well-known debates of 
realism within the historical context of Western Marxism. 
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The reason why I reformulate the Lukacsean idea of realism is that realism can 
be better defined by Lukacs' conceptualisation of the drive towards totality, or the 
orientation towards the real. For Lukacs, realism is related to an author's perspective 
on the world. It must be stressed that Lukacs distinguishes realism from the 
representational system: realism is pre-systemic, or pre-reined situation of mediation 
in which the subject-object dialectic interacts with reality. For Lukacs, realism is not 
mere representation, but rather 'an art which penetrates through the appearances of 
social life to grasp their inner dynamics and dialectical interrelations,.4 This means 
that 'realism is not simply a description of reality, it is an attainment of the real as 
significant and essential'.s In this respect, realism is not only epistemological, but also 
ethical; the more a work of art succeeds in revealing the hidden reality of history, the 
more it will be beautiful. Lukacs' idea of realism is therefore identical in the aesthetic 
realm to philosophical realism. From this perspective, the chapter contends that. like 
Adorno's philosophy of music, Lukacs' realism is another facet of his politics, a 
social project of an aesthetic programme, not a supplemental element of his pol itics. 
This is followed in Chapter 2 by a comparison between Adorno and Benjamin 
and, on the other hand, Lukacs. I argue that Adorno's formulation of anti-realism is 
based on Benjamin's idea of the mimetic faculty, and Adorno divides realism and the 
mimetic impulse to retain the utopian dimension of aesthetics against the realism of 
capitalist society. In this sense, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno all regard the technical 
experiments of the avant-garde movements as an aesthetic attempt to produce a new 
category of reality responding to changed socio-economic conditions. The chapter 
argues that Benjamin's and Adorno's formulations of mimesis are a developed 
Marxian idea of realism, even though they set out their aesthetic in the guise of anti-
4 Terry Eagleton, 'Pork Chops and Pineapples', London Review (?fBooks. 23 October 2003, p. 17. 
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realism. Benjamin and Adorno regard the representational system as the prison-house 
of instrumental rationalism, while Lukacs grasps it as 'the instrument of human 
memory to tell us who we are' .6 
As opposed to Benjamin and Adorno, who stress the utopian dimension of 
sensuous experience, Lukacs tries to search for the perfect form thereby mapping out 
the whole reality in proper proportion. Despite the distinction between their aesthetic 
principles, what is common in those theorists is the utopian pursuit to step outside of 
the capitalist total ising system. In this sense, my thesis presupposes that Lukacs' 
conceptualisation of realism and Benjamin's and Adorno's formulations of the 
aesthetic against the habitual representational system can be compatible. The culture 
industry is nothing less than the total ising accumulation of late capitalism in which 
the distinction between capital and culture is dissolved. I contend that this 
circumstance pushes aesthetic production beyond the traditional mode of 
representation to an attempt to create a new category of reality. 
In this respect, I recount Sartre' s criticism of Brecht in Chapter 3. The most 
significant factor in Brecht's formulation of realism is that he regards realism as the 
problem of general human interest. This is similar to the way in which Lukacs defines 
realism as an orientation towards the real, even though Brecht does not endorse the 
Hegelian category of mediation like Lukacs. For Brecht, realism does not mean the 
way in which a work of art represents the world as it actually is, but rather the way in 
which it deconstructs the conventional mode of representation. This idea leads Brecht 
to have sympathy for modernism and its technical experiments. More significantly, 
Brecht also regards realism as cognitive and evaluative: a work of art should serve as 
5 Galin Tihanov, The Master and the Slave: Lukacs, Bakhtin, and the Ideas olTheir Time (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000). p. 28. . 
6 Tom Rockmore .. Lukacs. Marxist Aesthetics, and Truth'. in .lahrhuch del' internationalen (J('org-
Lukacs-Gesellschaji, 200 I. (Bielefeld: Aisthesis. 200 I). p. 142. 
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an apparatus to lay bare the social reality through its form. For Brecht, aesthetic 
techniques are no more than functional components to amplify the cognitive effect. 
In this chapter, I describe the way in which the practical aspect of realism 
supported by Lukacs and Brecht declined because of the reification of aesthetic 
production as well as the institutionalisation of aesthetic criticism. I maintain that 
Sartre is a symptomatic theorist who marks an aesthetic shift from representation to 
representative. From this standpoint, my discussion delineates Sartrc's concept of 
analogous representatives, which abolishes the Cartesian category of correspondence. 
It seems to me that Sartre's formulation, thereby replacing the idea ofrealism with the 
idea of analogous representatives, influences a seminal idea of structuralist and 
poststructuralist conceptualisations of representation. 
From this perspective, I analyse the way in which Barthes formulates the 
reality effect and subsequently considers Foucault's understanding of representation 
in relation to neo-Kantian aesthetics in Chapter 4. The chapter claims that structuralist 
and poststructuralist theories of representation cannot provide a proper idea of 
aesthetic production against realism, in the sense that they cannot reject the category 
of mediation, the kernel of realism formulated by the Marxian idea of the aesthetic. 
Considering the similarity between neo-Kantianism and poststructuralism, I describe 
the way in which they blur the distinction between the aesthetic and the 
epistemological without any possible presupposition of mediation. The neo-Kantian 
idea of representation is that a particular WeltanschauunR is correlated to the 
production of a singular form; neo-Kantianism defines the work of art as a symbolic 
form associated with the logic of Weltanschauung. This formulation is based on the 
philosophical presumption that 'the object of cognition was actually produced by the 
subject according to a priori categories dwelling in 'consciousness in general"' and 
6 
'the mind could only know what the mind itself produces'. 7 This presupposition gives 
rise to the neo-Kantian idea of logical validity which is an autonomous realm against 
all knowledge of the empirical world. 
The problem is that neo-Kantianism does not postulate any category of 
mediation to explain the interrelationship between an individual artwork and a 
collective Weltanschauung. More significantly, Weltanschauung is independent of 
any potential aesthetic practice; an individual aesthetic practice cannot influence the 
logic of Weltanschauung. The distinction between the neo-Kantian aesthetic and the 
Marxist aesthetic lies in the way in which neo-Kantianism regards Weltanschauung as 
transcendental, while the Marxist idea of realism considers it as the consequence of 
the dialectical relationship between the work of art and Weltanschauung. as the 
consequence of class struggle. Endorsing the Althusserian conceptualisation of 
ideology, I criticise the metaphysical tendency ofneo-Kantianism. which is mainly 
presented in Panofsky's analysis of "perspective". 
Finally, in closely reading Jameson's works, Chapter 5 sheds light on the 
relationship between Jameson's concept of dialectical criticism and his idea of realism 
in relation to his analysis of postmodemism. I claim that Jameson's idea of dialectical 
criticism is a critical adaptation of the Marxian idea of realism. Throughout this 
exploration, my discussion attempts to substantiate the possibility of realism as an 
absolute problem of aesthetic production. This involves both a presentation and 
investigation of Jameson's dialectical method in relation to Sartre and Lukacs. 
My approach operates with a Marxist method for the analysis of Jameson's 
work, which also provides the historical context within which the other theories will 
be accessed in order to understand Jameson's theoretical position. To situate 
7 Craig Brandist. The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy. Culture and Politics (London: Pluto Press. 2002). p. 
16. 
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Jameson's texts in their context, the chapter investigates the origins of Jameson's 
recent thinking by means of reading his early work, Marxism and Form. Jameson's 
early works can lend a clue to understanding his latest work, but a dialectical 
approach suggests more than this, it argues that the specific problems that arise within 
these earlier works can only find their resolution through their dialectical 
transcendence or historicisation. 
This is followed by the criticism of Jameson's analysis of pastiche as a 
postmodern technique. The chapter argues that the way in which an author chooses 
parody or pastiche is determined by his or her attitude towards reality. I claim that 
Jameson's theoretical synthesis of aesthetic insights between the Marxian and the 
non-Marxian ideas of realism can provide realist alternative such as cognitive 
mapping, which is designed to totalise global reality. Jameson's formulation of 
cognitive mapping still retains the category of mediation, the subject-object dialectic, 
to defend the aesthetic principle of realism. 
By considering Jameson's concept of cognitive mapping as a new mode of 
realistic pursuit, I argue that the condition of possibility for realism is still guaranteed 
by the mimetic impulse towards the utopian category of total i ty. Even though the 
totalising system of late capitalism has already dominated the process of cultural 
production, the problem of realism at an epistemological level incessantly pushes the 
category of reality beyond the reifled code system of late capitalism. 
I conclude that the possibility of realism is actually related to the recuperation 
of a revolutionary collective subjectivity coping with the new reality, the reality of a 
global ising world. This is the very reason why the Marxian idea of realism still retain 
its own mediated position between utopia and reality against the totaJising capitalist 
system. The Marxian idea of realism is related to the way in which an author renders 
8 
the unforeseeable socio-economic pattern in aesthetic practice. No doubt. this is also 
accompanied by an attempt to map out the present global reality in the 
epistemological dimension. 
I} 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE AESTHETIC OF REFLECTION: LUKAcs 
Introduction 
Lukacs' defence of realism as a literary mode was one of the most 
controversial features of his aesthetics in the sense that it precipitated the conflict with 
other Marxist theorists of his time. l Today, Lukacs' defence of realism is often 
misunderstood as an obsolete edifice after the advent of Western Marxism and 
Althusserian Marxism. In spite of intermittent debates about contentious aspects of his 
politics, there are few theorists who have produced a proper evaluation of his 
aesthetics of realism. It is my claim that the theoretical rejection of Lukacs' real ism is 
quite problematic, in the sense that his opponents such as Adorno and Althusser 
symbolically used the name of Lukacs and perpetuated the suspicion of Lukacs' 
compromise with Stalinism. 
I contend that Lukacs' model of reflection is not couched in Stalin's socialist 
realism, a theory that assumes the transparency between aesthetic forms and reality, 
but rather raises the essential problems of the condition of revolutionary writers in 
capitalist society. In this sense, Lukacs' realism aims at providing a practical strategy 
to overcome cultural reification, focusing on the mediation between an author and his 
material condition. An investigation of Lukacs' realism reveals that Lukacs' way of 
understanding realism arises from his emphasis on objectivity rather than subjective 
reflection, as in Kantian philosophy. 2 
I For more details of the debates between them, see Ernst Bloch and others, AesthL,tic,I' and Politics, 
trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1980). 
2 For Lukacs' own criticism of Kantian reflection, see Georg Lukacs, History and Class 
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge. MA: The 
MIT Press, 1999), p. 200. 
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From this perspective, Lukacs regards artistic form as "self-containment" in 
which the totality of the form is more intensively structured than material reality. That 
is to say, the Lukacsean concept of reflection is not the Kantian correspondence 
between consciousness and reality, but rather reflection in proper proportion as in a 
geographical map. This is the kernel of Lukacsean reflection theory, signified by an 
aesthetics of realism definitively opposed to Stalin's socialist realism. In this respect. 
Lukacs' formulation of realism is a method of mapping out the capitalist social reality 
beyond fragmentation and reification. 
Finally, I want to take AIthusserian Marxism as the occasion to stage a wide 
consideration of anti-realism. I propose to elucidate the implicit assumptions behind 
the decline of Lukacs' realism, and the reification of cultural fields that gradually 
came to dominate Western literary apparatuses. Therefore, my concern with 
Althusserian anti-realism leads to the conclusion that cultural rei fication of Marxist 
literary theory is symptomatically revealed in the shift of focus from the writer to the 
reader. 
1. Questions for Lukacs' Reflection Theory 
Despite the prejudice that his argument is a mere reflection theory, what 
Lukacs' realism proposes is quite equivocal. At first sight, Lukacs' realism seems to 
suggest a better method to copy reality, yet, paradoxically, his realism implies another 
meaning at the level of the practical message. As Galin Tihanov argues, Lukacs' 
understanding of realism lies in the way in which he conceptualises method as the 
expression of Weltanschauung.) There is no doubt that Lukacs' formulation of 
method is partly influenced by the neo-Kantian conceptualisation of the relationship 
II 
between an individual artwork and Weltanschauunf!.. "' Lukacs confesses that Georg 
Simmel, a philosopher of Lehemphi/osophie, gave him the idea of the social character 
of art. Yet Lukacs also maintains that Simmers influence was nothing less than 'a 
basis for the discussion of literature that went well beyond Simmers own,.5 For this 
reason, it seems to me that it is not the transcendental catcgory of Weltanschauung in 
neo-Kantian aesthetic that is crucial to Lukacs' formulation of realism, but rather the 
subject-object dialectic, responding to both Hegelianism and nco-Kantianism. 
According to Tihanov, for the early Lukacs, who attempted to reformulate the neo-
Kantian idea of aesthetics, 'embracing Hegel for the purpose of establishing a 
systematic aesthetics involves a compromise between historical and a priori 
category' .6 
In other words, Lukacs endorses the Hegelian category of mediation to 
substantiate the neo-Kantian conception, adapting the teleological view of totality. In 
this way, Lukacs' idea of realism is inseparable from his early philosophical 
presupposition of form, which was developed in Heide/hag Aesthetics (1916-1918).7 
Lukacs' doctrine of realism contains the tension between 'thc Ilegelian postulate of 
the unity of content and form and the neo-Kantian prejudice that only form can 
upgrade content to essentiality'. 8 This is the very principle whereby Lukacs regards 
3 Galin Tihanov, The Masler and the Slave: Lukacs. Bakhtin. and the Ideas o/Their Time (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 108. 
4 As a result of the decline of early neo-Kantianism in 19\0, Cassirer and Lask reformulated neo-
Kantian ideas in bringing about a convergence with Lehensphilosophie and phenomenology. For a 
more detailed discussion about this, see Craig Brandist, The Bakhlin Circle: Philosophy. ClIllure and 
Politics (London: Pluto, 2002), pp. 16-21. 
5 Georg Lukacs, Record of a L(!e: An Autohiographical Sketch, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: 
Verso, 1983), pp. 37. However, it is undeniable that the influence of neo-Kantianism is still evident 
throughout Lukacs' whole works. Most importantly, Lukacs retains the neo-Kantian idea of timeless 
form and modifies it, so that the form of a great realistic artwork is the eternal achievement of human 
progress. 
6 Tihanov, The Master and the Slave, p. 42. 
7 According to Tihanov, in Heidelberg Aesthetics, 'Lukacs presents a more elaborate, if not completely 
enthusiastic, case for a Hegelian understanding of culture as a possible alternative to Kantianism'. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
8 Ibid., p. 42. 
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realism as 'a perennial trend in literature ... and a specific, historically determined 
mode ofliterary production,.9 for Lukacs, Weltanschauung is not a priori ahout 
artistic creation, but rather the mode of narrative produced hy the mediation hetween 
an author and his circumstance. 10 This is the reason why, as Tihanov acknowledges. 
'Lukacs's category of method seems more plausihle and seamlessly attachahle to his 
discussions of particular schools and movements' .11 That is to say, Lukacs' 
conception of method, pertaining to the category of Weltanschauung can be properly 
applied for the periodisation of aesthetic ideologies. 12 
From this perspective, Lukacs attempts to draw a distinction between the 
description of naturalism and the narration of realism. It is to be noted that Lukacs 
considers naturalism as "modern realism", the mode of realism without mediation 
between subject and object. Lukacs' scathing criticism of the descriptive method in 
modern realism explicitly challenges the view that such a technique adequately 
mirrors the inhumanity of capitalism. Lukacs does not admit the position that defends 
a descriptive method as more realistic, but rather reproaches the writers who employ 
description to dilute the essential capitalist reality. Along with this criticism, Lukacs 
deplores "modern realism" for making the novel lose 'its capacity to depict the 
dynamics of life, and thus its representation of capitalist reality is inadequate, diluted 
9 Ibid., p. 108. In this way, Lukacs' realism has to be subsumed into his later study of Marxist ontology. 
Explaining the task of Marxist ontology, Lukacs argues that' its object was the reality existing. And its 
task is to investigate the existing and trace it back to its being, and thus to discover the various 
gradations and connections contained within it'. See Georg Lukacs, Conversations with Lukacs, trans. 
by David Fembach (London: The Merlin Press, 1974), p. 17. 
10 This idea is even found in Lukacs' non-Marxist criticism of Kantian aesthetics, when Simmel and 
Weber fully influenced him. At that time, Lukacs already criticised the Kantian presupposition of 
transcendental aesthetic judgement. Lukacs says that 'my view was that aesthetic judgements did not 
possess such priority, but that priority belonged with being'. See Lukacs. Record o/a Lije, pp. 37-38. 
In a sense, this is a fundamental idea constituting Lukacs' formulation of aesthetics necessarily 
followed by realism. Lukacs still retains such an idea within his formulation of realism, arguing that 
'reality ... has an intrinsic order of priority'. See Lukacs, Conversations with Lukacs, p. 17. 
II Tihanov, The Master and the Slave, p. \07. 
12 This is the very point that Brecht attacks Lukacsean realism. I will return to this subject in Chapter 3. 
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and constrained,.13 For Lukacs, "modern realism" designates naturalism and, in 
Jameson's terms, the coded language of socialist realism. In addition, Lukacs himself 
explicitly defined Stalin's socialist realism as socialist naturalism. l-t Lukacs also 
criticised the way in which Stalin's socialist realism simply combines political 
dogmatism withfactum brutum without mediation; it represents a contiguration of 
objectivity that is nothing less than inverse subjectivity: Stalinist dogmatism as 
naturalism. 
As Fredric Jameson observes, 'the concept of mediation has traditionally been 
the way in which dialectical philosophy and Marxism itself have formulated their 
vocation to break out of the specialized compartments of the (bourgeois) disciplines 
and to make connections among the seemingly disparate phenomena of social life 
generally'. IS The category of mediation is the way in which we actually grasp the 
heterogeneous relationships between the individual phenomena, which appear to be 
part of abstract homogeneity. Accordingly, mediation does not so much presuppose 
the conceptual antagonistic dichotomy, identity versus identity, but rather the pre-
reified concrete relationship of particularity as such. In short, identity is not fully 
constituted in mediation. Hegel utterly argues that mediation is 'a conscious Being 
[the mediator], for it is an action which mediates consciousness as such: the content of 
this action is the extinction of its particular individuality which consciousness is 
undertaking' . 16 
A significant philosophical factor in the Hegelian formulation lies in the 
conceptualisation of the mediator as an "action" resisting "consciousness" in which 
13 Georg Lukacs, 'Narrate or Describe?' in Writer and Critic, trans. by Arthur Kahn (London: Merlin 
Press, 1978), p. 147. 
14 See 'Die Gegenwartsbedeutung des kritischen Realismus', in Essavs fiher Rt'alisnlus (Neuwied: 
Luchterhand, 1971), p. 590. . 
15 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Social(v ,~vmh(}lic Act (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981), p. 40. 
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all difference is sublimated. Needless to say, Hegel believes in the tinal triumph of 
consciousness over the action. Even though Marx arguably draws on enlightenment 
strategies such as "de-mystification", more significantly, he seems to indirectly 
highlight the concept of mediation as an action in his discussion of Hegel. 
Obviously focusing on this principle in his explanation of Lukacs' theoretical 
originality, Jameson argues that 'the privileged relationship to reality, the privileged 
mode of knowledge of the world will no longer be a static, contemplative one, will no 
longer be one of pure reason or abstract thought. but will be the union of thought and 
action that the Marxists call praxis, will be one of activity conscious of itself .17 
Putting an emphasis on mediation, Lukacs distinguished his realism from 
"mirroring realism". Lukacs plainly argues that writers should take the opportunity to 
reach a higher aesthetic level by means of realism rather than symbolism. In Lukacs' 
view, therefore, symbolism is a mirror in which writers' subjectivity, not external 
objectivity, reflects itself. Lukacs designates this non-aesthetic aspect as 
"mannerism", in the sense that this reflection comes to produce repetitively a mirror 
image as it works. It is in this way that the problem of Lukacs' realism does not arise 
out of his reflection theory, but rather its pedagogical purpose out of providing a 
user's guide to revolutionary literature. 
In spite of the practical aspect of Lukacs' realism, the theory of reflection is 
still the most suspicious element in Lukacs' defence of realism. In particular, Adorno 
insists that Lukacs simply considers the formal and stylistic aspects of an artwork to 
be reactionary decadence. 18 Adorno's argument is that form is 'self-antagonistic and 
16 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o/Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), p. 136. 
17 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 188. 
18 See Theodor W. Adorno, 'Reconciliation under Duress', in Aesthetics and Politics, trans. by Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Verso, 1980), p. 153. For more details on Adorno's defence ofform against 
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refracted, through which each and every successful work separates itself from the 
merely existing'. 19 In short, Adorno's defence of form presupposes the autonomy 0 f 
the artwork distinguished from reality - the artwork obtains its autonomous totality by 
rejecting realism. Adorno's anti-realist aesthetics has influenced both the defenders of 
Lukacs as well as his opponents. 
Despite their sympathetic reception of Lukacs, for instance, Jameson and 
Michael Lowy are not interested in his formulation of reflection theory. Their focuses 
are on the early Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness where he explicitly 
formulates his theory against the Kantian concept of reflection. What offers a 
philosophical ground for the Lukacsean formulation of realism is that form is a 
specific spatiality in which the temporality of reality has been fixed. For Lukacs, 
therefore, form is a spatialisation of time in which the logic of content is structured by 
mediation between author and reality. In Lukacs' terms, that is to say, "content" does 
not so much designate a monadic unity of reality as rather heterogeneous reality itself 
- one form does not have one content but many contents. This Lukacsean concept of 
content is incisively drawn from the way in which Lukacs understands reality as the 
total sum of events. 
The issue that Lukacs seriously raises in this formulation of realism arises 
from his disenchantment with Kantian transcendental aesthetics, in which Kant 
presupposes space and time as a priori epistemological conditions. For Kant, space 
and time do not belong to experience but rather to the a priori condition of 
experience, in the sense that every experience is constituted within a specific 
combination of spatiality and temporality. In this respect, Kant regards time and space 
as 'two sources of knowledge, from which bodies of a priori synthetic knowledge can 
Lukacs' stress on content, see Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 142. 
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be derived' .20 In other words, time and space as the pure form of all intuition make a 
priori synthetic knowledge possible. However, Lukacs refutes this Kantian 
proposition of time and space as a priori conditions of knowledge. Lukacs presumes 
that time is not a homogenous medium, in the sense that the world is not constituted 
by a conglomerate of individual things but by a complex of events. 21 Largely 
endorsing the Hegelian dialectic, Lukacs understands reality as combinations of 
essence and appearance - crucially for Lukacs these categories of essence and 
appearance are not merely by-products of consciousness but the effects of the outer 
world. No doubt, this is where Lukacs reverses the Kantian idea of representation. 
Explicitly distinguishing reality from fact, Lukacs defines reality as the 
changeability everlasting of essence and appearance. From this perspective, the 
Lukacsean category of totality comes to exist in its own right - ' the category of 
totality ... determines not only the object of knowledge but also the subject'.22 In 
other words, the subject of totality means the classes in capitalist society. Therefore, 
Lukacs definitely designates the collective subjectivity of classes when he mentions 
the dialectical relationship between subject and object. 
More controversially, what Lukacs apparently rejected in History and Class 
Consciousness was the very Kantian concept of reflection; Lukacs' real ism seems to 
betray his early theoretical principle of non-reflection theory. Lukacs criticised the 
Kantian concept of reflection, because in this formulation 'we find the theoretical 
embodiment of the duality of thought and existence, consciousness and reality,.23 
According to Lukacs, Kant strove to solve this duality by logic; yet, 'his theory of the 
19 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 142. 
20 Immanuel Kant, Critique o{Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan. 
1929), p. 80. 
21 See Martin Jay, Downcast eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Centlll}' French Thought 
(Berkeley: University of California Press. 1993). p. 196. 
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synthetic function of consciousness in the creation of the domain of theory could not 
arrive at any philosophical solution to the question' ,24 in the sense that Kant searched 
for the answer only in the realm of metaphysics. That is to say, there is the 
fundamental duality inherent in the Kantian formulation that presumes the dichotomy 
of phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. Lukacs was well acquainted with this 
philosophical dilemma as follows: 
It must be clearly understood that every contemplative stance and thus every 
kind of 'pure thought' that must undertake the task of knowing an object outside 
itself raises the problem of subjectivity and objectivity. The object of thought (as 
something outside) becomes something alien to the subject. This raises the 
problem of whether thought corresponds to the object!2' 
Even with a cursory reading, it is clear that Lukacs decisively presents the 
meaning of reflection in this quotation as correspondence, not using the term as in his 
later conceptualisation of reflection. As Bela Kiralyfalvi argues, • in Lukacs' system 
the term "reflection" is a constant reminder of the objectivity of art, but it definitely 
does not have a passive, mechanical meaning, with implications of copying, 
photography, or any kind of naturalistic technique'. 26 Seemingly, Lukacs preserves 
his criticism of the Kantian concept of reflection even when he attacks naturalism as 
"mirror realism", adapting Lenin's reflection theory. Therefore, it must be stressed 
that Lukacs depends on a different terminology in his defence of realism from his 
early theoretical articulation. Lukacs regards Kant's philosophical impasse as an 
inevitable consequence of the "theory" itself - while he defends the positive feature of 
22 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Stlldies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by Rodney 
Livingstone (Cambridge. MA: The MIT Press. 1999). p. 28. 
23 Ibid .. p. 200. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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Kant's epistemology. In other words, Lukacs does want to retain the optimistic factor 
of Kant's philosophical question as to the relationship of subject and object, while 
minimising a metaphysical aspect innate in Kant's theory. The solution that Lukacs 
alternatively prepares for Kant's theoretical dead-end is to introduce the concept of 
totality. Even though many theoretical opponents harshly attack Lukacs' concept of 
totality, few properly present an alternative for the concept, much less an acceptahle 
criticism of it.27 
Despite the constructive aspect of Lukacs' aesthetics, it is interesting that most 
of his defenders even go so far as to regard Lukacs' realism as another version ofa 
vulgar reflection theory. The conspiracy of silence around Lukacs' reflection theory, I 
suggest, arises from Lukacs' political career and his compromise with "official 
Marxism". No doubt, this individual history leads to the prejudice that Lukacs' 
defence of realism is nothing less than a by-product of his politics. Even for Jameson, 
who has consistently endorsed Lukacs, it is the uncomfortable truth that Lukacs used 
a na'ive reflection theory to privilege the position of realism over other 
representational modes. In a rather coy reference to reflection theory, Jameson 
situates this disturbing aspect of Lukacs' realism within the historical condition in 
which Lukacs' theory was constructed. After describing the dichotomy of base and 
superstructure which is commonly attacked as a vulgar Marxist theory by non-
Marxists, Jameson defends this classical Marxist schema in the sense that it can be 
prolonged into allegorical interpretation.28 In his following discussion, Jameson states 
26 Bela Kinllyfalvi, The Aesthetics ofGyorgy Lukacs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 
56. 
27 Adapting Benjamin's terminology, for instance, Adorno attempts to substitute the concept of totality 
for that of constellations. A more detailed discussion about the comparison between totality and 
constellation can be found in Chapter 2. 
28 See Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Social/v Svmholic Act (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 32-33. . . 
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that· Lukacs' essay on realism may serve as a central example of the way in which the 
cultural text is taken as an essentially allegorical model of society as a whole'. 29 
For Jameson, allegory is a rhetorical strategy produced under conditions where 
one cannot represent something, but, at the same time, one cannot not represent 
something.3D To put it another way, the represented narrative is essentially allegorical 
in the sense that form is always less perfect than material reality itself. Jameson's 
understanding of Lukacs comes through an allegorical approach to realism. Jameson 
suggests the way in which "typification", Lukacs' key concept in his 
conceptualisation of realism, can be grasped as an allegorical method that allows us to 
read the mode of production in terms of an ultimately determining reality. In short, 
Jameson depends on allegorical interpretation in order to recuperate Lukacs' realism. 
He then reaches a resolution of criticisms of Lukacs' reflection theory by historicising 
Lukacs' work. A direct consequence of this historicisation is the theoretical eclipse of 
the most political dimension of Lukacs' realism. 
The hidden impetus behind Lukacs' formulation of realism was his own 
intellectual demand to overcome the subjectivist tendency in History and Class 
Consciousness. The following quotation from 'Preface to the New Edition' elucidates 
this transition undertaken by Lukacs. 
My intention, then, was to chart the correct and authentic class consciousness of 
the proletariat, distinguishing it from 'public opinion surveys' (a term not yet in 
currency) and to confer upon it an indisputably practical objectivity. I was 
unable, however, to progress beyond the notion of an . imputed' [sugerechnet 1 
class consciousness ... Hence, what I had intended subjectively, and what Lenin 
had arrived at as the result of an authentic Marxist analysis of a practical 
movement, was transformed in my account into a purely intellectual result and 
thus into something contemplative. In my presentation it would indeed be a 
miracle if this 'imputed' consciousness could turn into revolutionary praxis.31 
29 Ibid., p. 33. 
30 For Jameson's own explanation of allegory, see Fredric Jameson, 'Marxism and the Historicity of 
Theory: An Interview with Fredric Jameson'. New Li/erarv His/orv. 29 (1998).353-83 (p. 376). 
31 Lukacs, His/ory and Class Consciousness, pp. xviii -xi~. . 
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When considering that Lukacs wrote this 'Preface' in 1967, we realise that this 
statement aims to valorise Lenin's achievement. Lukacs drew on Lenin as a symbolic 
authority in order to attack Stalinism's legitimacy. When interpreting Lukacs' words. 
we become aware that his emphasis was not on Lenin as such but rather on a 
"practical" objectivity analysed by Lenin. In this sense, what Lukacs initially intended 
in his transformation from 'pure class consciousness' to a reflection theory was rooted 
in his political and philosophical resolution that appears to be in opposition to his 
early theoretical trajectory. It is not difficult to see that Lukacs' way of accepting 
Lenin's reflection theory is entirely different from the official Marxist model. Michael 
Lowy argues that Lukacs' book on Lenin is 'in complete conformity with Leninist 
orthodoxy but, curiously enough, immediately enters into conflict with the official 
interpretation of Leninism in the Soviet Union, which is that of Stalin' .32 In this 
respect, the original idea of Lukacsean realism has no relation to Stalinist dialectical 
materialism. Unlike Stalin's socialist realism, Lukacs' model does not presuppose the 
transparency of reflection between consciousness and the natural law - "thinking" is 
not merely a by-product of the mechanical causality outside of human consciousness. 
According to Stalinist dialectical materialism, "thinking" is nothing less than a 
cognitive function whereby human consciousness simply obtains knowledge of the 
naturallaw.33 Describing the transitional moment in Lukacs, Alex Callinicos states: 
32 Eva L. Corredor, Lukacs afier Communism: Interviews with Contemporary Intellectuals (Durham. 
NC: Duke University Press. 1997), p. 18. Around this moment, Lukacs' views of Stalinism and USSR 
became more radical. For a detailed discussion, see U>wy. 'Lukacs and Stalinism', in Nev.' Leli Review. 
91 (1975),25-45. 
33 See Oskar Negt, 'Marxismus als Legitimationswissenschaft: Zur Genese der stalinstischen 
Philosophie" in Nikolai BuchariniAbram Dehorin: Kontroversen iiher dialekfischen lind 
mechanistischen Materialismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1974). 
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It must be stressed, however, that History and Class COl1sciou.me.u is a 
transitional work. The last two essays, 'Critical Observations on Rosa 
Luxemburg's Critique of the Russian Revolution', and 'Towards a Methodology 
of the Problem of Organization', form a unity with Lukacs's little book, Lenin 
(1924). Together these texts represent a marked shift away from the messianism 
of his early Marxism, and an acceptance of Lenin's 'revolutionary Realpolitik,.34 
It seems to me that this gives us a clue as to the reason why Lukacs 
vehemently formulated a reflection theory, which seemed to be sharply contrasted to 
subjectivism. My contention is that after History and Class Consdollsnes.\·, when he 
began strategically following Lenin, Lukacs' aesthetic of realism is fundamentally 
opposed to the pseudo-socialist realism presented by Stalin. In this respect, Lukacs' 
realism can be seen as a form of anti-Stalinist code disguising its political meaning 
under the veil of aesthetics. From mid-1930s onwards, Lukacs launched critical sallies 
against the naturalism of writers such as Zola and Flaubert. Interestingly, Jameson 
indicates that 'in Lukacs' work, "naturalism" is a code word for "socialist realism"'.-') 
For Jameson, Lukacs' criticism of Zola is a strategy to disguise his attack on 'what is 
publicly impossible to attack as such,.36In this way, Jameson says that 'Zola was not 
only a writer with certain political positions who might demand to be judged on their 
basis, or evaluated on their basis, but he was also the inventor of a mode of writing, 
naturalism, which was current in Lukacs's day and which Lukacs indeed identified 
with socialist realism,.37 In Gelebtes Denken, Lukacs himself briefly mentions his 
Leninist differentiation as 'opposed to Stalin's mechanical uniformity':"! This 
fragment clearly reveals the complicated political and aesthetic meaning of Lukacsean 
realism. 
J4 Alex Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 78. 
)5 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 37. 
36 Corredor, Lukacs after Communism, p. 78. 
)7 Ibid. 
38 Lukacs, Record of a Life, p. ) 65. 
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Meanwhile, there is a broad consensus amongst Western intellectuals that 
Lukacs' realism is nothing less than an aesthetic collaboration with Stalinism. For 
example, David Pike attempts to stress the Stalinist aspect of Lukacs' realism, arguing 
that in the period of Soviet exile, 1933-1939, Lukacs wittingly supported Stalin's 
doctrine with his aesthetic writings. Pike claims that "Stalin's remarks at the 
seventeenth congress were significant for Lukacs because he claimed the struggle for 
objectivity in art, which for him was pre-eminently a question of form, to be part of 
the battle "'against capitalist residues in the consciousness of the people,,· .. ~l) From this 
standpoint, Pike regards 'Art and Objective Truth' as evidence that Lukacs coupled 
his aesthetic idea to Stalinism. 
However, the way in which Pike criticises Lukacs' realism is quite 
problematic. His assertion that Lukacs' realism is a by-product of Stalinism does not 
seriously consider the question as to how a political doctrine imposes on literary 
criticism. The problem lies in the way in which Pike reductively contlates Lukacs' 
political agenda with his aesthetic idea. Lukacs' formulation of realism is more 
complicated than what Pike describes. As Tom Rockmore acknowledges. "Lukacs' 
early interest in German neo-Kantianism influenced his entire later development. 
specifically including his aesthetic views' ,40 Tihanov also claims that Lukacs' 
doctrine of realism 'was shaped in the process of responding not only to Hegel's 
concept of totality but also to the attempts of Lehensphi/osophie to reconcile fonn and 
life' ,41 In this sense, a judgement that the principle of Lukacsean realism is nothing 
less than an aesthetic variant of Stalinism cannot be easily delivered. 
39 David Pike, Lukacs and Brecht (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1985), p. 144. 
40 Tom Rockmore, 'Lukacs, Marxist Aesthetics, and Truth', in Jahrhuch der inlcrnUlionalen Georg-
Lukdcs-Gesellschaft. 2001, (Bielefeld: Aisthesis. 200 I). 
41 Tihanov, The Master and the Slave, p. \03. 
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More problematically, Pike overlooks the fact that Lukacs completed the book 
on Lenin, which shows the essential idea of his realism, in 1924. In this book, Lukacs 
argues that Lenin's assessment of reality is 'far more a purely theoretical sup£'J'iority 
in accessing the total process' .42 No doubt, Lukacs' understanding of Lenin's theory 
anticipates his later principle of realism: the realistic form of an artwork is superior to 
other aesthetic forms in its ability to access the total process of reality. Even though 
one can see a similarity between Lukacsean realism and Stalinism, it is difticult to 
consider it as an essential and fundamental reconciliation. 
Rather than Pike's criticism, Rockmore's analysis of the affinity between 
Lukacs' realism and so-called "official Marxism" might be better taken for granted. 
Rockmore points out an interesting aspect of Lukacs' formulation of realism: 'the 
reflection theory of knowledge has no demonstrable source in Marx, the source of 
Lukacs's earlier critique of this view. Hence, in returning to the reflection theory 
which he had earlier criticised, Lukacs now agrees with Marxism, even if necessary 
against Marx' .43 This logical syllogism discloses that Lukacs' realism is no more than 
symptomatic evidence of his alteration of Marx; Lukacs' formulation of Marxism is 
created by his theoretical reinvention emphasising the Hegelian aspect of Marx. As 
Tihanov indicates, 'while an uncontested political affiliation was driving him towards 
a full embrace of Marx, a lasting sense of measure, historical continuity, and the 
unrestricted sway of reason was propelling him towards an appreciation of Hegel as 
the philosopher par excellence, whose thought, regardless of all delusions and 
limitations, posits the true scale and depth of Marxism' .44 
42 Georg Lukacs, Lenin: A Study on the Unit)' ()lhis Thought, trans. by Nicholas Jacobs (London: NLB. 
1970), p.42. 
43 Rockmore, 'Lukacs, Marxist Aesthetics, and Truth', p. 147-8. 
44 Tihanov, The Master and the Slave, p. 248. 
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However, there is another issue raised by Lukacs' moditication of Hegcl. 
Analysing Hegel's conceptualisation of the dialectic of labour in The Young lIegel. 
Lukacs argues that 
Man becomes human only through work, only through the activity in which the 
independent laws governing objects become manifest, forcing men to 
acknowledge them i.e. to extend the organs of their own knowledge, if they 
would ward off destruction.45 
According to Tihanov, this book, The Young Hegel, is Lukacs' doctoral 
dissertation submitted to the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences during Lukacs' second stay (1933-45) in MoSCOW.46 What is at stake hcre is 
that Lukacs' analysis of Hegel can be easily compatible with the Stalinist doctrine of 
dialectical materialism. For Stalinism, the process oflabour is an objectitied system 
legitimated by natural law. This seems to be easily followed by the notorious 
confusion between economic mechanism and natural law. Lukacs' discussion of 
Hegel seems to be insensitive to such a dangerous possibility. Not surprisingly, this is 
where Lowy raises an issue on Lukacs' political harmonisation with Stalin to solve 
the dilemma of 'either "reconciling with reality" by accepting the Stalinist Soviet 
Union or breaking with the communist movement' .47 
For Lukacs, there would be no choice except actually existing socialism, in the 
sense that his philosophical premise was grounded on a fundamental antagonism 
towards capitalism. This principle of his way of understanding the world system has 
frequently been considered the result of Lukacs' dogmatic "evolutionism". When he 
drew on Lenin's reflection theory, Lukacs presupposed that the evolution of the 
45 Georg Lukacs, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. 
bl Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1975), p. 327. 
4 Tihanov, The Master and the Slave, p. 246. 
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artwork necessarily reflects the material conditions of society. Lukacs' theory of 
reflection according to the traditional dualism of base and superstructure remaint:d 
established until the early 1930s. Criticising the Lukacsean exploration of a modernist 
work of art, for example, Perry Anderson says that 'the basic error of Lukacs's optic 
here was its evolutionism' .48 According to Anderson, evolutionism means that 'tim~ 
... differs from one epoch to another, but within each epoch all sectors of social 
reality move in synchrony with each other, such that decline at one level must be 
reflected in descent at every other' .49 In the same way, Anderson uses evolutionism in 
his rumination on Lukacs' criticism of modernism. It goes without saying that 
Lukacs' understanding of "healthy art and sick art" can be criticised as the result of 
his evolutionism. This is the main point of Anderson's argument in that Lukacs' 
attack on modernism is anachronistic. Anderson convincingly points out the problem 
of Lukacsean reflection theory, yet, at the same time, he fails to observe that Lukacs' 
sense of evolution metaphorically alludes to the utopian unity of subject and ohject in 
artistic reflections. To quote Lukacs: 
When we consider mankind's evolution through the ages, art is seen to be one of 
the most important vehicles for the production and reproduction and for the 
development and continuity of man's consciousness and sense of identity. 
Because great and healthy art fixes those moments of our development -
otherwise transitory - that point ahead and enhance man's self-consciousness 
and are thus lasting and because perfected forms allow the re-experiencing of 
these moments, great and healthy works of art remain an ever-renewing treasure 
for mankind.5o 
47 Corredor, Lukacs after Communism, p. 19. 
48Perry Anderson, 'Marshall Berman: Modernity and Revolution', in A Zone (?f Engagement (London: 
Verso, 1992), p. 33. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Georg Lukacs, 'Healthy or Sick Art?', in Writer and Critic, trans. by Arthur Kahn (London: Merlin 
Press, 1978), p. 109. 
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What Lukacs argues here implies that "perfected forms" are indicative of the 
utopian reconciliation between subject and object in narrative. That is to say, form 
must be grasped as the incarnation of an author's utopian impulses towards totality. 
Contrary to Anderson's argument, Callinicos maintains that the most important 
influence on Lukacs, including other Hegelian Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci and 
Karl Korsch, was 'the anti-naturalist revolt at the turn of the nineteenth century'.:i I In 
short, a significant philosophical factor in Lukacs was not evolutionist materialism in 
the sense of naturalism, but anti-empiricist materialism in the sense of Marxism. What 
Lukacs essentially aimed to do throughout his works was nothing less than 'the 
reinterpretation of historical materialism'. 52 In a sense, the suspicious aspects of 
evolutionism are inevitably internalised in Lukacs' formulation, insofar as he 
endorses the orthodox dualism of base and superstructure. However, Lukacs' case 
was not similar to Christopher Caudwell's vulgar dualism, precisely because from the 
outset Lukacs' involvement with Marxism was based on an anti-empiricist 
materialism. 
Lukacs does not endorse the "empiricist ideology" but "experience" as such. 53 
Certainly, the way in which Lukacs privileges experience is drawn from Hegel's 
distinction between empiricism and experience. Regarding experience as "raw 
sensory material" distinguished from abstract philosophical thinking, Hegel believes 
that he can refute empiricism. In fact, Hegel's differentiating of experience and the 
abstract is derived from Kant and Hume, who emphasise the indeterminacy of 
51 Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, p. 71. 
52 Ibid., p. 72. 
53 See Georg Lukacs, Conversations with Lukacs, ed. by Theo Pinkus (London: The Merlin Press, 
1974), pp. 13-14. Lukacs claims: 'someone is crossing the road. He might be the most obstinate neo-
positivist in his epistemology, denying all reality, but he will nevertheless be convinced at the 
pedestrian crossing that, if he does not remain where he is, he will really be run over by a real car, 
rather than some kind of mathematical formulation of his existence being run over by the mathematical 
function of the car, or his idea by the idea of the car'. 
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relationship between experience and thought. 54 This discrimination is implicit in the 
way in which Lukacs defends realism in the sense that an author's own experience is 
more important than his abstract idea. It is in this sense that Lukacs considers realism 
as more aesthetic than naturalism and modernism. That is to say, what Lukacs pursues 
through his arguments about realism is this sensuous material that is independent of 
abstract thinking in the Hegelian sense. 
Lukacs inevitably drew on the orthodox concept of base and superstructure, as 
he did not yet have the appropriate narrative to manifest his idea of realism at that 
moment. In addition, the theoretical transition of Lukacs' realism was definitely 
witnessed after the mid-1930s. In the face of Stalinism, Lukacs launched a disguised 
criticism of official Marxism through the epistemological category of realism. 55 It is 
in this sense that Lukacs' realism must be considered as the aesthetic surface of a 
political contention aimed at correcting the Stalinist voluntarism. This is why Lukacs 
precisely stressed objectivity in opposition to subjectivism.5b 
In general, Lukacs stresses the philosophical doctrine of realism: first, 
materiality outside our knowledge determines language. Second, the process of 
thought reflects the world as reality. Third, appearance hides a more fundamental 
reality which exists independently of thought. This is the essential philosophical 
guideline that Lukacs observes in his argument for realism. Therefore, Lukacs 
emphasises narration rather than description in the sense that real entities are 
concealed by their visual appearance. In other words, Lukacs' realism is an attempt to 
54 See Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 96. 
55 See Georg Lukacs, 'Art and Objective Truth', in Writer and Critic, trans. by Arthur Kahn (London: 
Merlin Press, 1978). 
56 For more detailed discussion, see Laszlo Illes, 'Georg Lukacs' BemUhungcn um Realismusthcorie', 
in Literaturtheorie und Literaturkritikin derfi-iihsowjetischen Diskussion (Berlin: Weimar, 1999). p. 
567. What Illes enumerates in this essay is that Lukacs' realism must be understood in the historical 
context of Russian socialism. According to this argument, Lukacs' realism can be regarded as a coded 
attack on Stalinist subjectivism. 
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make a hidden reality visible. For Lukacs, visualisation serves to suppress reality by 
means of an illusionary inversion in which subjectivity takes the place of objectivity. 
In Lukacs' sense, realism does not mean an imaginary correspondence. as in 
naturalism and symbolism. but a "self-containment" that intensively reflects everyday 
life in "proper proportion". Self-containment is the way in which the form of the 
artwork reflects social reality, as in the case of synecdoche. Lukacs states that 'the 
totality of the work of art is rather intensive' . 57 In other words, the form of the 
artwork is 'the circumscribed and self-contained ordering of those factors which 
objectively are of decisive significance for the portion of life depicted, which 
determine its existence and motion, its specific quality and its place in the total life 
process,.58 Lukacs' definition of form as self-containment incisively reserves the 
possibility of the changeability of form in each historical moment - in Lukacs' terms. 
'history is the history of the unceasing overthrow of the objective forms that shape the 
life of man' .59 From this perspective, a specific artistic form is manifested by the each 
particular historical epoch. Therefore, what Lukacs called "perfected forms" 
designates a self-contained form in which the intensive totality of artwork cognitively 
maps the social reality in proper proportion. 
As we have seen, Lukacs' realism was a detour to get the insight of an 
alternative socialist system in terms of aesthetic epistemology. For Lukacs, aesthetics 
was always the reverse side of politics, so that his criticism of naturalism and 
modernism largely aimed to suggest the practical aesthetic criterion for socialist 
movements. In a sense, Lukacs' realism can be said to be a "symbolic act" to solve 
contradictions in actually existing socialism. That is to say. Lukacs' realism contains 
more politically significant implications than his opponents expect. Regarding his 
57 Lukacs, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 38. 
58 Ibid. 
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unflinching fidelity to the teleological aim of socialism, it can be argued that Lukacs' 
theoretical pursuit towards realism in the 1930s came through the failure of his 
political career. 
In 1928, Lukacs drew up the 'Blum Theses' for the Second Congress of the 
Hungarian Communist Party. As Michael Lowy points out, all that lies behind these 
draft Theses was 'an application to Hungary of the right turn of the Comintern',60 and, 
at the same time, . both a continuation of the line of the years 1924-7 and an augury 
of the Popular Front strategy of 1934-8,.61 According to Lowy, Lukacs' suggestions 
were too late and too early in the sense that 'these Theses were to be the last echo of 
the right turn, coming as they did at the very beginning of the International's new 
'left' turn' .62 This misfortune led Lukacs to confront hostile criticisms and 
consequently to write his "hypocritical" self-criticism. Lukacs acknowledged this in 
the 'New Preface' as follows: 
When I heard from a reliable source that Bela Kun was planning to expel me 
from the Party as a 'Liquidator', I gave up the struggle, as I was well aware of 
Kun's prestige in the International, and I published a ·Self-criticism'.1 was 
indeed firmly convinced that I was in the right but I knew also - e.g. from the 
fate that had befallen Karl Korsch - that to be expelled from the Party meant that 
it would no longer be possible to participate actively in the struggle against 
Fascism. I wrote my self-criticism as an 'entry ticket' to such activity as I neither 
could nor wished to continue to work in the Hungarian movement in the 
. 63 
C Irc umstances. 
Regardless of some polemical problems arising from these remarks, Lukacs' 
unconditional capitulation to his inner opponents was the consequence of his own 
circumstances. As Lowy explains, Lukacs saw the situation as an 'isolated 
59 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 186. 
60 L1>wy, 'Lukacs and Stalinism', p. 29. 
61 Ibid., p. 30. 
62 Ibid., p. 29. 
63 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xxx. 
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phenomenon' and 'temporary aberration,.M As a result, we could consider Lukacs' 
Theses to be an incorrect anticipation, in the sense that the new turn, which would 
provide an opportunity for the Theses, would only come when 'it was too late, after 
Hitler's victory and the establishment of fascism in the heart of Europe'.h5 This 
analysis would be incomplete without mentioning another important element 
manifested in the 'Blum Theses'. We need to realise that these Theses provide notahle 
evidence for understanding Lukacs' theoretical turn from early pure class-
consciousness theory into reflection theory. Lowy's analysis is validated by linking 
Lukacs' political non-fulfilment to his reflection theory. As Lowy points out, 'the 
ebbing of the revolutionary tide, and the internal changes in the USSR after 1924' 
forced Lukacs to feel disillusionment.66 
Disoriented by the disappearance of the revolutionary upsurge, Lukal:s clung on 
to the only two pieces of 'solid' evidence which seemed to him to remain: the 
USSR and traditional culture. Seeing that the new, transcendent synthesis had 
failed, he would at least attempt a mediation, a compromise and an alliance 
between these two different worlds.67 
For Lukacs, this "reconciliation" of bourgeois-democratic culture and the 
socialist movement may appear to be more realistic than the utopian messianism that 
his early hopes presupposed. Lukacs confessed that Lenin's intellectual personality, a 
'philosopher of praxis, a man who passionately transforms theory into practice, a man 
whose sharp attention is always focused on the nodal points where theory becomes 
practice, practice becomes theory', forced him to revise the messianic features of 
64 LOwy, 'Lukacs and Stalinism', p. 31. 
65 Ibid., p. 32. 
66 Ibid., p. 39. 
67 Ibid. 
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History and Class Consciousness.68 According to Lukacs, this was the process in 
which he came closer to reality. From utopian messianism to "Realpolitik". Lukacs 
attempted to develop a reflection theory derived from Lenin, not in an abstract 
philosophical sense, but in a practical sense. 
After the mid-1930s, Lukacs intended to wrest realism from Stalinism. As 
10han Vogt indicates, Lukacs' harsh criticism of authors such as Hugo and Zola 
'struck also the panegyrical Soviet novels of the Stalin period'. 69 As has been 
discussed, in distinguishing Stalinism from Leninism, Lukacs emphasised that 
Lenin's policy was more "realistic" than Stalinism, in the sense that the Leninist 
method was nothing less than an attempt to present policy changes as 'logical 
consequences and improvements of the previous line,.70 For Lukacs, Lenin's method 
was more suitable than Stalinism, for reflecting the discontinuous reality of history. 
One of the reasons why Lukacs emphasised the rupture between Lenin and Stalin was 
that 'Stalinism presented all socialist history as a continuous and correct 
development'.71 Convincingly, this statement reveals a clue whereby we can approach 
Lukacs' reflection theory without any misleading prejudice. Once Lukacs embraced 
this "discontinuity" of history, he would have had to correct his utopian messianism 
which seemed to be the dominant feature of History and Class Consciousness. Lukacs 
confessed this transition to solve this problem of historical development as follows: 
In the twenties, Korsch, Gramsci and I tried in our different ways to come to 
grips with the problem of social necessity and the mechanistic interpretation of it 
that was the heritage of the Second International. We inherited this problem, but 
none of us - not even Gramsci, who was perhaps the best of us - solved it. We 
68 Lukacs. His/ory and Class Consciousness. p. xxxii. 
69 Johan Vogt. 'The Harmony of Passions and Reason', in Georg Lukacs Festschrift (Neuwied: 
Luchterhand, 1965), p. 34. 
70 Georg Lukacs, 'Lukacs on his Life and Work', New Left Review, 68 (1971),49-58 (p. 51). In this 
interview, Lukacs says that a complete rupture with Stalinism is necessary, in the sense that Stalinism 
abandoned Leninist method. 
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all went wrong, and today it would be quite mistaken to try and revive the works 
of those times as if they were valid now. In the West, there is a tendency to erect 
them into 'classics of heresy', but we have no need for that today.72 
In these remarks, Lukacs' intention appears to be quite obvious. What he 
wanted to historicise was his early epoch, in which he tried to establish the system of 
knowledge of necessity in historical process. This aim of his theoretical work led him 
to pronouncing 'pure class consciousness' based on utopian messianism. As Lukacs 
himself confessed, this was where the problematic aspect of his early subjectivism 
came to exist. Lukacs did not agree with Western Marxism's emphasis on his early 
work and the assessment that later Lukacs is a digression from early Lukacs. While 
this may have become the fate of Lukacs' reception in Western intellectual contexts, it 
has, to an extent, paradoxically betrayed him. 
2. Forgetting Lukacs 
Notwithstanding his criticism in Marxism and Form of the undialectical 
approach to Lukacs taken by Adorno, Susan Sontag and George Steiner, Jameson also 
seems to hesitate in acknowledging Lukacs' reflection theory as a kernel of his 
realism. 73 Jameson rather encourages the early Lukacs' view in which realism had not 
yet genuinely arisen in his theoretical horizon. A significant part in Lukacs' positive 
reception by Jameson lies in Lukacs' theory of totality and reification, both relatively 
independent of realism. This is where Jameson's ruling out of the possibility of any 
practical understanding of Lukacs' realism comes to be suspect in the sense that his 
revision of Lukacs' theory represses its actuality in the name of historic is at ion. 
Rejecting Lukacs' negative aspects such as reflection theory, what Jameson retains 
72 Ibid. 
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from Lukacs is Hegelian dialectics closely related to his theory of totality and 
reification. In this sense, Jameson also follows the general trajectory of Western 
Marxism in which the Hegelian dialectic comes to be a resolution to the nightmare of 
Stalinism. 
No doubt, Adorno's essay, 'Reconciliation under Duress', was one of the 
origins that motivated the hostile attacks on Lukacs in the Western intellectual 
context. Throughout this highly judgmental essay, Adorno consistently reveals his 
antipathy to and criticism of Lukacs. To quote Adorno: 
Like Brecht, he would like to widen the concept of socialist realism, which has 
been used for decades to stifle any spontaneous impulse, any product 
incomprehensible or suspect to the apparatchiks, so as to make room for works 
that rise above the level of despicable trash. He ventures a timid opposition in 
gestures which show him to be paralysed from the outset by the consciousness of 
his own impotence. His timidity is no mere tactic. Lukacs's personal integrity is 
above all suspicion. But the conceptual structure to which he has sacrificed his 
intellect is so restricted that it suffocates anything which might have breathed 
more freely; the sacrijizio dell'intelletto does not let the intellect otT scot-free. 
This casts a melancholy light on Lukacs's unconcealed nostalgia for his own 
I . . 74 ear y wntmgs. 
Adorno's way of understanding Lukacs, in which a split between early Lukacs 
and later Lukacs must be stressed, strongly affected the attitude of many Western 
Marxists' towards Lukacs.75 Not surprisingly, a marked discrepancy in Lukacs' whole 
theoretical career was easily ascribed to his conciliation under ofticial Marxism. 
Adorno's bitter counter-attack on Lukacs' critique of modernism and avant-garde as 
decadence, which may appear to Western Marxists as cogent, is worthy of note, yet. at 
the same time, his condemnation of Lukacs is quite paradoxical. For his statement is 
exactly the reverse of Eastern European criticism of Lukacs since the 1950s: Lukacs 
73 See Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 160. 
74 Adorno, 'Reconciliation under Duress', p. 152. 
75 There are a few exceptional cases such as Raymond Williams and Fredric Jameson. 
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was regarded as an opportunist and anti-Stalinist in East Germany. 76 This 
paradoxical situation is indicative of Lukacs' contradictory status and must be 
interpreted by more complex evaluation. It also highlights the fact that Lukacs' 
theoretical track is more complicated than his opponents suggest. It is diffit:ult to deny 
that Adorno's anti-communism reinforced the rejection of Lukacs' realism in his 
theoretical pursuit. In his critique of Lukacs, Adorno deliberately underestimates 
Lukacs' theoretical turn after the mid-1930s. Never considering the anti-Stalinist 
aspects of Lukacs' realism, Adorno simply highlights the conspiracy of Lukacs' 
compromise with Stalinism.77 However, Lukacs had already estranged himself from 
USSR when Adorno published the essay. According to Andrew Ruhin, 'Lukacs had 
expressed his growing disillusionment with the Soviet Union and supported the Nagy 
regime against the Soviet invasion of his native Hungary in 1956'. Ironically 
speaking, it is in this sense that· Adorno reconciled Lukacs' work to the pol itical 
d f · ·,78 uress 0 antI-communIsm. 
On the other hand, Adorno's attack on Lukacs can be regarded as a disguised 
political criticism of Stalinism - presumably Adorno used the symholic name of 
Lukacs to conceal his political attitude towards actually existing socialism in the guise 
of an aesthetic debate. Interestingly, Slavoj Zizek describes the way in which the 
Frankfurt School silently avoided a theoretical confrontation with Stalinism. To quote 
Zizek: 
'Stalinism' (really existing socialism) was thus, for the Frankfurt School, a 
traumatic topic with regard to which it had to remain silent - this silence was the 
76 After the "uprising" in Hungary in 1956, a fatal criticism of Lukacs began to liquidate Lukacs' 
legacy in East Germany. For a crucial document for this process, see Hans Koch .. Georg Luk,Jcs lind 
der Revisionismus (Berlin: Weimar, 1960). 
77 According to Rubin, Adorno's anti-communism is partly produced by the American anti-communist 
policy for the Cold War. See Andrew Rubin, 'The Adorno Files' in Adorno: A Critical Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
78 Ibid., p. 180. 
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only way for them to retain their inconsistent position of its underlying solidarity 
with the Western liberal democracy without losing the official mask of its 
'radical' leftist critique. Openly acknowledging this solidarity would have 
deprived the Frankfurt School theorists of their 'radical' aura, changing them 
into another version of the cold war anti-communist left liberals, while showing 
too much sympathy for 'really existing socialism' would have forced them to 
betray their unacknowledged basic commitment. 79 
According to Zizek, this situation was concomitant with 'the fateful shift from 
concrete socio-economic analysis to philosophical-anthropological generalisation, the 
shift by means of which the reifying 'instrumental reason' is no longer grounded in 
concrete capitalist social relations, but itself almost imperceptibly becomes their 
quasi-transcendental 'principle' or 'foundation'.so Alongside this, the way in which 
Adorno denigrates Lukacs arises from the theoretical articulation that Adorno 
attempted, that is to say, replacing orthodox Marxism's conceptualisation of the 
relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed with the concept of 
administrative society. To put it another way, Adorno's disparagement of Lukacs' 
formulation symptomatically results from his reformulation of the orthodox Marxist 
presumption - the ruling class is a crucial cause of oppression in class society - with 
the idea that the oppressed mass supports and preserves the ruling system as much as 
the ruling class does.8) No doubt, the emergence of Fascism and Stalinism, and 
subsequently the political frustration of European leftists influenced Adorno's 
theoretical trajectory. As Martin Jay points out, Adorno's critique of Lukacs was 
articulated from the failure of the revolutionary optimism symbolically presented hy 
Lukacs' formulation. 82 As a result, the way in which Adorno criticises Lukacs' 
79 Slavoj Zifek, 'Postface' in A Defence £?fHistory and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialec.:tic 
(London: Verso, 2000), p. 158. 
80 Ibid., p. 157. 
81 See Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming 
(London: Verso, 1997). For the historical contexts of this theoretical articulation, see Perry Anderson, 
Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976), pp. 33-34. 
82 See Martin Jay, 'The Concept of Totality in Lukacs and Adorno', Telos, 32 (1977), 117-137 (p. 128). 
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revolutionary pursuit as premature led Adorno to legitimise what Anderson descrihes 
as the formal shift of the theoretical site from party assemblies to academic 
departments. 83 In other words, Adorno's rejection of Lukacs means the theoretical 
repression of the practical dimension of Lukacs' realism. 
In this historical context, the renunciation of any direct engagement of 
socialist practice in Adorno's formulation is part ofa wider historical move in Marxist 
theory from economics and politics towards philosophy. Adorno himself clearly 
implies the political effect in the beginning of Negative Dialectics in which he 
consistently rejects Lukacs' theoretical presupposition which appeared in History and 
Class Consciousness: 'philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the 
moment to realize it was missed. The summary judgment that it had merely 
interpreted the world, that resignation in the face of reality had crippled it in itself: 
becomes a defeatism of reason after the attempt to change the world miscarried' . R4 
From this standpoint, Adorno's theoretical rejection of Lukacs' realism can be seen as 
a "symbolic act" in order to solve the political crisis particularly caused by Stalinism, 
as in the case of Lukacs' defence of realism against Stalin's socialist realism. 
However, Adorno could not take the path that Lukacs practically chose. insofar as he 
conceived actually existing socialism as a product of the premature revolutionary 
movement. 
It is interesting that there are some remarkable similarities between Adorno 
and Althusser in their rejection of Lukacs.85 Even though Althusser aimed at 
repudiating both Lukacs and the Frankfurt School at the same time, the enigmatic 
alliance appeared in their theoretical projects that attack the notion of "expressive 
totality". As in Adorno's criticism, Althusser also conceives the Lukacsean notion of 
83 Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1(76), p. 50. 
84 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 3. 
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totality as an "expressive totality" resting on the presumption that a subject invents 
the totality through self-objectification. X6 Only considering Lukacs' early 
conceptualisation of totality in History and Class Consciousness, it is not dinicult to 
acknowledge the validity of these criticisms in the sense that the Lukacsean notion 
designates a totality as the product of a creative act (as in the case of Sartre). K7 
However, Lukacs' concept of totality throughout his works cannot be fixed in single 
dimension. In other words, the later Lukacsean concept of totality is not so much what 
Althusser, as well as Adorno, identify in their critiques, but rather the disguised 
synonym of universal history, aimed at criticising the subjectivism of Stalinism. As 
Jay properly points out, 'if expressive totality was retained in Lukacs' thought at alL it 
was in the guise of a future possibility, as a normative idea, not a descriptive one'. KX 
In a normative sense, according to Jay, totality is 'a desirable goal towards which 
humanity should strive in an age of fragmentation' .89 Stated another way, it is the 
teleological aspect of optimism that Adorno and Althusser attempt to liquidate in 
Lukacs' formulation. It is clear that their critique of Lukacs derived from a different 
historical context than the one in which Lukacs had vigorously defended the 
optimistic vision of proletarian revolution. Therefore, both Adorno and Althusser 
symbolically used the name of Lukacs as the sign of premature Marxist theorising in 
order to resolve the political problem of actually existing socialism to which Lukacs 
also strove to find the answer. Let me discuss this more through an investigation of 
Althusserian Marxism. 
85 For these similarities, see Jay, 'The Concept of Totality in Lukacs and Adorno', p. 135-37. 
86 See ibid., p. 130. 
87 See ibid., p. 124. According to Jay, Lukacs is anticipating the distinction Sartre strives to make 
between a given totality and the process of tot ali sat ion. 
88 Ibid., p. 128. 
89 Ibid .. p. 131. 
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After the events of May 1968 in France, Lukacs came rapidly to be regarded as om: of 
the old-fashioned theorists whose theoretical paradigms largely rested on humanism 
and historicism. Nicos Poulantzas stated: 
In the theoretical conjuncture in which we were working it was structuralism 
against historicism, it was Levi-Strauss against Sartre. It has been extremely 
difficult for us to make a total rupture from these two problematics. We insisted 
that for Marxism the main danger was not structuralism but historicism itself. So 
we directed all our attention against historicism - the problematic of the subject; 
against the problematics of Sartre and Lukacs, and as a result we 'bent the stick'; 
and of course this had had effects in our theory itself.90 
It is not surprising that post-structuralism also retained this criticism of the 
problematic of the subject. In fact, this problematic of the subject is nothing less than 
that of the object: the interrelationship of subject and object. Following Marx, Lukacs 
considers the object as the condition of subjectivity, in the sense that the 
establishment of the subject-object identity is linked to the process of perceiving 
totality. Lukacs' realism, therefore, can be seen as an aesthetic approach to the 
subject-object identity from the perspective that the concrete always deconstructs the 
abstract in terms of epistemological claims towards totality. 
Paradoxically, Althusserian literary criticism, with its strong anti-humanistic 
tendencies, begins from the same epistemological insight which appeared in the later 
Lukacsean notion of totality. However, the path of the Altusserians is different from 
that of Lukacs. In 'On Literature as an Ideological Form', Etienne Balibar and Pierre 
Macherey argue that the Marxist category of reflection is a 'reflection without 
mirror' .91 According to them, reflection theory serves as a basic definition which 
90 Stuart Hall and Alan Hunt, 'Interview with Nicos Poulantzas', Marxism Today (1979), p. 198. 
Quoted in Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism: Problems of Modern European Thought 
(London: Hutchinson, 1986), p. 89. 
91 See Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, 'On Literature as an Ideological Form', in Untying the 
Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. by Robert Young (London: Routledge, 1981), pp. 79-99 (p. 83). 
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separates two aspects: literature as an ideological form and the specific process of 
literary production.92 Influenced by "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in 
which Althusser attempted to revise the humanistic Marxist notion of ideology, they 
launched an attack on the formalistic structuralism of Tel Quel and the normative 
realism of Lukacs. 
While maintaining that ideological forms are 'manifested through the 
workings and history of determinate practices in determinate social relations,'n - the 
Ideological State Apparatuses - they criticise literary realism in the sense that 
'literature is produced through the effect of one or more ideological contradictions' .94 
Balibar and Macherey suggest a third way in which the objectivity of literature comes 
to exist in its own right and avoiding the errors of Tel Quel and Lukacs. To their 
minds, ideological contradictions and linguistic contlicts in literary formations are 
already articulated in a schooling system thereby reinforcing the bourgeois state 
hierarchy. This is where their condemnation of Lukacs' realism arises in the sense that 
'realism is the key-word ofa school,;9) therefore, the category of realism already 
dominates all literary fields and influences definitions of literature. It is in this respect 
that the definition of literature generally seems to be identified with realism - all 
literature must be realistic. According to Balibar and Macherey, however, the 
category of reflection is not concerned with realism but with materialism.96 Drawing 
on Brecht and Gramsci rather than Lukacs, they argue that in the Marxist sense 
literature cannot be a category concerned with realism. For Marxism, literature is not 
so much fiction - fictive image of the real- but rather the production of fiction-
effects. In other words, there is no reality in literature but only a reality-effect. From 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 84. 
94 Ibid., p. 88. 
95 Ibid., p. 91. 
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the position of an Althusserian literary criticism, the text simultaneously produces a 
reality-effect and a fiction-effect. To sum up, fiction and realism, which are generally 
acknowledged as central concepts of literature, are nothing less than notions produced 
by literature itself. 
Strictly speaking, Balibar and Macherey draw on Althusser's theoretical 
modification of the conventional concept of reality in their criticisms ofliterary 
realism. The Althusserian reconsideration of reality is nothing less than an attempt to 
acquire "scientific" knowledge of reality reflected in "true" Marxist dialectics and 
without a Hegelian concept of mediation. For Althusser, dialectics provide the 
"scientific" way in which we can rule out the empirical fallacy and humanism. 
Following Althusser, the main logic underpinning Balibar and Macherey's arguments 
is that the objectivity of literature is produced from constitutions deriving from the 
way in which 'the effectivity of ideology of bourgeois education is realised,.'J7 Similar 
to a Lacanian reading of the symbolic relations rather than the imaginary relations, 
they argue that 'one must not look for unifying effects but for signs of the 
contradictions (historically determined) which produced them and which appear as 
unevenly resolved conflicts in the text' .98 
Furthermore, the antagonism towards humanism leads Balibar and Macherey 
to argue for "the death of the author". For them, the writer is neither a supreme 
creator, nor an expendable medium, but rather a 'material agent, an intermediary 
inserted in a particular place' in the submission of social contradictions. 99 Not 
surprisingly, the writer's conditions existing independently of his creation come 
through a 'particular social division of labour, characteristic of the ideological 
% See ibid. 
97 Ibid., p. 86. 
98 Ibid., p. 87. 
99 Ibid., p. 94. 
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superstructure of bourgeois society, which individuates him'. 100 In this sense, the 
"literary effect" rather than "literature" takes place within the reproduction of other 
ideological effects. in the sense that the effect results from the imaginary resolution of 
social contradictions. Having seen a literary text as the imaginary resolution of one 
contradiction within another, we do not need to focus on the role of an author in the 
literary production, since there is no place to permit the creative competence. 
From a materialistic perspective. Balibar and Macherey raise the problem of 
"literariness" in Lukacs' realism, but they underestimate the mediation between the 
author and literary institutions. On the other hand, Lukacs' arguments of realism can 
be regarded as an attempt to reveal a mediation of the bourgeois literary tradition and 
revolutionary socialist literature. Lukacs does not, in fact, presuppose a humanistic 
illusion of a Romantic image of an author in his discussion of "great realists". Lukacs 
reminds us that the role of an author is one of historical mediations whereby literary 
texts dialectically reflect historical reality. In his discussion of Shakespeare in 1964, 
Lukacs says that 'as the golden age of human achievements that now no longer exists. 
or the utopian aim that should be completed in the future, Shakespeare stands in front 
of the world against which we must drastically fight to prevent ourselves from total 
destruction' .101 It may be seen from this that Lukacs' consideration of Shakespeare is 
yet another example of his teleological thinking. However, the significant point in his 
suggestion is that he posits Shakespeare as a typical model of an author who should 
face up to dehumanising worldly law. In this sense, Lukacs suggests that a singular 
theatrical scene of Shakespeare cannot be subsumed under a holistic unity without 
mediation. 102 The only way in which a text gains such unity is through a mediation in 
100 Ibid. 
101 Georg Lukacs, 'Ober einen Aspekt der Aktualitlit Shakespeare', in Proh/eme des Realismus III 
(Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1965), p. 632, my translation. 
102 See ibid. 
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which the mutual relationships of independent individualities reconstitute themselves. 
In other words, it is not surprising for Lukacs that mediations are the constitutive 
interrelations of individual entities. Therefore, a significant factor in Lukacs' 
cogitation of the revolutionary role of an author lies in his underscoring of mediation. 
3. The Meaning of Lukilcsean Realism 
Mediation presupposes unstable and contingent situations between writers and 
reality. Lukacs does not stress the relationship of texts and readers; rather he 
emphasises the principle that an "author's aesthetic view of the world" - and this is 
not a political tendency but rather an epistemological perception of reality - crucially 
determines textuality in the sense that social beings cannot exist outside of social 
conditions. \03 In his controversial criticism of modernism, Lukacs argues that 
Crucial, for the critic, is the determination of the direction in which a writer is 
moving, not the detection of stylistic idiosyncrasies. This is not to say that style 
is unimportant. On the contrary, I maintain that the more closely we combine an 
examination of the ideology informing a writer's work with an examination of 
specific form given to a specific content, the better our analysis will be. That is 
to say, the critic must establish by examination of the work whether a writer's 
view of the world is based on the acceptance or rejection of al1~st, whether it 
involves a flight from reality or a willingness to face up to it. IO 
Lukacs' indication of the circumspective view of reality means that writers 
cannot depict the whole of social reality, in the sense that 'reality is always richer, 
more multifaceted than any law'. 105 Thus, writers can merely reflect reality in 
proportion in terms of "typification". In Lukacs' formulation, ""typification" is closely 
103 For Lukacs' own discussion of this subject, see Georg Lukacs, 'Das Problem der Perspektive'. in 
Probleme des Realismus I (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1971), pp. 653-55. 
104 Georg Lukacs. The Meaning o/Contemporary Realism, trans. by John and Necke Mander (London: 
Merlin Press, 1963), p. 83. 
105 Lukacs, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 37. 
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related to "self-containment" as the way of constructing the form of artwork. In this 
respect, the reflection in proportion does not necessarily mean that literary textuality 
is merely the correspondent mirroring of social reality, but rather the formal "self-
containment" in which an intense totality of artwork synecdochically signifies the 
whole worldly reality. To put it another way, Lukacs understands the reflection of 
artwork through the formulation that the whole is properly reflected in a part. at the 
same time, a part fully manifests the whole. In this sense, typification is what Fredric 
Jameson would call a cognitive mapping whereby an author reconstructs social reality 
in proper proportion. From this standpoint, Lukacs always presupposes that form is 
less perfect than reality. Crucial here is that Lukacs does not regard the meaning of 
the word "perfect" as simplicity, but rather as complexity. 
Even in his notorious criticisms of modern decadent art, it is not difficult to 
discern Lukacs' accentuation of social complexity. Lukacs says that man himself is a 
complex biological entity, and social phenomena must be conceived as a 'complex 
made up of complexes' .106 For Lukacs, social complexity provides the everlasting 
changeability of history, while the symptom of inhumanity and anti-humanity in 
modernist art inflates and distorts 'the concrete problem of capitalist inhumanity into 
a hazy, universal, "cosmic" inhumanity' .107 It is in this sense that Lukacs conceives of 
modernism as "sick" art in which the development and continuity of man's 
consciousness and sense of identity cannot be achieved. In other words, to reflect 
complexity is the only way in which art can be healthy, in the sense that reflection is 
nothing less than the process of constituting textuality according to objectivity. A 
significant factor in Lukacs' criticism of modernism lies in the way he disagrees with 
106 Georg Lukacs, Conversations with Lukacs, ed. by Theo Pirkus, trans. by David Fembach (London: 
Merlin Press, 1974), p. 18. 
107 Lukacs, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. \08. 
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the formalist legitimisation of aesthetic autonomy and its separation of artworks from 
material reality. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical validity of Lukacs' realism, his classification 
of healthy art and sick art comes to be problematic in contemporary critical contexts. 
When Lukacs puts the distinction between healthy art and sick art in the metaphorical 
sense of evolution, he obviously presupposes the utopian perspective of artistic 
reflections in which the conciliation of subject and object can be achieved in perfect 
forms. However, it is not easy to depict this optimistic happy ending of history in the 
sense that one no longer imagines the flawless teleological process of history in a 
utopian sense. It is rather that the teleological evolutionary paradigm itself becomes 
an absolute nightmare. Certainly, this nightmare causes the repression that leads to the 
evaluation of Lukacs' realism today. It seems to me that a positive aspect of Lukacs' 
realism is deliberately repressed by an attempt to resolve political and theoretical 
contradictions in Western Marxism. However, allowing for the historical situation in 
which Lukacs articulated his criticism, the question seems to reside in the way in 
which Lukacs considers description as an aesthetic symptom of the utopian impulse 
towards the understanding of a complex reality. It was in this sense that Lukacs 
criticised modernism as "sick art". 
It is interesting to note that there was no proper terminological consensus 
among Western critics to conceptualise the broad spectrum of art designated as 
modernism when Lukacs was criticising this aesthetic tendency as "politically 
decadent art". As Astradur Eysteinsson claims, 'when Georg Lukacs wrote about 
"Avangardeismus" he was in fact dealing with "modernism" but resorted to the 
concept of the "avant-garde" for lack of a better term at the moment in critical 
4S 
history'. 108 What is implicit in Eysteinsson's investigation is that there was no clear 
distinction between realism and modernism in the Western aesthetic scope before 
1960s. Therefore, it is arguable that in Lukacs' criticism modernism is not an opposite 
aesthetic category opposed to realism, but rather modernism was a cultural symptom 
that was caused by the situation in which literary realism lost its cultural power in the 
capitalist market system. In this respect. Lukacs does not deny that modernism can be 
regarded as an aesthetic resolution to social contradictions. For Lukacs, modernism is 
also "reflection", even though modernists reject the category of reflection. To quote 
Lukacs: 
The real question is the treatment of time, for here the modernists have indulged 
in the wildest orgies. However, their experiments, which one may condemn as 
empty, artificial, hothouse, do reflect something of the relationship of the 
individual and his personal life to the social framework or, more precisely, 
historical time of which this particular life is a moment. The retlection may be 
distorted, mannered, playful indeed, but reflection it is. I09 
What is implicit in this argument is that Lukacs locates modernism in the 
broader sense of representation; in other words, Lukacs' formulation of reflection can 
be understood in the necessary category of representation in general. From this 
perspective, Lukacs does not criticise the style of modernism, but rather its 
pessimistic view of reality. There is no doubt that such pessimism is partly related to 
the development of media technology. The proliferation of the visual media 
influenced literary form and technique, and as Adorno states, 'just as painting lost 
many of its traditional tasks to photography, the novel has lost them to reportage and 
108 Astradur Eysteinsson, The Concept of Modernism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 2. 
109 Georg Lukacs, Essays on Thomas Mann, trans. by Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1964), 
p.78. 
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the media of the culture industry, especially film' .110 This is where modernism's 
aesthetic tum comes to exist through its own cultural logic of political frustration in 
the face of capitalism. 
There is an example to support Lukacs' understanding of modernism. In her 
criticism of realism that appears in 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown', Virginia Woolf 
alludes to the change in the way in which the cultural perception of reality constitutes 
literary truth. I I I What is implicit in WooIrs argument is that the language of realism 
no longer properly catches up on the details of reality. For Woolt~ the way in which 
the literary expression accurately describes reality is not the inventory of details, but 
rather the epitome of the worldly totality. I 12 Interestingly, for Woolf it is the writer's 
subjective attitude towards reality that is more signiticant than technique in the 
expression of reality. Stressing an epistemic break between the Edwardian and the 
Georgian way of perceiving reality, Woolfclaims: 
I ask myself, what is reality? ~nd who are the judges of reality? A character may 
be real to Mr. B~nnett and qUIte unreal to me. For instance, in this article he says 
that Dr. Watson In Sherlock Holmes is real to him: to me Dr. Watson is a sack 
stuffed with straw, a dummy, a figure of fun. I 13 
Here, what is clear is that the validity of WooIrs argument rests on the 
presupposed shift from the conventional category of reality to subjectivism - the 
subjective objectification of reality. It is important that Woolf points out the aesthetic 
resolution for the crisis of representation that arises from the more developed 
circumstance of capitalism, a circumstance that reinforces the rei tication of the social 
110 Theodor W. Adorno, 'The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel', in No(es (0 
Literature, Vol.!, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 
31. 
III See Virginia Woolf, 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown', in The Captain's Death Bed and Other Essays 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1950), pp. 91-92. 
112 See ibid., p. 105. 
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relationship between individuals. This situation strongly prompted the collapse of the 
conventional literary machine, and gave rise to the new formal technique of 
representing reality; the cultural decoding experiment is necessarily followed by the 
devaluation of the conventional code system. In this way, modernism resorts to the 
category of truth instead of everyday reality. Stated another way, modernism adapts 
the sensuous truth of everyday life in order to reject the empirical sphere of reality. It 
seems to me that this is a symbolic act, which resolves the crisis of realism by 
retaining the utopian impulse. This attempt gives rise to the theology of art, art for 
art's sake. The development of capitalism destroys any common sensuous perception 
of reality; and the fragmental reification over the surface of reality prevails. This is 
the very perspective that Lukacs took, when he attacked modernism as "sick art". 
That is to say, Woolfs definition of literary transition seems to support Lukacs' 
aesthetic presupposition: the public aesthetic consensus is changed according to the 
shifts of human relationships. Woolf describes the transformation of the cultural codes 
on which the conventional literary apparatuses are constituted. To quote Woolf: 
At the present moment we are suffering, not from decay, but from having no 
code of manners which writers and readers accept as a prelude to the more 
exciting intercourse offriendship. The literary convention of the time is so 
artificial ... that, naturally, the feeble are tempted to outrage, and the strong are 
led to destroy the very foundations and rules of literary society. Signs of this are 
everywhere apparent. Grammar is violated; syntax disintegrated; as a boy staying 
with an aunt for the week-end rolls in the geranium bed out of sheer desperation 
as the solemnities ofthe sabbath wear on. The more adult writers do not, of 
course, indulge in such wanton exhibitions of spleen. Their sincerity is desperate, 
and their courage tremendous; it is only that they do not know which to lise, a 
fork or their fingers. 1 14 
A significant factor seems to lie in the way in which Woolf attempts to depict 
the changed cultural situation that is manifested by the linguistic transformation and 
113 )b·d 9 I ., pp. 7-98. 
114 Woolf, 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown', p. 108. 
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gives rise to the aesthetic desperation of realism. From this perspective, it is 
effectively possible to reconsider Lukacs' defence of realism against modernism. 
Strictly speaking, for Lukacs, modernism just means a temporary anti-realistic 
tendency; this judgement precisely stemmed from Lukacs' presupposition that 'all we 
do, all we know and all we are, in the final analysis, is the product of our reaction to 
reality' .115 It seems to me that this is the kernel of Lukacs' aesthetics in which his 
criticism of naturalist and modernist techniques focuses on their descriptive aspects. 
In his essay, 'Narrate or Describe?', Lukacs criticised description as a method 
that endows writers with • still lives' and brings them to the position of spectators. For 
Lukacs, this tendency generates certain pessimism in writers as they attempt to 
represent capitalist reality. According to Lukacs, capitalist reality is a dialectical 
process in which dehumanisation dominates everything alongside the evolvement of 
individuals. Lukacs claimed that the capitalist system 'reproduces itself continuously, 
and this progress is in reality a series of bitter and implacable struggles - a process 
evolving simultaneously in the life of the individual, who is transformed into a 
soulless appurtenance of the capitalist system,.llb Severely denouncing description as 
a passive method which acknowledges the perfection of the capitalist system, Lukacs 
suggests the following: 
The decisive ideological weakness of writers of the descriptive method is in their 
passive capitulation to these consequences, to these phenomena of fu Ily-
developed capitalism, and in their seeing the result but not the struggles of the 
opposing forces. And even when they apparently do describe a process - in the 
novel of disillusion - the final victory of capitalist inhumanity is always 
.. d 117 antiCIpate . 
115 Georg Lukacs, Muw}szef es tarsadalom (Budapest, 1968), p. 13. Quoted in Kinilyfalvi, 711e 
Aesthetics ofGyorgy Lukacs, p. 55. 
116 Lukacs, 'Narrate or Describe?', pp. 145-46. 
117 Ibid., p. 146. 
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In a sense, Lukacs' attack on symbolism lies in this presupposition that the 
symbolic mode of representation fosters pessimism, and finally capitulates to 
conformism. Lukacs' scathing criticism of description attacks the claim that this 
method adequately mirrors the inhumanity of capitalism. Lukacs does not admit the 
position that advocates a descriptive method as more realistic. but rather reproaches 
the writers who employ description to dilute the essential capitalist reality. Along with 
this criticism, Lukacs deplores "modern realism" for making the novel lose 'its 
capacity to depict the dynamics of life, and thus its representation of capitalist reality 
is inadequate, diluted and constrained'. 118 A philosophically important factor relating 
to Lukacs' privileging narration is that Lukacs' concept of realism resorts to Vico's 
verum-factum principle: 'the true and the made are interchangeable'. Ill) In this respect, 
Lukacs contends that 'truth is revealed only in practice, in deeds and actions' .120 This 
is where the suspicion of reflection theory arises for Lukacs' realism. As we have 
seen, however, Lukacs puts his realism on the opposite side of "mirroring realism". 
Lukacs rather draws on the notion of reflection as the category of representation in 
general. What is at issues in Lukacs' formulation of reflection is not merely to what 
degree form reflects content, bur rather how form is structured hy the combination of 
writer's intention and objective reality. From this perspective, Lukacs plainly argues 
that writers should take the opportunity to reach a higher aesthetic level by means of 
realism rather than symbolism. In Lukacs' view, therefore, symbolism means a mirror 
on which writers' subjectivity, not external objectivity, merely reflects itsel[ Lukacs 
denotes this non-aesthetic aspect as "mannerism". 
118 Lukacs, 'Narrate or Describe?', p. 147. 
119 Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures o./a Concept/i'om Luk(lcs to Hahermas 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1984). p. 35. 
120 Lukacs, 'Narrate or Describe?', p. 123. 
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What we see in Lukacs' criticism of description is not attention to the 
structure of narration that contains the utopian impulse, but rather the commitment of 
writers who would want to revolt against de-humanising "capitalist prose" in order to 
obtain the "true poetry of things". 121 Lukacs believes that 'objects come to life 
poetically only to the extent they are related to men's life'. 122 Without any 
interrelationship between objects and their function in concrete human experience. 
narrative cannot achieve artistic significance. For Lukacs, this is why the 
incomprehensibility of the symbol arises in its own right. According to Lukacs, a 
symbol results from the attempt that objects acquire significance 'only through direct 
association with some abstract concept which the author considers essential to his 
view of world' .123 
Contrasting Balzac, Stendhal, Dickens and Tolstoy with Flaubert and Zola, 
Lukacs illuminates the difference between these writers. For Lukacs, the latter writers 
are lacking in participation in the social struggles of their times. The former writers 
are not "specialist", and they follow 'the tradition of the writers, artists and scientists 
of the Renaissance and of the Enlightenment', while the latter writers become 
'specialists in the craft of writing, writers in the sense of the capitalist division of 
labour' .124 What Lukacs focuses on here is not so much the cultural condition of 
description by which the recent writers become servile to capitalism, but rather the 
political function of the writers' literary text. Lukacs argues that 'when a writer is 
isolated from the vital struggles of life and from varied experiences generally, all 
ideological questions in his work become abstractions', and 'such abstraction results 
121 For Lukacs, description cannot provide the true poetry of things, but transforms us into components 
of still lives. It is hardly surprising that Lukacs regards the true poetry of things as the real epic in 
which things playa part in the destinies, actions and passions of men. See ibid. p. 137. 
122 ' Ibid., p. 137. 
123 Ibid., p. 131. 
124 Ibid., pp. 118-19. 
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in the loss of the creative productiveness provided by questions of ideology in the 
earlier literature'. 125 This presumption constitutes the practical aspect of Lukacsean 
realism. It would also be incomplete without considering Lukacs' reception of Hegel 
to understand the Lukacsean formulation of the relationship between artwork and 
practice. In this sense, Lukacs could inspire Western Marxism to re-interpret Marx 
through the Hegelian dialectic. In the following, I will investigate the relationship 
between Lukacs and Western Marxism to understand the historical context in which 
Lukacs' realism comes to be underestimated by the strategic emphasis on early 
Lukacs' Hegelian tendency. 
4. Lukacs and Western Marxism 
In his several autobiographical sketches, Lukacs discussed the crucial 
influence of Hegel in his studies of Marx. J26 Although Lukacs criticised his own 
inclination to Hegel in the new preface of History and Class Consciousness, his 
theory has been generally considered as a mixture of Marx and Hegel. Even for 
1iirgen Habermas, Lukacs was one of theorists who silently made an orthodox tie with 
Hegel: Lukacs rested on the Hegelian dialectic to rescue his Marxism from the official 
doctrine of dialectical materialism and its assertion of the dialectic of nature. 127 To 
some extent, the way in which western theorists consolidate Lukacs with Hegel is 
125 Ibid., p. 143. 
126 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. ix. Lukacs states that 'I first read Marx while I was 
still at school. Later, around )908 ) made a study of Capital in order to lay a sociological foundation 
for my monograph on modem drama. At the time. then. it was Marx the 'sociologist' that attracted me 
- and I saw him through spectacles tinged by Simmel and Max Weber. I resumed my studies of Marx 
during World War I. but this time I was led to do so by my general philosophical interests and under 
the influence of Hegel rather than any contemporary thinkers'. We can find similar statements by 
Lukacs in other interviews, such as Record ofa Life. Interview with New Lefi Review, and 
Conversations with Lukacs, etc. 
127 See JOrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the 
Rationalization a/Society, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 150. 
52 
influenced by the fact that Western Marxism privileged the early Lukacs rather than 
the later Lukacs. 
In its own historical context, Western Marxism has faced sustained criticism 
for its attacks on, and negative attitude towards orthodox Marxism. As Anderson 
properly points out, the distinctive characteristic of Western Marxism is a rupture 
between "theory" and "practice". 128 In a similar tone to Anderson, Neil McInnes 
describes Western Marxism as a theory that reflects political despair at the defeat of 
the working class by Nazism and Fascism. 129 In the case of Western Marxism, theory 
emerges at the point where practice stops. It is not so surprising, therefore, that theory 
seems constantly to return to preceding theories for theorizing its situation, because 
theory can never go before the situation but fly at dusk when the situation ends (to 
paraphrase Hegel). In other words, the emergence of new theory is not so much the 
result of will on the part of individuals, but rather the product of specific concrete 
situations. The return to Hegel by Western Marxists was a moment when they 
regained this perspective on the relationship between theory and practice. 
The restoration of Hegel by Western Marxists can be understood in the sense 
that Hegelian philosophy is not only the reflection of Hegel as an individual, but also 
the product of history as a collective process. According to the Hegelian dialectic, the 
opposition between subject and object means that the subject is part of the object and 
128 See Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, p. 29. Anderson claims that 'the organic unity 
of theory and practice realized in the classical generation of Marxists before the First World War, who 
performed an inseparably politico-intellectual function within their respective parties in Eastern and 
Central Europe, was to be increasingly severed in the half-century from 1918 to 1968, in Western 
Europe'. In Anderson's terms, the unity of theory and practice, a fundamental principle of Marxism 
was deconstructed by the 'structural divorce'. World capitalism went its way in 'a long boom of 
unprecedented dynamism, the most rapid and prosperous phase of expansion'. Contrasted with 
capitalism's boom, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe showed no hope in moditication of their 
bureaucratic structure, so that no political challenge to the enhancement of the capitalist bloc was 
brought out in that period. 
129 See Neil Mcinnes, The Western Marxists (London: Library Press, 1972), p. 31. 
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the object is producing the subject. 130 In this sense, Marx did not refute the Hegelian 
dialectic in itself but Hegel's philosophy in a guise of bourgeois ideology. Above all, 
the important point is that Marx criticises not the Hegelian dialectic as such but only 
the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic. Marx writes as follows: 
The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means 
prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a 
comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It 
must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical 
shell. 131 
To invert the Hegelian dialectic does not mean to remove it. but rather to 
return it to its correct form. Even though Marx remarks that his dialectical method is 
'not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to if. this does not place 
his method outside the Hegelian dialectic. 132 On the contrary, Marx regards the 
Hegelian dialectic as an "ideological reflex" just as with phenomena in the camera 
obscura. 133 It is in this sense that the purpose of Marx's criticism of Hegel seems not 
so much to refuse the Hegelian system, but rather, to complete it in terms of its own 
negation. Paradoxically, Marx's attempt to rescue the Hegelian dialectic from 
bourgeois ideology means the "realisation" of Hegel's philosophy, that is to say, the 
"end" of philosophy, since 'the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the 
mind of man, and translated into forms ofthoughf. 134 From this perspective, every 
theory must be understood as "forms of thought" into which the material world is 
translated. 
130 See ibid. 
131 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1. trans. by Ben Fowkes (London: 
Penguin, 1990), p. 103. 
132 Ibid., p. 102. 
133 See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology. ed. by C.J.Arthur (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart. 1999), p. 47. 
134 Ibid. 
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The inversion of the Hegelian dialectic in the works of Marx sets it to work 
not so much in matter as in history. 135 For the dialectic is not the natural law by which 
matter is worked, but the way in which the individual subject understands the world. 
It is in this sense that the Hegelian dialectic leads idealism to collapse because the 
dialectic presupposes an attempt to overcome the split between the world and the 
mind in terms ofa critical rather than a systematic characteristic. 136 Here is the point 
where one can say that the abstract is always deconstructed by the concrete. When 
George Lichtheim indicates that 'the Hegelian dialectic is not really what it purports 
to be', 137 he seems undoubtedly to be thinking of this dialectical principle. As 
Lichtheim points out, Hegel cannot take flight from 'the idealist cave in which the 
speculative enterprise has been imprisoned since Plato', in that· his procedure is kept 
going by the operation of the sovereign intellect which undertakes to render an 
adequate report of the world by reflecting up its own self-consciousness,.m 
Lichtheim continues with a further problem: 
The philosopher, as an empirical individual, is a contingent being and as such 
cannot constitute an absolute starting-point. German Idealism, culminating in 
Hegel, tries to escape from this dilemma by treating the individual mind as the 
vehicle of Mind or Spirit in the abstract: conceived as intersubjective and 
transphenomenal. But in making this assumption Hegel oversteps the boundary 
of the idealist metaphysics. Rather it is a metaphor whose employment veils a 
particular kind of empirical reality: the collective mind of society. I,!) 
IJ5 See McInnes, The Western Marxists, p. 18. McInnes points out the fact that "dialectical 
materialism" misuses Marx's dialectic as follows: 'If Hegel's upside-down dialectic concerned ideas, 
then by standing it back on its feet, Marx must get a dialectic that works in matter. Matter, too, would 
then be held capable of contradicting itself and thereafter progressing to higher forms by overcoming 
that contradiction. This was the blunder of the founders of dialectical materialism and it is still 
solemnly taught as one variety of Marxist metaphysics. In truth, Marx's dialectic. being the historical 
interpretation of Hegel's, worked in history, not matter'. Nevertheless, McInnes confuses the Hegelian 
dialectic with Hegel's idealism, and is not aware that Western Marxism is interested in "historical 
materialism", not "dialectical materialism". 
136 See Jameson, Marxism and Form, pp. 361-62. 
\37 George Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel and Other Essays (London: Orbach & Chamers, 1971), 
p.24. 
138 Ibid. 
\39 Ibid. 
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In this way, Hegel's thinking comes to be negated by its own dialectic, so that 
Marx endorses the Hegelian dialectic, even though it is in mystified form. Jameson 
also indicates that this Hegelian sequence is distinguished by 'that ultimate and 
inevitable, structurally inherent movement toward its own dissolution, in which it 
projects the Marxist model out of itself as its own concrete realization and 
fulfillment' .140 For Marx, Hegel's idealism can be seen as the result of an "inverted 
dialectic". Thus, it is not surprising that Marx indicates this "distortion" not as 
something to be eliminated but as the condition of ideology. As Marx remarks. 'men 
and their circumstances appear upside-down' in all ideology, in that 'this phenomenon 
arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the 
retina does from their physical life-process' .141 In Marx's terms, therefore, Hegel's 
idealism is nothing more than the "form" in which the material world is translated, so 
that we can regard Hegel's idealism as the "inverted relation" of form and content. 
Marx sees this illusion as mere phantoms formed in human brains, to which their 
material life-process is sublimated. 
In Descartes' cogito, for example, to prove "I who think" means to reject 'all 
reasonings I hitherto accepted as proofs' .142 For Descartes, everything outside "I who 
think" is false, so that only "I" is something to justify "am" in the world. The 
relationship of subject and object is reversed in this statement. It is in this sense that 
cogito is the ghostly inversion of sum. Here is the point where Marx mentions the 
phenomenon of ideology in which men and their circumstances appear upside-down 
140 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 326. 
141 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 47. 
142 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. by F. E. Sutcliffe (London: 
Penguin, 1968), p. 53. 
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as in a camera obscura. 143 Consequently, in Marx's terms, Descartes' cogilo is not so 
much philosophical discovery as ideological invention. These phantoms have no 
history and development, while men's material life-process changes in its own way. 144 
This is the reason why the dialectic must be employed to understand these phantoms. 
In this sense, Marx's concept of ideology and dialectical method serves as a key term 
to approach Western Marxism. 
Lukacs also sustained his positive evaluation of HegeL even though he 
provided a self-criticism of his own early idealism that was influenced by Hegelian 
philosophy. Lukacs acknowledged that his concept of alienation in History and Class 
Consciousness was equated with objectification in the Hegelian terms. Lukacs 
claimed that 'when I identified alienation with objectification I meant this as a 
societal category - socialism would after all abolish alienation - but its irreducible 
presence in class society and above all its basis in philosophy brought it into the 
vicinity of the 'condition humaine". 145 In this respect, Lukacs suggested that the 
concept ofreification is neither socially nor conceptually identical with alienation, 
even though the phenomenon of reification is closely related to that of alienation. As 
has been discussed, Lukacs drew on Lenin to overcome his Hegelian tendency. For 
Lukacs, Lenin was a symbolic figure who seemed to materialise Hegelian dialectic in 
the real political dimension. Therefore, the Western Marxist version of Lukacs 
143 d , Marx and Engels, The German I eo ogy, p. 47. 
144 See ibid., It is compelling that Deleuze and Guattari seem to use this formulation in order to criticize 
Lacan in Anti-Oedipus. They launch an attack on psychoanalysis, since it makes the unconscious not 
'the fantastic factory of Nature and Production' but 'a private theater'. For them, the Oedipus complex 
is a "phantom" which has no relation to the unconscious. They argue that' the unconscious is an 
orphan, and produces itself within the identity of nature and man. The autoproduction of the 
unconscious suddenly became evident when the subject of the Cartesian co~ito realized that it had no 
parents, when the socialist thinker discovered the unity of man and nature within the process of 
production, and when the cycle discovers its independence from an indefinite parental regression'. See 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p.49. Of 
course, Deleuze and Guattari depend on the empirical method rather than the Hegelian dialectic. 
Throughout Anti-Oedipus, nevertheless, this radical attitude against "idealism" provides the basis on 
which their analysis stands. 
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conceals an interesting factor within its historical context - Lukacs as a Leninist 
philosopher. More importantly, Lukacs himself had a lack of interest in the 
contemporary Hegelian revaluation of his early philosophy.I-l6 However, it is not easy 
to see that Lukacs was an orthodox Leninist or that his later theory stemmed from 
Leninism as such. In other words, it is undeniable that there was a gap between 
Lukacs' interpretation of Lenin and Leninism. According to Zizek, Lenin 'was not 
fully aware of the philosophical stance he 'practised' in his revolutionary work',1-l7 
when Lukacs tried to provide the philosophical account of Leninism. 
For Lukacs, as we have seen, the name of Lenin was a symbolic resolution to 
his early utopian messianism in the sense that it stands for the revolutionary 
Realpolitik. In Lukacs' sense, revolutionary Realpolitik was sharply opposed to the 
idea that socialism is a complete condition. Lukacs argued that 'the utopian conceives 
. I' f b ., b f b' ,,148 F h' socIa Ism not as a process 0 ' ecommg, ut as a state 0 ' emg. rom t IS 
standpoint, Lukacs regarded Lenin's politics as 'the admirable realism'. 149 This is 
where Lukacs' aesthetics paves the way for realism by which all utopianism are 
finally eliminated. In this respect, Lukacsean realism is an aesthetic transformation of 
his political interpretation of Leninism. In Hegel's terms, Lukacsean realism can be 
perceived as an aesthetic, resulting from the "moment" of action in which the essence 
was resolved into individuals. ISO As was previously discussed. Lukacs emphasised 
"mediation" to abolish his utopian workerism, whereby he once rejected any possible 
mediation between the bourgeois' past and the proletariat's future. 
145 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xxiv. 
146 See Lukacs, Record of a Life, pp. 77-78. 
147 Zi~ek, 'Postface', n. 4. 
148 Lukacs, Lenin. p. 72. 
149 Ibid., p. 73. 
ISO See Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. p. 264. 
58 
5. Lukacs and Althusserian Marxism 
As opposed to L6wy who considers Lukacs' stress on mediation as a symptom 
of the political retreat, I want to suggest that it is rather a theoretical turn from 
utopianism to realism, whereby Lukacs attempted to retain a positive non-Stalinist 
legacy of the Russian Revolution. It also seems to me that Althusserian Marxists' 
refusal of any mediation can be understood as the consequence of disillusionment 
caused by actually existing socialism. The decline of revolutionary action easily 
engenders a reactionary condemnation of the preceding theoretical models such as 
Lukacsean realism. While the theoretical emphasis on the complexity of structure 
immediately discouraged the utopian perspective of the May '68 events, there were 
disturbing and changing political situations outside France. As Keith Reader 
describes: 
Mao's reputation as the 'Great Helmsman' was shattered by the revelation about 
the Cultural Revolution ... The euphoria caused by the ending of the Vietnam 
War seemed to become a nightmare with the ensuing bloodbath and the horrors 
of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. Many on the French Left felt doubly 
compromised by these, for while what was then 'Indo-China' had been under 
French colonial occupation many of the Cambodian leaders had been learning 
their Marxism in Paris. The PCF's attempts at self-rehabilitation were drained of 
their credibility by the Party's timorousness in condemning Soviet or Soviet-
backed repression first in Afghanistan, then in Poland. lsl 
This horrific malpractice of Marxism inclined French Intellectuals to 
radicalise themselves in rejecting any mediation between past and present theoretical 
developments. Consequently, they stressed a break rather than a mediation of cultural 
conventions. It is not surprising then that an anarchistic epistemology and avant-garde 
aesthetics, whereby de-Marxified French theorists legitimise aesthetic production 
rather than cognitive criteria, followed this radicalisation. Reader argues that 'the 
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bizarre amalgam of conceptual rigour and freewheeling textuality ... in the Tel Quel 
'manifesto' has clearly left its mark, in the erosion of established disciplinary 
boundaries and consequent calling into question of specialist competence, if not in the 
polysemic 'Grand Science' which was the dream to which it aspired'. 152 From this 
perspective, the distinction between "art" and "reality" comes to be questionable, in 
the sense that poststructuralist textuality continuously demonstrates an ontological 
concern - asking what it is to be a text. IS3 The newly emerged formulation 
presupposes that 'theory does not simply "analyze" or "describe" reality; far more 
importantly, it seems to articulate strategies by which what is extant may perpetually 
be overcome' .154 Suffice it to say that theoretical reading comes to be regarded as 
practical action. This new formulation incisively precipitated the renunciation of 
Marxist aesthetics of realism by its emphasis on aesthetic production rather than 
cognitive criteria; the substitution of an aesthetic realm for the cognitive definitely 
reinforced the shift of the focus from the role of authors to the role ofreaders. It 
seems to me that this shift clearly demonstrates a reified state of cultural production 
by which the revolutionary creative activity fails to involve social realities, a situation 
in which academic disciplines and the market system largely come to dominate the 
field of cultural production as a whole. 
Regarding this, there is certainly a significant political intention to "bend the 
stick" in Balibar and Macherey's attacks on Tel Quel and Lukacs: they reinterpret a 
materialistic criterion in terms of multiple structural determinations. The Althusserian 
sense of "overdetermination" supports this theoretical approach to social reality. 
Stressing the multiple conditions of contradictions manifesting the structure in 
151 Reader, Intellectuals and the Left in France Since 1968, p. 20. 
152 S 'b'd 28 . ee I I ., p. . 
153 See Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, FOllcault, Derrida (Berkeley: 
University of Cali fomi a Press, 1987), p. 263. 
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dominance that unifies the whole, Althusser says that 'this refleL'lion olthe conditions 
of existence of contradiction within itself,' this reflection of the structure articulated in 
dominance that constitutes the unity olcomplex whole within each contradiction, this 
is the most profound characteristic of Marxist dialectic, the one I have tried recently 
to encapsulate in the concept of 'overdetermination" .155 In other words, Althusser's 
concept of "overdetermination" can be expressed as 'complexly-structurally-
unevenly-determined' .156 The definition of overdetermination is nothing less than the 
counter-concept of totality. 
The way in which Althusser emphasises the complexity of structural 
determination could be described as a symbolic strategy to liquidate the mechanical 
materialism dominating preceding socialist movements. By symbolically attacking the 
Lukacsean category of totality, Althusser developed the concept of overdetermination. 
On the other hand, in the 'Introduction' to For Marx, there is another symptomatically 
significant factor that alludes to the political meaning of the Althusserian repudiation 
of Lukacs. To quote Althusser: 
Those who impute all our disappointments, all our mistakes and all our disarray 
in whatever domain, to Stalin, along with his crimes and errors, are likely to be 
disconcerted by having to admit that the end of Stalinist dogmatism has not 
restored Marxist philosophy to us in its integrity. After all, it is never possible to 
liberate, even from dogmatism, more than already exists. The end of dogmatism 
produced a real freedom of investigation, and also in some a feverish haste to 
make philosophy an ideological commentary on their feeling of liberation and 
their taste for freedom. Fevers sink as surely as stones. What the end of 
dogmatism has restored to us is the right to assess exactly what we have, to give 
both our wealth and our poverty their true names. to think and pose our problems 
in the open, and to undertake in rigour a true investigation. 157 
154 Ibid., p. 233. 
::: Louis Althusser. For Marx. trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, \999), p. 206. 
, Ibid., p. 209. 
157 Ibid., p. 30. 
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This description obviously reveals a disturbing dilemma in which Althusser strives to 
search for the third way between Stalinism and Western Marxism. What Althusser 
chooses here is a scientific investigation to know "ourselves". It is interesting that 
Althusser identifies the scientific with a true investigation in which we face the reality 
that Marxist philosophy has still to be constituted. No doubt, this statement calls for 
self-examination, through which one should obtain true knowledge of reality. For 
Althusser, true knowledge - scientific Marxism - could be achieved by ruling out 
unscientific Hegelianism. Symptomatically analysing the deeper sense of this 
declaration, we can see that Althusser presents the concept of overdetermination in 
order to legitimise his theoretical perspective as scientific. Althusser's insistence on 
the scientific implies an intransigent attitude in which objectivity must not be 
confused with subjectivity. That is to say, the scientific is more objective than the 
unscientific. In order to develop this account, Althusser seems to suggest . structural 
causality' in Reading Capital. 
Althusser sees the scientific as a category of anti-reflection; on the other hand, 
Lukacs posits "scientific cognition" as an essential category of reflection. Even when 
Lukacs mentions that 'objective reality is correctly reflected in any accurate scientific 
cognition'. in order to explain the difference between scientific reflection and artistic 
reflection, he does not mean that particular knowledge produced by particular 
reflection is always decisively scientific. ISS Lukacs rather understands the scientific 
as the way in which the absolute cognition always appears as relative and as an 
approximation. For Lukacs, the scientific is the nature of knowledge, whereby the 
dialectic of absolute and relative cognitions comes to exist. In comparing the 
scientific and the artistic reflections of reality, Lukacs states that 'individual scientific 
158 Lukacs, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 37. 
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cognitions (laws, etc.) are not independent of each other but form an integral system', 
while artistic reflection is relatively independent of general social development. 159 
Lukacs employs the concept of "self-containment", the 'capacity to achieve its efTect 
on its own',160 to distinguish artistic reflection from scientific reflection: Lukacs 
separates theoretically aesthetic realism from scientific realism. Althusser, on the one 
hand, does not preserve the distinction between these reflections; Althusser's concept 
of the scientific is not posited as oppositions of subject and object at all: science is not 
the subjective reflection of objectivity, but rather opposed to ideology. Althusser's 
formulation of anti-reflection does not seem to provide the proper alternative to 
Lukacs' realism, in the sense that Althusser simply declares the concept of a 
decentred structure of totality without any theoretical demonstration that verifies how 
much Lukacs' realism is "unscientific". Allowing for the distinction between their 
theoretical contexts, Althusser's attack on Lukacs is political rather than theoretical. 
In the following, my concern will be related to the hidden impetus behind Althusser's 
critique of Lukacs. 
Even though Lukacs also criticises empiricism, Althusser still denounces 
Lukacs' realism as empirical. What Althusser proposes to accomplish in his criticism 
of empiricism is precisely the concept of the subject that is defined by Stalinism, just 
as Lukacs consistently emphasises objective reality more than artistic form, to reject 
Stalinist subjectivism. Considering this, it is difficult to say that Althusser properly 
establishes a new formulation in order to correct Lukacs' fallacy, but rather easy to 
see that Althusser draws on the notion of Lukacs' compromise with Stalinism, first 
raised by Adorno. As Etienne Balibar acknowledges, Lukacs was 'a symbolic figure 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., p. 38. 
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in the history of Western communism more than an object of proper study,.161 
Balibar's statement clearly demonstrates that there is "bending the stick" in 
Althusser's anti-Lukacsean formulation. In this respect. the difference between 
Althusser and Lukacs merely lies in the use of rhetoric to defend scientific cognition 
against Stalinist sUbjectivism. Taking these rhetorical aspects into account, it can be 
said that Lukacsean reflection is synecdochical, while the Althusserian concept of 
scientificity metonymically signifies material reality. 162 In Althusser's terms, 
synecdochical reflection refers to "expressive causality", in the sense that 'if the 
whole is fully reflected in every part, then aspects of the whole not immediately 
visible in a part must be latent within it, repressed or unconscious within ir. 163 From 
this perspective, Althusser claims: 
To speak of the criterion of practice where theory is concerned, and every other 
practice as well, then receives its full sense: for theoretical practice is indeed its 
own criterion, and contains in itself definite protocols with which to validate the 
quality of its product, i. e., the criteria of the scientificity of the products of 
scientific practice. This is exactly what happens in the real practice of the 
sciences: once they are truly constituted and developed they have no need for 
verification from external practices to declare the know ledges they produce to be 
, ,. b Ia I d 164 true, I. e., to e lOwe ges. 
Here, Althusser involuntarily refers to the Lukacsean concept of artistic 
reflection as "self-containment" in order to explain the absoluteness of knowledge. 
Lukacs precisely points out that science establishes absolute concreteness by 
investigations of practical laws, 165 yet, at the same time, the absolute concreteness of 
scientific knowledge always appears as relative, in the sense that knowledge must be 
161 Corredor, Lukacs after Communism, p. 116. 
162 For a useful insight about this, see Jonathan Arac, Critical Genealogies: Historical Situations/hI' 
Postmodern Literary Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 264. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Verso. 
1997), p. 59. 
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amplified and elaborated by the transformation ofreality. In other words, scientific 
concreteness is a unity of the absolute and the relative, as in the case of artistic 
reflection. On the other hand, Lukacs argues that there is a crucial difference between 
scientific reflection and artistic reflection, because artistic reflection produces 'a unity 
which cannot go beyond the framework of the work of art' .166 Abandoning the 
concept of synecdochical reflection, the Althusserian formulation of scientificity 
consequently creates a vicious circle. As Kant presupposes that Newtonian physics 
legitimises his scientificity, so does Althusser with Marxist science. Nevertheless, 
there is no way in which one can sufficiently define what Marxist science really is. In 
an Althusserian formulation, Marxist science is already always an absent cause 
whereby the effect of scientificity emerges. Even Althusser himself acknowledges this 
circle in the sense that "this circle is not the closed circle of ideology, but the circle 
perpetually opened by its closures themselves, the circle of well-founded 
knowledge' .167 It is quite surprising that this statement reminds us of Lukacs' 
definition of scientific knowledge. 
To solve this controversial aspect of his formulation Althusser draws into his 
theoretical scope the concept of "symptomatic reading", inspired by Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Althusser describes Marxist readings as the "symptomatic reading'" 
since it is a scientific way in which a reading divulges the undivulged event in the 
text. 168 As we have seen, a symptomatic reading does nothing less than reveal the 
structural complexity in textuality - the reading necessarily presupposes the "self-
containment" of the text as in the Lukacsean concept of artistic reflection. What is at 
stake in this formulation is that Althusser simply focuses on the self-contained 
165 See Lukacs. 'Art and Objective Truth'. p. 37. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid .. p. 69. 
168 See ibid .• p. 28. 
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textuality, disregarding what Lukacs practically suggests with his concept of 
synecdochical reflection. In this respect, Althusser sees philosophy as a theoretical 
practice whereby science can be articulated through politics, while Lukacs posits art 
as a mediation of science and politics. This is where a fundamental difference 
between them arises. a difference that lies in the attitude towards the mediating role of 
an author in the process of constructing texts. Since the symptomatic reading comes 
through reading hidden registered linguistic traces in texts, the author's intention must 
be regarded as a surface meaning. To attack a humanistic defence of interpretation, 
Althusser's concept of symptomatic reading rests on Lacanian psychoanalysis: the 
stress on symbolic registers, rather than the imaginary, raises the philosophical 
problem of the subject. 
When Althusser mentions the "'absent presence" of scientific discourse, he 
obviously alludes to this philosophical connotation in the Lacanian concept of subject. 
In other words, the Althusserian concept of absence is associated with traces in which 
presence is repressed by ideology - the material system of social practice. The 
absence is like an empty mould to which the repressed must return. The symptomatic 
reading, therefore, lies in the nature of scientific discourse, that is to say, 'the specific 
nature of a discourse which cannot be maintained as a discourse except by reference 
to what is present as absence in each moment of its order'. 169 No doubt. this 
presumption of the symptomatic reading cannot be linked to Lukacs' realism, in the 
sense that the Lukacsean fonnulation of realism does not aim at establishing an 
interpretative approach for readers, but rather a practical criterion for writers. In other 
words, Lukacs suggests realism as a practical way in which writers effectively 
overcome reification in order to accomplish the perfect form of artwork in capitalist 
169 Ibid., p. 69. 
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society. Suffice it to say that Lukacs' defence of realism is nothing less than a way of 
disguising his political involvement, even though it is the product of political 
frustration. 
Both Lukacs and Althusser stress the scientific perspective as an essential 
component of Marxism. According to Althusser, a scientific perspective provides the 
only method by which we can reach towards a complex material reality beyond 
abstract ideology. 170 Nevertheless, for Althusser, ideology is not just "an illusion" by 
which reality is veiled, but rather the overdetermined unity of the real relation and 
imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of existence.l7I It is in this 
sense that 'the real relation is inevitably invested in the imaginary relation' in 
ideology. 172 So ideology can be seen as the expression of collective desire on which 
people's hope and nostalgia are consequently founded. As Althusser points out. 
ideology is not at all related to describing a reality, but rather the chemistry in which 
the overdetermination of the real and the imaginary reinforces or modifies the relation 
between men and their conditions of existence. 
Althusser's concept of ideology can be compared to Lukacs' criticism of 
ideology as pseudo-objectivity, in the sense that both theorists largely regard ideology 
as the abstract whereby the trace of reality is virtually replaced with a 'phantom 
objectivity'. To be sure, there is an undeniable difference or a break between 
Althusser and Lukacs, precisely precipitated by their ways of defining ideology. 
Contrary to Althusser, who stresses the educational function of ideology, thereby 
constituting a subject, Lukacs sees ideology as an illusion which manifests the failure 
of reconciliation between subject and object. The way in which Lukacs grasps 
170 See Althusser, For Marx, p. 85. Althusser argues that 'if we are prepared to stand back a little from 
Marx's discovery so that we can see that he founded a new scientific discipline and that this emergence 
itself was analogous to all the great scientific discoveries of history'. 
171 See ibid., p. 233. 
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ideology seemingly can be affiliated with Althusser's notion of ideology, in the sense 
that Lukacs also opens the way in which we approach ideology in terms of the 
dialectic of the visual representation. 
For Lukacs, it is reification that obstructs epistemological totalisation in 
capitalist society, specifically the rationalisation of a world operated by commodity-
structure. This process ofrational objectification subsequently conceals the immediate 
qualitative and material character of things as things. 173 This is the very process of 
reification through capitalist rationalisation; rationalisation transforms any quality of 
natural materials into the symbolically quantitative dimension. Not surprisingly, Marx 
analyses this symbolising mechanism of rationalisation in explaining the relation 
between time and the clock - 'the clock was the first automatic device applied to 
practical purpose; the whole theory of the production of regular motion was 
developed through it'. 174 As Charlie Chaplin's film. Modern Times, clearly manifests. 
the clock is, so to speak, an ideological apparatus, whereby the rationalisation of 
capitalism comes to occupy human consciousness as well as the unconscious. When 
Lukacs conceptualises the meaning of reification, it refers to not only the 
rationalisation of human relationships in capitalist society but also the individual and 
collective psychological effect generated by the process of the symbolic mechanism. 
It is in this sense that reification can be seen as a matrix in which the chemistry of the 
ideological production is closely linked to the individual fantasy. From this criticism 
of ideology, Lukacs' formulation of realism implicitly reveals an interesting aspect -
the non-ocularcentric aesthetic. 
172 Ibid .• p. 234. 
173 See Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 92. 
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6. Realism as Non-Ocularcentric Aesthetic 
The hidden impetus behind the philosophy of consciousness resides in its 
ocularcentrism, in the sense that from the outset it presupposes visual sight as a 
predominant media of perception. Hans Jonas points out that this has been a specific 
feature of the Western philosophy: 'since the days of Greek philosophy sight has been 
hailed as the most excellent of the senses'. 175 According to Jonas. sight incisively 
tends to provide 'the model of perception in general and thus as the measure of the 
other senses'. 176 This ocularcentric way of perception particularly endows the 
privileged authority to "image". As Jonas claims, there are three characteristics for 
largely securing the visual image's primacy in the realm of perception ~ '(1) 
simultaneity in the presentation of a manifold, (2) neutralization of the causality of 
sense-affection, (3) distance in the spatial and mental senses'. 177 These three features 
appeared in the function of image endow vision with the primary position, though 
vision has no self-sufficient sensible function. As Jonas plainly puts, sight needs to 
have 'the complement of other senses and functions for its cognitive office'. 17M 
No doubt, this is where Lukacs' criticism of description crucially arises ~ the 
passivity of visualisation essentially resides in its contemplative characteristic. The 
Lukacsean conceptualisation of the distinction between narration and description is 
the result of his classical dichotomy between subject and object. However, the 
Lukacsean category of subject and object precisely lies in the way in which mediation 
is always already involved with the relationship. As Jameson indicates, it is not the 
174 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Correspondence, trans. by I. Lasker (Moscow: Progress 
Publisher, 1975), pp. 129-130. 
m Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Bi%Rl' (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1979), p. 135. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., p. 136. 
178 Ibid., pp. 135-6. 
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linguistic discourse that makes mediation between the individual and the socio-
economic reality, but rather they are always related in actuality.I7'! 
The way in which Lukacs conceptualises realism is decisively opposed to 
mimetic visualisation, which dominates the representational mode in general, insofar 
as Lukacsean literary criticism defines description as a symptom of artistic impotence 
in the engagement with reality. Strictly speaking, thus, Lukacsean realism does not 
designate the dominant visual representation mode in genera!, but rather a 
strategically designed non-ocularcentric aesthetic edifice in particular. More 
significantly, Lukacsean realism is not effectively anti-ocularcentric but literally non-
ocularcentric; Lukacs specifically postulates description as an effect of artistic 
frustration in its process of achieving the perfect form. For Lukacsean realism, it is 
not important whether a certain work politically contains the real content, hut rather 
whether its form immanently embodies the logic of reality. I KO Therefore, description 
is supposedly grasped as the symptomatic failure of the utopian impulse, insofar as 
capitalist reification comes to occupy the field of cultural production. 
The direct consequence of this historically changed condition in late 
capitalism gives rise to reformulating Lukacs' criticism of modernism - modernism is 
not so much pessimistic decadence retreated from social reality, but rather the 
consequence of the petty bourgeoisie'S desperate struggle against instrumentally 
demystifying capitalism. lSI In this respect, Lukacs' realism is possibly grasped as a 
utopian project that allows writers to overcome the limit of modernism, in the sense 
that the drastic impetus of modernism that demands the totalisation of cultural power 
179 See Jameson, Marxism and Form, p.406. 
180 See Georg Lukacs, 'Marx und das Problem des ideologischen Verfalls', in Probleme des Realismlls 
I (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1970). 
181 See T.J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodesfrom a History of Modernism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999), p. 389. 
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is necessarily failed in capitalist society, and the successful aesthetic achievement 
seems to be attained only by a realistic representational mode. 
Not surprisingly, the presupposition of Lukacsean realism is precisely raised 
by the concept of reification - reification fundamentally impedes the totalisation of 
identity in capitalist society, as Lukacs always states, 'commodity fetishism is a 
specific problem of our age' .182 In other words, it is almost impossible to describe the 
total content of the cultural logic without recognising the specific function of formal 
reification in the age of modem capitalism. It is in this sense that Lukacs comes to 
privilege narration rather than description, precisely because description is nothing 
less than the spatialisation oftime imposing an escape from the everlasting change of 
reality. To quote Lukacs: 
Thus time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an exactly 
delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable 'things' ... in short. it 
183 becomes space. 
It is Bergson's philosophy that crucially sheds light on this Lukacsean 
formulation of rei fie at ion. According to Martin Jay, Bergson was one of the most 
important philosophers to influence the Lukacsean formulation of reification. 184 The 
purpose of Bergson's philosophy resides in its pursuit of restoring "true memory" into 
consciousness of recollections. More important is that, in Bergson's 
conceptualisation, "consciousness ofrecollections" cannot be reduced to the body, 
even though the body is a necessary matrix of memories. 185 This assumption that 
consciousness is stored "somewhere else" leads Bergson's philosophical formulation 
182 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 84. 
183 Ibid., p. 90. 
184 J ay, Downcast Eyes, p. 196. 
185 Ibid., p. 193. 
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to the third path, in which no cognitive image is allowed - his theoretical project is to 
overcome both idealism and materialism. For Bergson, 'each was too cognitive, each 
too trusting in images of the intellect, each not sensitive enough to that vital 
substratum of concrete, lived reality available only to the holistic understanding of the 
intuition' .186 It is unlikely that Lukacs would agree with Bergson's valorisation of the 
intuition; however, the way in which Lukacs emphasises narration rather than 
description specifically proves his theoretical affinity with Bergson, who defends 
action over contemplation. 187 Lukacs implicitly draws on the distinction between time 
and space in his discussion of narration and description in affiliation with Bergson's 
formulation; the problem of description arises from its contemporising characteristic. 
while narration always recounts the past in its recollection. 1xx In other words, 
description is lively restoring memories of temporal experiences by action than 
superficially mirroring the reification of spatialisation by contemplation. 
Convincingly, this adverse criticism of description is deeply rooted in Lukacs' 
investigation of ocularcentric capitalist culture. Symptomatically reading the 
historical matrix in which the descriptive style comes to dominate the modern 
composition, Lukacs practically encourages writers to overcome cultural reitication 
by adopting a dialectical, realist method. In short, reification definitely possesses the 
visual characteristic that erases all physical reality. Lukacs is distinguished from 
typical anti-ocularcentrism by the way in which he encapsulates reitication as "a 
symptomatic effect of commodity fetishism" - visual description is a formalistic self-
containment raised by the impossibility of narrative. As Michael Riffaterre argues, 
186 Ibid., p. 194. 
187 This theoretical affinity might be constituted by the idea of Lebensphilosophie that arises from neo-
Kantian opposition of culture and civilisation. The idea of Lebensphilosophie influences both Bergson 
and Lukacs in such a way that they subordinate culture to life. For more detailed argument of the 
relationship between Lukacs and the idea of Lebensphilosophie, see Tihanov, The Masler and the 
Slave, pp. 21-24. 
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description is 'a verbal detour so contrived that the reader understands something else 
than the object ostensibly represented,.IS'l That is to say, the crucial function of 
literary description does not lie in the way in which the reader sees something outside 
of the literary text. According to Riffaterre, 'its aim is not to present an external 
reality' .190 In other words, description is not imagery mimesis but rather linguistic 
significance. It is in this sense that the purpose of description is 'not to offer a 
representation, but to dictate an interpretation' .191 
Riffaterre's analysis of description seems to indirectly illuminate the reason 
for Lukacs' criticism of description as a reified form of narrative. Description does 
not require active mediation between subject and object, but rather the logical 
verification of linguistic structure. For Lukacs, it is in this respect that description is 
definitely regarded as a symptom arising from the reification of language. It is worthy 
of note that Lukacs is interested not so much in what is the political content of 
description, but rather in 'how and why description, originally one of the many modes 
of epic art (undoubtedly a subordinate mode) became the principle mode'.I92 
Therefore, a more significant factor in Lukacs' criticism of description certainly 
resides in the other side of its political strategy: description is not simply a political 
surrender abolishing any possibility of intervention into the reified situation, but 
rather an aesthetic symptom symbolically rendering a political dissatisfaction. 193 
Description is the closed moment of narrative. For Lukacs, the closed 
characteristic of literary descriptive imagery seems to cause the uncreative 
reductionism of its signification: to put it in Riffaterre's terms, 'the reader expects the 
188 Lukacs, 'Narrate or Describe?', p. 130. 
189 Michael Riffaterre, 'Descriptive Imagery'. Yale French Studies. 61 (1981), 107-125 (p. 125). 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Lukacs, 'Narrate or Describe?', pp. 116-7. 
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imagery to support the acceptability of representation first offered in literal terms' .19~ 
For Lukacs. the literary work should employ the mediatory function of narrative as 
the logic of the real content. In this respect, Lukacs observes that Romantic concept of 
"correspondence" is no longer capable of properly reflecting the reified reality of 
capitalist society. However, there is indubitable weakness in Lukacs' formulation. 
insofar as Lukacs' utopian perspective of realism consistently revolves around his 
conceptualisation of realism. In other words, his realism plainly presupposes the 
historical triumph of socialism over capitalism, hence fails to sufticiently 
conceptualise the political meaning of the other aesthetic achievements such as 
modernism. 
Allowing for Lukacsean realism as a failed utopian political aesthetic. the 
ethical distinction between sick art and healthy art comes to be meaningless. To 
resituate the Lukacsean formulation in the current historical context, it is not 
important whether a certain cultural form is aesthetically classified in the realistic 
mode or the symbolic mode. More ironically, only the attitude to reality, the kernel of 
the Lukacsean formulation of realism, is mainly imposed on a critical category; it is 
most likely impossible to see the clearly orthodox realistic mode today, in the sense 
that reification becomes largely prevalent in late capitalist society. As Virginia Woolf 
poignantly observes. 195 realism has already become a dominant aesthetic norm in 
capitalist cultural industry: realism itself has been reified, and reproduced its cultural 
mode as commodity. In the newly emerged historical condition that actually existing 
socialism is no longer sustainable, the production of narrative seems to be trapped in 
193 For Lukacs' symptomatical analysis of the relationship between literary form and history, see ibid .. 
~. 118-7. 
94 Riffaterre, 'Descriptive Imagery', p. 107. 
195 See Virginia Woolf, The Waves, ed. by Gillian Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). In 
this novel, it is not difficult to see that Woolfs modernism comes to exist as a strategic reification in 
the course of resistance against the principle of realism dominating the world. 
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an "autonomous repetition". No more narrative is needed but only descriptive image 
takes over the representational mode: Lukacsean realism comes to remain as merely 
uncompleted utopian aesthetic project. 
Considering their provocative political meanings issued by their historical 
contexts, Adorno and Althusser's attacks on Lukacs can be conceived largely as an 
attempt to precipitate the shift of the central arena of theoretical polemics from 
reflection to symptom. Alongside this shift, the role of readers rather than writers 
must be stressed. From this standpoint, the anti-Lukacsean formulations signify the 
further reified situation of Marxist theory in late capitalist society, in which Marxist 
theorists cannot but move from the immediate political dimensions to the mediating 
academic disciplines. In a sense, one might say that Lukacs' realism foreshadows this 
situation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PARADOX OF REALISM: BENJAMIN AND ADORNO 
Introduction 
Walter Benjamin is one of the most important theorists who reflects upon the 
relationship between technology and mimesis. For Benjamin, the technical 
reproducibility of the work of art designates a new stage of aesthetic production, in 
the sense that the distance between artworks and spectators, the fundamental 
condition of aura, is no longer possible in capitalism. Criticising Benjamin's 
formulation of aura, Adorno elaborates the presupposition of the commodification of 
aesthetic production in the newly articulated system of the culture industry in the 
administrative society. What is implicit in Adorno's formulation of the relationship 
between technology and the work of art is that there is a paradoxical aspect of 
aesthetic production - art disenchants the traditional code system and, at the same 
time, mystifies its autonomy. For Adorno, it is not the outer effect of technology but 
the inner law of art that liquidates the magical aura from the work of art. 
My concern in this chapter is, through a theoretical comparison of Lukacs. 
Benjamin and Adorno, to stage a specific consideration of the relationship between 
technology and realism in the age of the culture industry. First, the chapter recounts 
Benjamin's theory of the mimetic faculty in relation to his postulation of the technical 
reproducibility of artworks. Second, my investigation leads to a comparison between 
Benjamin and Adorno. Finally, in relation to Lukacs' formulation of realism, the 
chapter provides a discussion of Adorno's aesthetic strategy, a strategy that strives to 
preserve the utopian impulse of art through defending the category of sensuous 
experience, in order to overcome the total system of the culture industry. 
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1. Realism and Dialectical Images 
Unlike Lukacs who strives to fonnulate realism as a revolutionary mode of 
literary production. Benjamin is concerned with the linguistic or semiotic structure of 
realism. Benjamin's analysis of realism focuses on the way in which a specific mode 
ofliterary production is transfonned by social and cultural changes. For Benjamin. 
realism is not a means for the expression of world views, but rather a media system in 
which experience comes to be compromised by the massive convention of perception. 
It is the aspect of mimesis or the mimetic faculty that needs to be investigated in 
Benjamin's fonnulation. Benjamin observes a positive aspect of Walt Disney's 
cartoons as follows: 
Mickey Mouse proves that a creature can still survive even when it has thrown 
off all resemblance to a human being. He disrupts the entire hierarchy of 
creatures that is supposed to culminate in mankind. I 
In this fragment, Benjamin briefly mentions the meaning of the rise of Mickey 
Mouse films - 'the explanation for the huge popularity of these films is not 
mechanization, their fonn: nor is it a misunderstanding. It is simply the fact that the 
public recognizes its own life in them'.2 There is no doubt that this short analysis is 
open to various interpretations; but it is also clear that Benjamin properly picked out 
the kernel of the disenchanted world that capitalism provides to the public; hence, 
Benjamin correctly observes the point that capitalism destroys traditional cultural 
codes and creates a new knowledge of reality. More interestingly, there is a deeper 
sense in Benjamin's argument, for he presupposes the mimetic impulse as a cause of 
I Walter Benjamin, 'Mickey Mouse', in Selected Writings. Volume 2.' 1927-193-4, trans. by Rodney 
Livingstone and others (London: Belknap, 1999), p. 445. 
77 
Mickey Mouse's success. Mickey Mouse is not a cultural commodity that is produced 
by the traditional mimetic faculty, but rather constructed by a newly established level 
of mimesis, the semiotic mimetic faculty. What Benjamin calls the modem mimetic 
faculty is the hidden impetus whereby narrative is constituted in contemporary 
realistic artworks. 
Observing the newly emerged stage of art production, Benjamin crucially 
observes that the introduction of technology into the mode of art production is caused 
by 'the desire of contemporary masses to bring things 'closer' spatially and 
humanly',3 As Benjamin contends, the desire is related to 'their bent toward 
overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction': 4 the desire 
provokes a conflict of reproduction and uniqueness. Benjamin argues: 
Unmistakably, reproduction as offered by picture magazine and newsreels differs 
from the image seen by the unarmed eye. Uniqueness and permanence are as 
closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness and reproducibility in the former. 
To PI)' an object from its shell. to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception 
whose 'sense of the universal equality of things' has increased to stich a degree 
that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction. 5 
For Benjamin, the uniqueness of the artwork is located in its ritual function as 
use value. The stress on the exclusive characteristic of the artwork gives rise to the 
principle of l'art pour l'art, a theology of art - in Benjamin's terms, 'a negative 
theology in the form of the idea of 'pure' art, which not only denied any social 
function of art but also any categorizing by subject matter'. 6 
2 Ibid. 
3 Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in Illuminations, trans. 
by Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973). p. 216-17. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 218. 
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A significant factor in Benjamin' s critique of aestheticism does not reside in 
the way in which he emphasises "a theology of art" as the means of Fascism, but 
rather in the way in which he alludes to the conflicting relationship between 
individual artists, who try to establish the isolated aesthetic realm, and the masses, 
who desire to perceive the real at a closer distance. For Benjamin, the mimetic faculty 
in high capitalism has remarkably declined, in the sense that 'the observable world of 
modem man contains only minimal residues of the magical correspondences and 
analogies,.7 In this sense, the modern mimetic faculty is not presented in sensuous 
similarity, but rather indirectly transformed by language. From this perspective, 
Benjamin suggests the important function of the semiotic aspect of language in the 
modem mimetic system - in Benjamin's terms, nonsensuous similarity - by which 
'the ties not only between the spoken and the signified but also between the written 
and the signified, and equally between the spoken and the written'. 8 At the semiotic 
level of language, the modem mimetic faculty eventually reveals its own place in the 
unified system of representation. 
Similar to Benjamin's argument, Jameson suggests a third category beyond 
the aesthetic binary of realism and modernism. In the conclusion of Aesthetics and 
Politics, Jameson suggests that there is 'the aesthetic conflict between realism and 
modernism, whose navigation and renegotiation is still unavoidable for US,.9 
Jameson's emphasis in this discussion is on the overlooked opposition between the 
problem of Lukacsean realism, which attempted to lengthen traditional forms of 
realism into the new historical moment, and Brecht's defence of modernism, which 
understood realism as the experimental relationship between the audience and the 
7 Walter Benjamin, 'On the Mimetic Faculty', in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical 
Writings, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken, 1986), p. 334. 
8 Ibid., p. 335. 
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work of art. Jameson does not regard Brecht as a resolution of Lukacs' problem; 
Brecht also criticised the pure formalistic experiment which appeared in the artistic 
trend of modernism. 
Jameson's interest rather lies in what Benjamin, as well as Brecht, strove to 
achieve in their appropriation of technology in relation to the popular audience. By 
substantiating realism within the context of late capitalism, Jameson argues that 'the 
originality of the concept of realism ... lies in its claim to cognitive as well as aesthetic 
status' .10 For Jameson. Lukacs' concept of realism must be rewritten in terms of the 
categories of reification and totality. II As Benjamin alludes to narrative as the 
contemporary mimetic faculty, so Jameson sees realism as narrative by which the new 
category of reality itself is produced. Alongside this, according to Jameson, 'realism 
must also deprogram the illusory narrative and stereotypes of the older mode of 
production' .12 The way in which realism takes place in the artistic stance is, however. 
quite paradoxical - 'where the epistemological claim succeeds, it fails; and if realism 
validates its claim to being a correct or true representation of the world, it thereby 
ceases to be an aesthetic mode of representation and falls out of art altogether'. n To 
satisfy both categories of aesthetics and epistemology, real ism cannot but choose a 
path of disenchantment, thereby simultaneously deconstructing and reconstructing 
cultural codes. 
Jameson's formulation of realism as a dialectical narrative between the 
epistemological and the aesthetic seems to suggest a point of resistance to the 
formalised theory, such as Niklas Luhmann's formulation, which seems to reduce 
9 Fredric Jameson, 'Reflections in Conclusion', in Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso, 1980), p. 
196. 
10 Ibid., p. 198. 
II Ibid., p. 212. 
12 Fredric Jameson, Signatures of the Visible (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 166. 
IJ Ibid., p. 158. 
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realism to a by-product of a self-referential coding system. Luhmann could be such a 
theoretician who attempts to explain the correlation between the historical process and 
the social system in a highly formalised way. To a certain extent, Luhmann's 
formulation of "differentiation" seems to elucidate the another facet of realism, a facet 
of realism as communication in a broad sense. Luhmann's conceptualisation of 
differentiation contributes more or less to an understanding of the relationship 
between realism and modernism. 
As Jameson points out, Luhmann's differentiation consists in 'the gradual 
separation of areas of social life from each other, their disentanglement from some 
seemingly global and mythic (but more often religious) overall dynamic, and their 
reconstitution as distinct fields with distinct laws and dynamics' .14 Luhmann draws a 
distinction between system and structure: 'systems have boundaries' .15 In Luhmann's 
conception, a system exists and works universally beyond a structure. The 
intensification of boundaries lends systems differentiation, or vice versa -'a boundary 
separates elements, but not necessarily relations' .16 In other words, differentiation is 
the mechanism for producing boundaries and removing boundaries all at once. The 
intensification of a boundary separates a system from its environment - finally, a 
system perceives its environment as another system. Differentiation is closely tied to 
the particular acts of selection. According to Luhmann, 'a system's internal 
organization for making selective relations with the help of differentiated boundary 
mechanisms leads to systems' being indeterminable for one another and to the 
14 Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology a/the Present (London: Verso, 
2002), p. 90. 
15 Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. by John Bednarz, Jr., and Dirk Baecker (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), p. 28. 
16 Ibid., p. 29. 
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emergence of new systems (communication systems) to regulate this 
indeterminability' . 17 
In this sense, Luhmann writes that 'the ability to differentiate between 
functionally specific acts or functional dominances of one or the other selection 
horizon is possible only if the unity of communicative synthesis is guaranteed in 
advance as something normal' .18 To quote Luhmann: 
The combination of information, utterance, and expectation of success in one act 
of attention presupposes "coding." The utterance must duplicate the information, 
that is, on the one hand, leave it outside yet, on the other, use it for utterance and 
reformulate it appropriately: for example, b~ providing it with a linguistic 
(eventually an acoustic, written, etc.) form. 9 
The success of communication depends on this condition of coding: 'coded 
events operate as information in the communication process, uncoded ones as 
disturbance (noise)'. 20 What is implicated in Luhmann's argument is that 
communication does not have a dual structure, but requires a third category, the 
difference between information and utterance. The third category is required to make 
an addresser and an addressee have the expectation of success in the communicative 
act. Luhmann maintains that communication does not consist in an event as a giving 
and receiving, or as the difference between information and utterance, but rather 
emerges 'only if this last difference is observed, expected, understood, and used as the 
basis for connecting with further behaviors' .21 In this way, Luhmann formulates 
communication as a system, the transcendental and self-referential category beyond 
mediation. 
17 Ibid. 
IS Ibid., p. 142. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21Ibid.,p.14J. 
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The coding process is necessarily linked to the adequate standardisation by the 
act of selection. In other words, subject and media must take on a specific coding 
system in the same way. What Luhmann calls the third component of communication, 
the category of expectation in success, is nothing other than the habitual perception of 
reality, which Benjamin's and Jameson's criticisms want to change. Luhmann's idea 
of system leads to a defence of the reification of a particular communicative code as 
an autonomous unity from any social conflicts. Luhmann simplifies a dialectic 
whereby 'at any given moment the increase triggers a leap from quantity to quality 
and produces a radically new type of differentiation' .22 In this way, Luhmann simply 
replaces the classical category of self-consciousness with the modern ideology of 
system; a system is tied in with an ego in his theory. 
Therefore, Luhmann's formulation must necessarily be reconstructed from a 
Marxist perspective if it is to be used for analysing the modern condition of realism. 
Jameson claims that 'the strength of Luhmann's concept of differentiation lies in the 
way in which it posits formation and rearticulation together and at one within the 
same process: the public begins to differentiate at the very moment in which it comes 
into being as a newly identifiable social institution: the emergence of the new 
bourgeois reading public is at one with its fragmentation into articulated sub-groups 
that gradually become autonomous in their own right,.23 In other words, the newly 
established code system of communication encourages a relative view of the 
traditional cultural code of a specific community at a historical moment. 
No doubt, the historical change of the mode of production crucially 
precipitates the transformation of the code system of communication. Insofar as we 
define artistic expression as one of the general means of communications, it is not 
22 Jameson, A Singular Modernity, p. 90. 
23 Ibid., p. 158. 
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difficult to see that the unification between the visual code and the linguistic code - as 
Benjamin observes - serves as the possible condition of literary realism in the 
nineteenth century. In this cultural situation, the democratic form of the novel comes 
to be 'a champion of the common life' .24 More importantly, this is where the novel is 
to be taken as the exemplary genre by Lukacs to prove his doctrine of realism: 
'through the novel, realism should portray a world which neither conceals its 
contradictions nor presents itself in a fragmented and beguilingly autonomous 
fashion' .25 
The way in which Lukacs defends the principle of realism is similar to 
Benjamin's notion of allegory, which is directed against the Romantic symbol. 
Benjamin wants to reveal the mechanism of the Romantic symbol through an analysis 
of Baroque allegory.26 Benjamin'S study of Baroque allegory is deeply influenced by 
Alois Riegel. Riegel is the most pivotal theoretician of art history, whose work has 
affected succeeding generations of art historians such as Wilhelm Worringer and 
Erwin Panofsky. First of all, Riegel's influence on art historians lies in the way in 
which he separates art history from philosophy. Second, Riegel's formulation of art 
history aims at welding a formal analysis of the individual work to a historically 
grounded analysis: 'Riegel's art history represents an important synthesis of the two 
strands of aesthetics which had dominated the nineteenth century, Kantian formalism 
and Hegelian historicism' .27 
24 Terry Eagleton, Figures of Dissent: Critical Essays on Fish. Spivak. Zitek and Others (London: 
Verso, 2003), p. 14. 
25 Galin Tihanov, The Master and the Slave: Lukacs. Bakhtin. and the Ideas of Their Time (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 110. 
26 See Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John Osborne (London: Verso. 
1998), p. 160. 
27 Michael W. Jennings, Dialectical/mages: Walter Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 153. 
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As Michael Jennings indicates, 'Riegel's historical model is ideally suited to 
Benjamin's convictions' .28 Endorsing Riegel's fundamental insight into the history of 
art, Benjamin is convinced that the unity of the material and the transcendental object, 
which constitutes the paradox of the theological symbol, is distorted into a 
relationship between appearance and essence. From this standpoint, Benjamin argues 
that Romanticism introduced this distorted conception of symbol into aesthetics?> In 
contrast to allegory that comes to be seen as mere tradition, symbol does not need 
poetic tradition because its radiance transmits itself spontaneously. However, 
Benjamin does not accept Riegel's idea of a linear universal history. Benjamin's 
formulation of art history rather privileges decadent periods as 'more "historically 
responsible" than ages that produce classical or symbolic works of art' :10 In this 
respect, just as Lukacs criticises the Kantian system in which the dilemma of the 
thing-in-itselfbecomes a kind of "optical iIlusion",31 Benjamin claims that such a 
transcendental, immanent, symbolic unity is an impossible accomplishment, because 
of the discrepancy between ideas and the world. Benjamin's analysis of the Romantic 
symbol insinuates that it is a kind of the transformation of allegory in that it springs 
from the desire to annihilate the tension within allegory. 
In a similar tone to Benjamin,32 Lukacs criticises symbolism. As Jameson 
indicates, 'the principal characteristic of literary realism is seen to be its 
anti symbolism; realism itself comes to be distinguished by its movement, its 
28 Ibid., p. 155. 
29 See Benjamin, The Origin o/German Tragic Drama, p. 160. 
30 Jennings, Dialecticallmages, p. 156. 
31 See Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories o/Ull!ralure 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 185. 
32 In fact, Lukacs seemed to have much sympathy for Benjamin's theoretical approach to allegory. 
Lukacs discussed Benjamin's theory and indicated that 'Benjamin interprets Baroque (and 
Romanticism) from the perspective of the ideological and artistic needs of the present'. See Georg 
Lukacs, 'On Walter Benjamin', trans. by Rodney Livingstone, New Leji Review. 110 (1978). pp. 83-88 
(p. 84). 
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storytelling and dramatization of its content'.33 Lukacs acclaims Benjamin's 
examination of the relationship between symbol and allegory, since 'Benjamin sees 
with absolute clarity that, though the opposition of symbol and allegory is crucial to 
the aesthetic definition of any work of art, it is not ultimately the spontaneous or 
conscious product of aesthetic considerations' .34 Lukacs' interest in Benjamin's work 
here derives from his consideration of symbol and allegory as 'fundamentally 
divergent human responses to reality' .35 However, in his criticism of Benjamin, 
Lukacs is concerned only to 'establish aesthetic (or trans-aesthetic) parity for 
allegory,.36 Censuring Benjamin's attempt, Lukacs suggests the fact that 'to give 
things a more imposing form is to fetishize them, in contrast to an 
anthropomorphizing mimetic art, with its inherent tendency to defetishization and its 
true knowledge of things as the mediators of human relations,.:17 
For Lukacs, an attempt to retrieve an archaic culture as in avant-garde art can 
take place in the imagination, but in reality capitalist fetishisation of human relations 
into things always already occurs. It is in this sense that literary realism can be the 
only way in which writers engage with historical reality, since 'the realistic mode of 
presentation, the possibility of narration itself, is present only in those moments of 
history in which human life can be apprehended in terms of concrete' .38 
However, contrary to Lukacs' understanding of realism, Benjamin's argument 
genuinely indicates the representational transposition between image and language 
that dominates the process of the modem cultural transformation. For Benjamin, 
'language may be seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior and the most 
33 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 196. 
34 Lukacs, 'On Walter Benjamin', p. 86. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 200. 
86 
complete archive of nons en suo us similarity,.39 In Benjamin's sense, the modern 
mimesis of language liquidates the earlier magical power of mimetic visualisation: the 
linguistic communicative form transparently translates the visual communicative form 
into the same code system. According to Jennings, Benjamin's early speculations of 
language represent 'a late echo of the crisis of language', which is presupposed by 
such German Idealist figures as Ernst Mach, Fritz Mauthner, and Hugo von 
Hofmannstha1.40 This influence lends Benjamin the idea of 'the exhausted language 
to reveal inner essence,.41 From this perspective, Benjamin's doctrine of the aesthetic 
is fundamentally hostile to the positivistic idea of reality. 
As Benjamin suggests, the consolidation of image and language presupposes 
the positivistic view of the human body and social reality. Jonathan Crary's 
discussion may provide a supplement for Benjamin's insight: 
The collective achievement of European physiology in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was a comprehensive survey of a previously half-known 
territory, an exhaustive inventory of the body. It was a knowledge that also 
would be the basis for the formation of an individual adequate to the productive 
requirements of economic modernity and for emerging technologies of control 
and subjection. By the 1840s there had been both (1) the gradual transferral of 
the holistic study of subjective experience or mental life to an empirical and 
quantitative plane, and (2) the division and fragmentation of the physical subject 
into increasingly specific organic and mechanical systems.42 
This process incisively propelled by physiology can be regarded as the 
rationalisation of the body in which all the human sensuous functions are 
quantitatively reduced to statistic standardisation. Needless to say, such 
standardisation means the deconstruction and demystitication of the traditional 
39 Benjamin, 'On the Mimetic Faculty', p. 336. 
40 Jennings, Dialectical images, p. \05. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Jonathan Crary, Techniques o/the Observer: On Vision and Modernit}' in the Nineteenth Centllr}' 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 81. . . 
87 
communicative code, which provokes the Romantic critique of capitalism. This is 
where a distinction between scientific positivism and literary realism is crucially 
drawn. The problem of nineteenth century positivism resides in the insistence of 
transparency between image and language; language is a self-evidently neutral 
medium whereby thought prior to words is clearly transmitted. However, it is difficult 
to acknowledge that literary realism in the nineteenth century was acquiescently 
obliged to adopt the positivistic worldview. The ideological radiance of literary 
realism is markedly distinguished from the mainstream of positivism in modern 
society, because the novel discloses the fact that 'the more down-at-heel your life, the 
more precarious and potentially tragic it is likely to be' .43 
There is no doubt that Benjamin's idea of language is tied in with his theory of 
the dialectical image. In a sense, Benjamin's notion of the dialectical image can be 
said to be equivalent to the way in which Marx analyses the commodity form. As 
Jennings puts it. 'Benjamin conceived of the dialectical image as a powerful antidote 
to the concept of progress, for him the most dangerous ideological weapon in the 
capitalist arsenal' .44 Yet, it is undeniable that Benjamin's theory of the dialectical 
image is deeply immersed in German Idealism rather than the classical Marxian view 
of historical materialism. In contrast to Marx's II th Feuerbach thesis - 'the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change 
it,45 - revolution does not mean a political activity for Benjamin, aimed at directly 
changing the world, but the change of human perception and reason, and the change 
'in the structure of consciousness rather than the structure of society' .46 
43 Eagleton, Figures of Dissent, p. 16. 
44 Jennings, Dialecticallmages, p. 37. 
45 Karl Marx, 'Concerning Feuerbach', in Early Writings, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor 
Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 421. 
46 See Jennings, Dialecticallmages. p. 37. 
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In his analysis of commodity, Marx reveals the equivocal aspects of the 
commodity in the mechanism of capitalist society, insofar as commodification raises 
iconoclastic questions about social convention, while fetishising the relations of 
things. What makes Marx's achievement unique is that his analysis stresses not the 
iconoclastic feature of commodity but rather its fetishistic mechanism. This 
duplicated process of commodification in capitalist society leads Benjamin to 
consider the fantasy of commodity culture as a field of cultural production and the 
place of the dialectical image. Defining dialectical thinking as the "organ" of 
historical awakening, Benjamin argues that "phantasmagorias" should be considered 
as the residue ofa dream world, to which 'the development of the forces of 
production shattered the wish symbols of the previous century' .47 
The modem is nothing less than 'citing primal history,.48 Benjamin's idea of 
the modem stems from his understanding of history: the duplicated process of 
progress and regression. In this way, Benjamin impressively analyses the historical 
transformation of high capitalism, as the figure ofthefltineur replaces that of the 
boheme. For Benjamin, theflaneur can be said to be the "ruin" of the hoheme, and the 
boheme is the newly articulated image of the journeyman that was described in 
Marx's The Communist Manifesto. In his writing on Baudelaire, Benjamin 
deliberately introduces Marx's terminology of the hoheme into the context of 
Baudelaire's poetical textuality. Benjamin states: 
The boheme appears in a revealing context in the writings of Marx. In it he 
includes the professional conspirators with whom he concerns himself in his 
detailed note on the memoirs of the police agent, de la Hodde, which appeared in 
the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in 1850. To bring to mind the physiognomy of 
47 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (London: 
Belknap, 1999), p.13. 
48 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Baudelaire means to speak of the resemblance which he displays with this 
I·· I 49 po Itlca type. 
As a transformed figure of the boheme, theflaneur is a dialectical 
phenomenon that retains the trace of totality, in the sense that the crowd consists of 
the fantasy of the Jlaneur in which images of modernity are produced by the collective 
unconscious. Resorting to Marx's insight of the relation between image and ideology, 
Benjamin's analysis of the dialectical image oftheflaneur in capitalism also seems to 
provide a way in which one understands an ideology in relation to the fetishistic 
visualisation of the commodity-structure. 
Following Benjamin's analysis of the image ofthefhlneur, Susan Sontag also 
provides a useful discussion of the relationship between vision and reality. Seeing the 
flimeur as the image ofthe middle-class in nineteenth century capitalism, Sontag uses 
this newly charted historical image of human existence by Baudelaire to explain the 
advent of photography. According to Sontag, the photographer as afliineur is 'an 
armed version of the solitary walker reconnoitring, stalking, cursing the urban inferno, 
the voyeuristic stroller who discovers the city as a landscape of voluptuous 
extremes'. 50 Sontag's account of the relationship of the fhlneur and photography, not 
surprisingly, refers to the heroic image of a modem artist normally depicted in 
modernism. It is in this sense that 'gazing on other people's reality with curiosity, 
with detachment, with professionalism, the ubiquitous photographer operates as if that 
activity transcends class interests, as if its perspective is universal'. 51 By means of 
photography, thefldneur finds the world "picturesque" because the hidden reality 
comes to be visible. Seemingly, a more significant factor in Sontag's discussion lies 
49 Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. by Harry 
Zohn (London: Verso, 1997), p. II. 
so Susan Sontag, On Photography (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 55. 
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in the way in which photography - the newly emerged technological cultural form in 
nineteenth century capitalist society - is related to the fetishism of the visual image 
found by the eyes of the middle-class. 
As Benjamin and Sontag imply, ideological production resides not only in the 
manipulation of ideological state apparatuses but also in a commodity fetishism 
spontaneously operated by individuals. In this sense, the commodity-structure 
requires thefldneur to sell goods for its continuation; at the same time, thefliineur can 
exploit the potential of the commodity structure, which may be called "newness". For 
Benjamin, 'newness is a quality independent of the use value of the commodity'. 52 
Benjamin's contemplation of "newness" corresponds to the way in which Marx 
presents the iconoclastic aspect of the commodity. Marx raises the question of "new" 
idolatry coming through the critique of "old" idolatry in his formulation of 
commodity fetishism. For Marx, the commodity-form has no connection to the 
physical nature of commodity and is 'the definite social relation between men 
themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between 
things,.53 That is to say, commodity fetishism magically attaches itself to 
commodities, and so offers the commodity-form to an autonomous figure endowed 
with a life of its own. 
It is true that commodity fetishism can emerge by equating the different 
products of labour in exchange for values; the money fetish engenders the commodity 
fetish; therefore, money as the universal equivalent value form crucially gives rise to 
the very metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties of commodities. Marx 
remarks metaphorically in relation to values and fetishism as follows: 
51 Ibid. 
52 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. II. 
53 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. I, trans. By Ben Fowkes (London: 
Penguin, 1976; repro 1990). p. 165. 
91 
Values, therefore, do not have its description branded on its forehead: it rather 
transforms every product of labour into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, men try 
to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social product: 
for the characteristic which objects of utility have of being values is as much 
, . I d . h' I -q men s socIa pro uct as IS t elr anguage: 
What Marx particularly emphasises here is nothing less than the question of 
how values change every product of labour into the mysterious commodity-form. This 
question inevitably leads to an answer explaining why the simple money-form comes 
to be the universal equivalent value-form: money is a central commodity of the 
general commodity exchange. As the difference of use-value to each other is equated 
by exchange-value, then we consequently perceive the value-form as the universal 
equivalent of the money-form. Seemingly, a significant point in this argument is that 
the secret of values resides in the very enigmatic characteristic of commodity 
fetishism; if values are not related to any specific materiality of the commodity, at 
least they are like the materiality of commodity. Simply adopting Marx's metaphor, it 
seems that values are the language of commodification whereby the variety of 
different meanings of commodity can be translated into each other. Marx's analysis 
lies in this description of that process, whereby the money-form comes to be the 
universal language of commodity. 
Marx claims that the money-form of commodities is 'a purely ideal or notional 
form,55 distinct from commodities' real bodily form. In his analysis of the value-form 
versus the money-fonn, Marx speaks of the progressive development of the money-
form from the simple value-fonn; he describes the simple form of value as 'an 
embryonic form which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before it can ripen 
54 Ibid., p. 167. 
55 Ibid., p. 189. 
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into the price-form,.56 Herein, the Hegelian dialectic that Marx employs to explain the 
commodity-structure sufficiently raises the suspicion of evolutionism for non-Marxist 
theorists. Yet, the way in which Marx appears to analyse the commodity-structure 
arises in the exact opposite course of the Hegelian dialectic. To quote Marx: 
The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very simple 
and slight in content. Nevertheless, the human mind has sought in vain for more 
than 2,000 years to get to the bottom of it, while on the other hand there has been 
at least an approximation to a successful analysis of forms which are much richer 
in content and more complex. Why? Because the complete body is easier to 
study than its cells. Moreover, in the analysis of economic forms neither 
microscopes nor chemical reagents are of assistance. The power of abstraction 
must replace both. But for bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product 
oflabour, or the value-form of the commodity, is the economic cell-form. To the 
superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It 
does in fact deal with minutiae, but so similarly does microscopic anatomy. 57 
Intrinsically, the purpose of Marx's project, which appears here. resides in the 
"microscopic anatomy" of the enigmatic feature of commodity-structure: 'we have to 
trace the development of the expression of value contained in the value-relation of 
commodities from its simplest, almost imperceptible outline to the dazzling money-
form,.58 That is to say, to analyse this simple form is precisely Marx's real task. For 
Marx, the only way in which we can solve the riddle of commodity lies in the way in 
which we understand the language of commodity - the secret edifice of values. Marx 
metaphorically calls this language of commodity the hieroglyphic. The reason why 
Marx criticises political economists' bourgeois consciousness is that they cannot 
decipher this hieroglyphic of commodity-structure; they never raise radical questions 
about the fetishistic character of commodity; hence, 'political economy has indeed 
analysed value and its magnitude however incompletely, and has uncovered the 
56 Ibid., p. 154. 
57 Ibid., p. 90. 
58 Ibid., p. 139. 
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content concealed within these forms'. 59 What Marx illuminates here is that classical 
political economy has already unmasked the content of the commodity-form. For 
Marx, the secret of the commodity does not so much reside in its content, but rather in 
its form, the logic of fetishism. As Marx continues to explain, only by the radical 
question 'why this content has assumed that particular form', can one solve the riddle 
of commodity fetishism. In this sense, the critique of ideology within capitalist society 
could fall into a vicious circle of iconoclastic criticism, if it does not include the 
critique of commodity fetishism. Iconoclastic criticism arises in the same way that 
"fashion" produces a new mode of life style: the demand of newness, the engine of 
fashion machinery, is the origin of the illusory appearance in capitalist society in 
which commodity fetishism has been contained. 
For Marx, ideology means false consciousness; false consciousness is not so 
much fallacy but rather false understanding.60 This means that ideology is a necessary 
mechanism through which one can obtain any perception of reality. The unique aspect 
of Marx's conceptualisation of ideology totally distinguished from a widespread 
liberal idea lies in the way in which his formulation reveals the material and structural 
feature of ideology. Marx's postulate of ideology leads us to gain an insight into the 
image, through his metaphor of the inverted image in the camera ohscura. The 
camera obscura is a machine for turning an image upside down. Marx illustrates the 
distinction between an inverted image produced by the camera ohscura and a fetish 
image of commodity. To quote Marx: 
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the 
existence of men is their actual I ife-process. I f in all ideology men and their 
59 See ibid., p. 174. 
60 See W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image. Text. Ideology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1986), p. 172. 
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circumstances just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of 
objects on the retina does from their physicallife-process.61 
Employing a metaphor of the camera ohscura, literally a "dark box" in which 
an upside down image is projected, Marx elaborates the concept of ideology which 
can be distinguished from the commodity fetishism. As we have seen in the previous 
quotation, Marx rhetorically posits an analogy between the "historical life-process" 
and the "physical life-process". Significantly, the "historicallife-process" and the 
"physical life-process" consist of the "actual life-process"; it is a necessary part of 
men's actual life-process, even if ideology is nothing other than the "inversion of 
objects". Not surprisingly, this is where the metaphor of the camera obscura comes to 
unveil its duplicated meaning: a technical machine by which we can see highly 
realistic images of the visible world;62 a machine which scientifically produces optical 
images. Commodity fetishism, on the other hand, is located on the opposite side of the 
realistic and scientific image: the side of an irrational superstitious image. 
As Terry Eagleton points out, Marx's implication of the metaphor would be 
that 'idealism is really a kind of inverted empiricism' .63 What Marx indicates in his 
conceptualisation of ideology is precisely that the "historical life-process" produces 
"false understanding" of the real world as the camera obscura projects inverted 
images of visible objects. It is certainly significant to know that "false understanding" 
is not so much a nonsensical error but rather a system of representation as such. In 
this sense, one of the most important factors in Marx's concern of ideology is the 
problem of representation. When regarding the relations between the historical 
process and representation, the production of ideology must stress its dialectical 
61 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. by C. J. Arthur (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1970-96; repro 1999), p. 47. 
62 See Mitchell, Icon%gy, p. 163. 
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characteristic. Contrary to this, commodity fetishism is definitely not dialectical; it 
rather petrifies the dialectic of ideology. 
From this standpoint, Benjamin's first thesis on the philosophy of history can 
be opened towards a new interpretation. Here, Benjamin implicitly adopts Adorno's 
conceptualisation of the utopian impulse in his metaphor of a chess-playing puppet in 
Turkish attire. According to Jessica Riskin, the Turkish puppet exemplifies a 
contradictory attitude towards "a deception".64 Even though the disguised automatic 
device was not automatic, and the truth was finally revealed, the deceptive machine 
was praised as an original invention, in which 'two separate "powers", a visible "vis 
motrix" and a hidden "vis directrix",65 were successfully combined. This is a situation 
that Zizek describes in his reformulation of ideology: 'they know very well how 
things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know',66 a situation 
slightly different from Marx's formulation of commodity fetishism: 'they do this 
without being aware of it' .67 In short, metaphorically taking the chess-playing puppet 
as an example of more complex historical process, Benjamin aims at formulating a 
more elaborated version of Marxism to solve the newly emerged problem of capitalist 
society by constituting his own allegorical realism. There is no doubt that Benjamin 
also attempts to develop the Brechtian idea of mass culture and aesthetic strategy in 
high capitalism. 
In this way, the Benjaminian idea of allegorical realism retains the category of 
theological messianism, the hidden-dwarf in the visible machine; Benjamin's 
messianism is mixed with his Marxism in such a way that 'the true, creative 
63 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), p. 76. 
64 See Jessica Riskin, 'The Defecating Duck, or. the Ambiguous Origins of Artiticial Life'. Critical 
Inquiry, 29 (2003),599-633 (p. 623). 
65 Ibid. 
:~ Slavoj Zi~ek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), p. 32. 
Marx, Capital, p. 167. 
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overcoming of religious illumination ... resides in a profane illumination, a 
materialist, anthropological inspiration'. 68 For Benjamin, a profane illumination is 
related to the secularisation of the mystic, in his well-known idea, the decline of 
"aura". Benjamin's concept of profane illuminations is articulated by his idea of 
modem language. For Benjamin, 'language in its communicative, or semiotic function 
is itself depotentiated' .69 Benjamin is well aware of the limited ability of linguistic 
representation in modem society. However, it is for Benjamin that the original 
communicative feature oflanguage is 'now the necessary medium of the occasional 
flash of insight permitted modem man,.70 As Jilrgen Habermas also points out, 
Benjamin's idea of the profane illumination epitomises a communication in which the 
esoteric experience of happiness in high cultural form has become public and 
universal. 71 To quote Habermas: 
The development of art away from ritual involves the risk that the art work will 
surrender the substance of experience along with its aura and be merely banal; 
only the disintegration of the aura, on the other hand, offers a chance to 
universalize and stablize the experience of happiness ... When in a state of deep 
emotion, the mystic is more interested in the proximity and palpable presence of 
God than in God Himself. Only, the mystic shuts his eyes in his solitude; his 
experience is as esoteric as its tradition. It is just this moment that separates the 
religious experience of happiness from the one with which Benjamin's 
redemptive criticism is concerned. Therefore Benjamin calls this illumination, 
explicated in tenns of the impact of surrealist art, secular; these works are no 
longer art in the autonomous sense, but rather manifestation, slogan, document, 
bluff and counterfeit. 72 
68 Walter Benjamin, 'Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia', in Reflections, 
trans. by Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), p. 179. 
69 Jennings, Dialectical/mages, p. 118. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See JUrgen Habermas, 'Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism: The Contemporaneity of 
Walter Benjamin, trans. by Philip Brewster and Carl Howard Buchner, New (Jerman Critique, 17 
(1979), 30-59 (p. 46). 
72 Ibid. 
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For Benjamin. the hidden similarities between a text and reality, a complex 
constellation, can be revealed by reading. Reading produces the dialectical image. 
which flashes as a constellation bridging the past and the present all at once. 73 
Benjamin regards the similarity as a category of knowledge. which cannot be obtained 
in logical perception. In contrast to Lukacs and Adorno, Benjamin does not endorse 
mediation; he presupposes that immediate experience. Erlehnis. can achieve 
messianic redemption by an epistemological glimpse, by the shock of dialectical 
thinking. Benjamin's conceptualisation of dialectical thinking, or better still, 
"totalisation" without the category of mediation, is equivalent to his formulation of 
magic. According to Winfried Menninghaus. 'within the conceptual chemistry of the 
Romantics, both reflection and magic are identical at least in that they are forms of 
'totalizing', 'potentiating' and 'romanticizing' - that is, forms with a medial reference 
to the 'absolute". 74 
Rather than Hegelianism, Benjamin's formulation of dialectical thinking is 
incisively inclined to the Romantic idea of thinking, the idea that 'thinking that 
should, in the place of intuition, be true to the living, non-concretized 'I'. is 
reflection' .75 More significantly, Benjamin's consideration of literary criticism as 
another philosophical practice can be stemmed from 'the breakdown of systematic 
philosophy in such figures as Nietzsche and Dilthey, and the rechanneling of this 
philosophical energy into other areas - psychology and cultural criticism for 
Nietzsche, hermeneutics and the philosophy of history for Dilthey' .76 In this sense. as 
Fred Rush argues, 'Benjamin was all but untouched by Hegel. whose cast of mind he 
73 See Jennings, Dialectical/mages, p. 119. 
74 Winfried Menninghaus, 'Walter Benjamin's Exposition of the Romantic Theory of Reflection', in 
Walter Benjamin and Romanticism, ed. by Beatrice Hanssen and Andrew Benjamin (London: 
Continuum, 2002), p. 28. 
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found 'repellent".77 For Benjamin, Hegel is 'the silent yet always present 'third party' 
in his dialogue with Romanticism'. 78 Even though Benjamin's conceptualisation of 
aura remains ambiguous, his formula of history, the co-existence of progress and 
regress, undoubtedly serves to rethink the relationship between ideology and reality 
without the Hegelian category of mediation. It seems to me that Benjamin's insight 
anticipates the Althusserian conceptualisation of the ideology of ideology, the 
imaginary distortion that recognises 'the 'ideas' of a human subject exist in his 
actions, or ought to exist in his actions, and if that is not the case, it lends him other 
ideas corresponding to the actions (however perverse) that he does perform' .7() 
However, Benjamin does not push his idea of ideology beyond an intuitive 
perception to the formulation of the correlation between ideology and subject. As 
Lukacs points out,80 Benjamin still brings the aesthetic solution of the social 
contradiction into focus, when he regards the transformation from the mystic 
illumination to the profane illumination by the shock of the dialectical image. Lukacs 
claims that Benjamin's aesthetic of allegory disregards 'the fact that to give things a 
more imposing form is to fetishize them, in contrast to an anthropomorphizing 
mimetic art, with its inherent tendency to defetishization and its true knowledge of 
things as the mediators of human relations,.81 Lukacs' criticism of Benjamin might be 
right insofar as Benjamin does not consider properly the relationship between 
reification and ideology; Benjamin's formula appears to lack the category of action, 
7S Ibid., p. 29. However, Menninghaus points out that this is not the exact Romantic postulate of the 
relationship between thinking and reflection, but rather a slightly different version of the Romantic 
concepts revised by Benjamin's own project. 
76 Jennings, Dialectical/mages, pp. 111-2. 
77 Fred Rush, 'Jena Romanticism and Benjamin's Critical Epistemology', in Walter Benjamin and 
Romanticism, ed. by Beatrice Hanssen and Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 124. 
78 Nickolas Lambrianou, 'Neuromancer', Radical Philosophy, 120 (2003) 38-41 (p. 39). 
79 Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation', in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1971), p. 168. 
80 See Lukacs, 'On Walter Benjamin', p. 86. 
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of mediation. As Jennings also claims, Benjamin's formulation of profane 
illuminations does not consider the actuality that 'whether readers can become aware 
of such a complex constellation as the hidden similarity of a Parisian tenement and the 
venues of colonial imperialism ... may finally depend less on the mystical capability 
implied here than upon their skill as readers of texts' .82 
Benjamin's idea of an epistemological glimpse without mediation is explicitly 
influenced by the Brechtian conceptualisation of estrangement-effect; the shock is a 
capacity whereby audience can learn from their experience. From this perspective, 
Benjamin develops the idea of dialectical image that 'the damming of the stream of 
real life, the moment when its flow comes to a standstill, makes itself felt as reflux,.R3 
In fact, Benjamin's concept of dialectical image is not homogenous and universaL but 
rather the re-formulation of the traditional concept of a mental picture, Bild, in which 
heterogeneous strata are constructed at a standstill. Benjamin argues that 'where 
thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it gives 
that constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a monad' .84 This is 
nothing less than the way in which Brecht's aesthetic strategy of the estrangement-
effect achieves its pedagogical goal through revealing social contradictions. As I will 
return to the relationship between Benjamin and Brecht in Chapter 3, I restrict myself 
here to recount Benjamin's idea of realism. 
Developing Marx's presupposition of the relationship between knowledge and 
historical process, Benjamin points out that the category of reality is changeable 
according to the transformation of cultural codes to which the masses agree. The 
important point Benjamin makes is that the experience of technology changes the 
81 Ibid. 
82 Jennings, Dialectical/mages. p. 120. 
83 Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. by Anna Bostock (London: Verso, 1998), p. 13. 
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massive perception of reality: 'the mass is a matrix from which all traditional 
behaviour toward works of art issues today in a new form' .85 What Benjamin 
indicates here is that the new relationship between spectators and artworks has arisen 
from the new circumstance in which 'the distracted mass absorbs the work of art'. 86 
The emergence of the masses, whereby quantity necessarily replaces quality, signifies 
the commodification of artworks, insofar as the masses are by-products of the 
consumer society. No doubt, this situation imposes the disappearance of a distance in 
the relationship between spectators and artworks. 
As Benjamin claims, this condition of contemporary artworks plainly makes 
"aura", the unique phenomenon of a distance, decline. It cannot be denied that 
Benjamin's concept of aura is quite controversial; he employs the term against the 
contemporary popular cult that is raised by commodification. In Lukacs' terms, this 
can be called "reification". Benjamin elucidates that 'the cult of the movie star, 
fostered by the money of the film industry, preserves not the unique aura of the person 
but the 'spell of the personality', the phony spell ofa commodity,.87 That is to say, 
Benjamin's conceptualisation of aura clearly aims at attacking commodity fetishism, 
in the sense that the traditional concept of art can promote revolutionary criticisms. 
In this respect, Benjamin's critical pursuit can be easily regarded as a branch 
stemming from the Romantic criticism of modernity. However, what Benjamin 
definitely proposes to do with the concept of aura resides in the way in which he 
demonstrates a new condition of the artwork in modem society, a condition that 
renders unsustainable the Kantian opposition of subject and object. As in the case of 
Lukacs, Benjamin also presupposes the impossibility of the Romantic 
84 Walter Benjamin, 'On the Concept of History', in Selected Writings. Volume 4: 19311-19.fO, trans. by 
Edmund Jephcott and others (London: Belknap, 2003), p. 396. 
8S Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', p. 232. 
86 Ibid. 
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correspondences in capitalist society. Contrary to Lukacs, however, Benjamin wants 
to penetrate into the deeper sense of the media, the correlation between technology 
and the way of thinking - or, better still, language - in relation to artistic production 
and consumption. From the outset, therefore, Benjamin assumes a new condition for 
art in the age of mechanical reproduction. It is in this sense that Benjamin's 
formulation is based on the proposition that the transformation of the mode of 
production can be inscribed in cultural forms. 
For Benjamin, the new condition of art is constituted by the technical 
reproducibility of artworks. The experience of technology transforms the relationship 
between spectators and artworks; it is technology that fulfils the contemporary 
mimetic impulse, yet, at the same time, the technical reproduction of art threatens the 
autonomy of artworks. Dialectically considering these contradictory aspects of 
technology, Benjamin ultimately reveals the problem of commodification in the field 
of cultural production. Benjamin's analysis of technology and its cultural function can 
be thought as a precursor for Adorno's formulation of the culture industry. For 
Benjamin, the unique phenomenon of aura is a sublime autonomy of art that is tenahle 
with a distance between spectators and artworks. However, the technical 
reproducibility of artworks transforms the way in which the masses react towards art. 
Benjamin describes this in his discussion of film as a newly thriving cultural form: 
The greater the decrease in the social significance of an art form, the sharper the 
distinction between criticism and enjoyment by the public. The conventional is 
uncritically enjoyed, and the truly new is criticized with aversion. With regard to 
the screen, the critical and the receptive attitudes of the public coincide. The 
decisive reason for this is that individual reactions are predetermined by the mass 
audience response they are about to produce, and this is nowhere more 
pronounced than in the film. g8 
87 Ibid., p. 224. 
88 Ibid., pp. 227.28. 
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What Benjamin suggests in this analysis lies in the way in which film provides 
a new situation of artistic production and consumption in capitalist society. As 
Benjamin observes, 'the reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into 
the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie' .89 The intimate fusion of visual and 
emotional enjoyment whereby the masses produce the collective codes for a specific 
cultural form is a decisive feature that constitutes the cultural power of film. It is 
noticeable that Benjamin witnessed the rise of the culture industry and its effect in his 
analysis of film. This is the new condition that the absolute autonomy of artworks is 
no longer possible, in the sense that 'quantity has been transmitted into quality' .')0 As 
Benjamin points out, film was undoubtedly one of catalysts for sharply boosting these 
transformations. 
Benjamin and Adorno each understand the culture industry as one of the most 
important factors that influence the fate of the work of art: Benjamin focuses on the 
effect of the culture industry; Adorno, its economic foundation. Adorno critically 
considers the culture industry as a holistically total ising system in which 'even the 
aesthetic activities of political opposites are one in their enthusiastic obedience to the 
rhythm of the iron system' .91 Adorno's criticism ofthe culture industry is based on 
Marx's analysis ofthe real subsumption oflabour under capital. 
For Marx, the process of production has two stages: the formal subsumption of 
labour and the real sUbsumption of labour under capital. Marx describes the formal 
subsumption of labour as a situation in which 'the labour process becomes the 
instrument of the valorization process, the process of the self-valorization of capital-
89 Ibid., p. 227. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. trans. hy John Cumming 
(London: Verso, 1997), p. 120. 
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the manufacture of surplus-value' .92 In other words, the process of production is 
transformed into the process of capital itself. According to Marx, this process arises 
from the direct intervention of the capitalist under his direction with 'the sole purpose 
of using money to make more money' .93 In this stage, it is not difficult to immediately 
witness class struggle between the capitalist and the working class. However, the 
eventful situation of class struggle comes to be concealed when the real subsumption 
of labour gradually comes to dominate the process of production. Marx argues that on 
the foundation of the formal subsumption of labour under capital, 'there now arises a 
technologically and otherwise specific mode o.lproduction - capitalist production --
which transforms the nature of the lahour process and its actual conditions' .94 This is 
the new stage of capitalist accumulation named as the real subsumption of labour 
under capital, in which all the changes in the labour process by capital's formal 
subsumption become reality as such. That is to say, the industry comes to be 
identified with nature. From this perspective, it is not difficult to say that the culture 
industry stands for the purer capitalism that totally colonises nature and the 
unconscious.95 This new phase of capitalism is closely related to the development of 
forces of production accelerated by technology and science. Marx explains the result 
of the appliance of technology and science for large-scale production as follows: 
On the one hand, capitalist production now establishes itself as a mode of 
production sui generis and brings into being a new mode of material production. 
On the other hand, the latter itselfforms the basis for the development of 
capitalist relations whose adequate form, therefore'resupposes a definite stage 
in the evolution of the productive forces of labour.9 
92 Marx, Capital, p. 1019. 
93 Ibid., p. 1020. 
94 Ibid., p. 1034-35. 
95 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1991), p. 36. 
96 Marx, Capital, p. 1035. 
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What this situation imposes on society is 'the productivity oflabour, the mass 
of production, of population and of surplus population created by this mode of 
production that constantly calls new branches of industry into being once labour and 
capital have been set free' .97 No doubt, one of the new industries is what Adorno 
denotes as the culture industry - this is the industry in which 'the people at the top are 
no longer interested in concealing monopoly: as its violence becomes more open, so 
. , 98 Its power grows. 
This is the point where Benjamin raises the category of habit whereby even 
the optical reception is determined.99 In other words, despite its violent monopoly 
system, the culture industry as the way in which capital's real subsumption of labour 
dominates the mode of production can be constituted by habit. What Benjamin 
attempts to say in his conceptualisation of habit is that the cultural code system is 
fabricated by language. As we have previously seen, Benjamin assumes language to 
be a central medium of modem mimesis. By introducing the category of language into 
the problem of representation, Benjamin incisively rejects the Kantian reflection 
theory based on Cartesian correspondence between consciousness and reality. More 
importantly, these formulae on which both Benjamin and Lukacs rely inevitably 
presuppose an invisible dimension that cannot be represented by language. Benjamin 
and Lukacs attempt to explain the hidden facet of cultural narratives. 
What Benjamin seems to argue with the notion of habit precisely lies in the 
way in which the semiotic aspect of modem mimesis works at practical cultural 
fields: the emergence of mass culture definitely opened the era of the culture industry, 
whereas the aura of cultural forms evidently declined. For Benjamin, habit stands for 
97 Ibid. 
98 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 121. 
99 See Benjamin, 'The Work of art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', p. 233. 
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the category of reality commonly perceived by the masses, which is subsequently 
established by the economic system. Crucial here is the knowledge that reality is not 
fixed at a specific moment, but 'the adjustment of reality to the masses and of the 
masses to reality is a process of unlimited scope'. JOO In a sense, Benjamin's 
conception of habit can be compatible with Lukacs' concept of form, insofar as it 
must be stressed that Benjamin's terminology connotes the hidden reality of the 
political unconscious in Jameson's terms. In other words, what Benjamin denotes as 
the concept of technical reproducibility is related to the political unconscious: the 
technically reproduced image of reality is not "conscious knowledge" of reality. 
Interestingly, Benjamin's conceptualisation of the relationship between habit and the 
perception of reality is deeply influenced by Romanticism - the Romantic concept of 
the hidden system. As David S. Ferris points out, Benjamin's analysis of ' the concept 
of criticism in the Romantics cannot be restricted to the Romantics alone' .101 In the 
following, my discussion leads to the consideration of Benjamin's involvement with 
Romanticism and its anti-capitalist aspect. 
2. Benjamin and Romanticism 
In his early philosophical writing about experience, Benjamin criticises 
experience that serves as the mask of the adult, the habitual criticism of youth. 
Benjamin's claim seems to be a romantic defence of a youthful perspective on life; his 
comment focuses on the way in which the adult devalues youth according to his 
overwhelming experience. However, a more significant aspect resides in the way in 
which Benjamin tends to raise the question of experience against what he designates 
100 Ibid, p. 217. 
101 David S. Ferris, 'Goethe, the Romantics and the Pure Problem of Criticism', in Walter Bey!jumin 
and Romanticism, ed. by Beatrice Hanssen and Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 180. 
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as the "philistine" who effortlessly comes to believe his "'experience". To quote 
Benjamin: 
Nothing is so hateful to the philistine as the "dream of his youth". And most of 
the time, sentimentality is the protective camouflage of his hatred. For what 
appeared to him in his dreams was the voice of the spirit, calling him once, as it 
does everyone. It is of this that youth always reminds him, eternally and 
ominously. This is why he is antagonistic toward youth. I02 
What Benjamin signifies here can be translated into the nightmare of History, 
in which the "voice of the spirit" is repressed as the political unconscious in 
Jameson's terminology. For Benjamin, experience, to some extent. serves as the 
reality principle whereby many blossoming dreams of youth cannot be satisfied; the 
philistine's conviction of experience is nothing less than a symbolic act in order to 
forget the imaginary dream of youth. Benjamin's analysis of the relationship between 
the experience of technology and mass culture is based, 1 suggest, on this early insight 
into experience. Positively considering the dialectical interaction between technical 
reproducibility and the category of reality, Benjamin raises the critical problem of 
realism, in the sense that the classical way of understanding realism as mimesis is no 
longer possible in the age of technology. As Benjamin states, 
Even if one has a general knowledge of the way people walk, one knows nothing 
of a person's posture during the fractional second of a stride. The act of reaching 
for a lighter or a spoon is familiar routine, yet we hardly know what really goes 
on between hand and metal, not to mention how this fluctuates with our moods. 
Here the camera intervenes with the resources of its lowerings and Iiftings, its 
interruptions and isolations, its extensions and accelerations, its enlargements 
and reductions. The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does 
psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses. IOJ 
102 W lB' . 'E . ,. Sid a ter enjamm, xpenence, m e ecte Writings. Volume I: 1913-1926, trans. by Rodney 
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From this perspective, descriptive mimesis must be regarded as an illusion that 
conceals many fractions of reality. In other words, Benjamin implicitly raises the 
problem of empiricism in our optical perception, in the sense that technical 
reproducibility reveals the hidden dimensions foreclosed by our optical experience. 
For Benjamin, 'there is no greater error than the attempt to construe experience - in 
the sense of life experience - according to the model on which the exact natural 
sciences are based' .104 Benjamin posits observation as a medium of knowledge and 
perception based on "self-immersion". 105 Benjamin raises the issue of the category of 
reality that is more real than reality as such. 
It is true that the influence of Romanticism on Benjamin was essential for the 
constitution ofthe whole scope of his writings. Benjamin's doctoral dissertation, 'The 
Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', is a theoretical pursuit 'to 'potentiate' 
the poetic philosophical terminology of the Romantics - 'criticism', 'reflection', 
'sobriety' - in determinate contrast to the mystical interpretations of the proteges of 
Stefan George' .106 In this dissertation, what attracts Benjamin is the Romantic 
concept of criticism which postulates the role of critical interpretation as constituting 
or completing the artwork and 'the consequent shift away from issues of critical 
judgement to those of critical comprehension' .107 Benjamin's interpretation of 
Romanticism is deeply reflected in his critical methodology, including the idea of 
language. This implicates that Benjamin's formulation of mimesis, which sheds light 
not on representation but on embodiment, is indebted to Romanticism. 
104 Walter Benjamin, 'Experience', in Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1927-1934, trans. by Rodney 
Livingston and others (London: Belknap, 1999), p. 553. 
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For Benjamin, Romantic reflection should be understood 'as the mutual and 
reciprocal production of reflected and reflecting - and even the metaphysical 
assumption holds here that the differential division in the poles of reflection not only 
does not run counter to the unpreconceivable Absolute, but that this unpreconceivable 
Absolute is already located in and of itself in the position of dividing - divided 
reflection, and thereby experiences its very self-representation in reflection'. lOX This 
concept of reflection is closely related to the Romantic formulation of language: 'the 
entire system is contained in every linguistic element, since every sound and every 
meaning is what it is not on account of some positivity in its substance, but solely on 
account of its negative and differential relations to all other elements'. 109 In other 
words, 'the self-referential and differential systematic character of language' 
articulates the Romantic idea of reflection. I 10 
In this way, it is the Romantic doctrine of language in relation to reflection 
that influences Benjamin's way of understanding the relationship between perception 
and reality. Indeed, Benjamin's inclination towards Romanticism subsequently gives 
rise to his analysis of technology; and his conceptualisation of aura seems to link the 
Romantic doctrine to the modem cultural criticism of technology. The hidden impetus 
behind the Romantic way of understanding the world resides in the epistemological 
impulse towards the absolute system of the knowledge of everything real. III 
Benjamin's positive reception of Romanticism seems to lie in the way in which he 
identifies the epistemologically realistic urge with the utopian impulse. It is in this 
108 Menninghaus, 'Walter Benjamin's Exposition of the Romantic Theory of Reflection', p. 40. 
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sense that technology can be regarded as an elaborated medium of mimesis in which 
the utopian impulse is closely combined with realism. 
According to Michael Lowy and Robert Sayre, 'Romanticism is essentially a 
reaction against the way of life in capitalist societies'; 112 the Romantic vision is 
inevitably accompanied by a melancholic nostalgia with its retrospective view of the 
past, while containing the critique of capitalist modernity. In the Romantic view, 
capitalism imposes a cruel realism on individuals, destroying the organic unity of 
humanity and society. By accelerating industrialisation and the market system, this 
capitalist realism encourages accepting "reality" in which there emerges 
rationalisation, bureaucratisation, urbanisation, secularisation, reification, etc; hence, 
"reality" precisely designates the socio-economic system of capitalism. I 13 Lowy and 
Sayre highlight the anti-capitalist impulse of Romanticism. as they pursue the third 
path of defining the political signification of Romantic sensibility; their theoretical 
resituating of the term "Romantic" aims to reconsider the prevailing account of 
Romanticism as a decadent symptom of pre-fascism. Therefore, what they attempt to 
attain seems to lie in the way in which the Romantic critique of capitalist economy 
was incisively propelled by a revolutionary subjective intention towards utopia. In this 
way, they come to redefine the aesthetic characteristic of Romanticism as "critical 
irrealism".114 Leaving aside their theoretical side-stepping of the difficulty of drawing 
an aesthetic distinction between realism and irrealism, their criticism of the superficial 
anti-Romantic tendency and suggestion that Romanticism should not be defined as an 
aesthetic term but rather as a political category is to be welcomed. 
112 Michael U>wy and Robert Sayre, Romanticism against the Tide of Modernity, trans. by Catherine 
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However, as Lambrianou criticises, their presupposition of Romantic anti-
capitalism 'unfortunately demonstrates little or no understanding of the way in which 
the foundational moments of the Romantic project emerged out of the German 
Enlightenment itself .115 To put it in another way, they simply neglect the specific 
historical context in which such a Romantic doctrine reacts against modernisation. 
They only stress that the specificity of Romanticism develops an anti-capitalist 
critique 'from the standpoint of a value system - with reference to an ideal- drawn 
from the past' .116 Yet, they do not describe the dark side of the Romantic aesthetic 
ideology - 'the dream of a language linked to a purified body politic, purified by 
violence and maintained by repression'. 117 More controversially, the Romantic 
politics of the symbol 'would appear as a politics of embodiment (the signified in the 
signifier), the archform of embodiment being the state' ,118 
This is where Benjamin's attention to the dialectic between nostalgia and 
progress becomes significant. Constantly throughout his works, Benjamin retains the 
way of seeing historical progress as the product of the dialectical image in which the 
nostalgic utopian impulse towards the past ideal community ironically drives 
civilisation to the future. In 'On the Concept of History', Benjamin explicitly depicts 
the dialectical image borrowed from Klee's painting named Angelus Novus: 
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; 
it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm drives him 
irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris 
before him grows toward the sky. What we call progress is this storm. I 19 
lIS Lambrianou, 'Neuromancer', p. 40. 
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117 Christopher Prendergast. The Triangle of Representation (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), p. 114. 
118 Ibid., pp. 114-5. 
119 Benjamin, 'On the Concept of History'. p. 392. 
111 
Benjamin's Romantic idea of history is well reflected in his conceptual isation 
of historical materialism: the founding concept of historical materialism is 'not 
progress but actualization'. 120 Benjamin's Romantic orientation is also revealed in his 
applause of collectors, whereby 'the most profound enchantment for the collector is 
the locking of individual items within a magic circle in which they are fixed as the 
final thrill, the thrill of acquisition, passes over them' .121 This shows that Benjamin 
acknowledges the complex modality of Romanticism in the sense that the collector's 
Romantic re-enchantment against the capitalist disenchantment precisely connotes the 
anti-capitalist, but ideal aspect, all at once. Benjamin's concept of the dialectical 
image, an image emerging in a flash, denotes this paradoxical and convoluted 
Romantic critique in which the nostalgia of the imaginary society in the past reacts 
against modernity. Therefore, what Benjamin is really interested in is not only the 
nostalgic aspect of Romantic idealism, but also the revolutionary potency of 
Romanticism; Benjamin's argument presents Romantic nostalgia as nothing less than 
an aesthetic symptom resulting from the Romantics' anti-rational absolutism against 
capitalist realism. This means that Benjamin's attitude towards Romanticism is more 
entangled than Lowy and Sayre's argument of Benjamin's theoretical affinity with the 
Romantic worldview. 
Lowy and Sayre argue that, against capitalist rationalisation, Romanticism 
attempted to establish mysterious analogies or correspondences between the human 
soul and nature. 122 The Romantic critique of capitalist rationalisation and 
quantification specifically lies in its implementation of the absolutising strategies 
against the secularism and relativism of modernity; more importantly, in attempting to 
120 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p. 460. 
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bridge the gulf between human beings and nature, what most revolutionary Romantics 
tried to restore was a perfect harmony of the universe without the presence of God. 
Not surprisingly, the political vision of the French Revolution permeated the 
Romantic utopian project. 
In his philosophical fragments, for example, Friedrich Schlegel. like Goethe 
and Fichte, designated the French Revolution as the greatest tendency of the age. 123 
For Schlegel, the historical insights of the French Revolution remained isolated as a 
few traces, in the sense that one can see it as 'the center and apex of the French 
national character, where all its paradoxes are thrust together: as the most frightful 
grotesque of the age, where the most profound prejudices and their most brutal 
punishments are mixed up in a fearful chaos and woven as bizarrely as possible into a 
monstrous human tragicomedy' .124 Schlegel raised the new presumption that 'there is 
no greater need ofthe age than the need for a spiritual counterweight to the 
Revolution and to the despotism which the Revolution exercises over people by 
means of its concentration of the most desirable worldly interests'. 125 
In light of the neo-Kantian doctrine which regards the world as 'disintegrated 
and poised between a realm of facts and a realm of values' , 126 Romanticism should be 
aesthetically distinguished from a mere epigone of the classical Weltanschauung, the 
perspectival worldview of the Renaissance. Such a framework no longer produces a 
sense of the real in the historical moment of Romanticism. Therefore, Romanticism is 
a cultural symptom manifesting the collapse of the classical world and a utopian 
pursuit to re-establish the systematic knowledge of universality by means of aesthetic 
122 L~wy and Sayre, Romanticism against the Tide of Modernity, p. 32. 
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strategies against the fragmentation of capitalist rationalisation in which the 
absolutism of God no longer sustains the system of classical knowledge. 
Contrary to the positively scientific Weltanschauung, according to Benjamin, 
'the early Romantics, thanks to their method, dissolve this worldview completely into 
the absolute' .127 The way the early Romantics surmounted the positive science resides 
in the method of "reflection", an absolutely systemic thinking. 128 The Romantic 
reflection was an elaborated Kantian "Reflection" that does not mean speculation, but 
'connotes only a pure referral or reflecting back, obtained by a simple, optical pattern 
and presupposing, moreover, the mediation of an inert, dead body, of a blind tain' .129 
Reflection is equivalent to thinking whereby a mode of consciousness transcends the 
reifications of intuition and reflection. 130 Endorsing this Kantian reflection. the 
Romantic concept of the subject is 'the "I" as an "empty form'" .131 Needless to say. 
this transformation from the Cartesian cogito to the Romantic concept of the subject, 
which presupposed no substantial re-presentation, resulted from the condition that 
what had philosophically supported the classical worldview disappeared - the 
classical value system is melted down by capitalist commodification. The newly 
emerged capitalist exchange value form of commodity definitely destroys the 
hierarchical system of pre-capitalist culture and palpably equalises all individuals 
according to the relationship of commodity exchange in the capitalist market system. 
This is properly what Zizek identifies when he says that 'in capitalism relations 
between men are definitely not 'fetishized" .132 To quote Zizek: 
127 Benjamin, 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', p. 13 1. 
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What we have here are relations between 'free' people, each following his or her 
proper egoistic interests. The predominant and determining form of their 
interrelations is not domination and servitude but a contract between free people 
who are equal in the eyes of the law. 133 
What Romantics were concerned with was the alienation of human 
relationships, 'the destruction of the old organic and communitarian forms of social 
life, the isolation of individuals in their egoistic selves, which taken together 
constitute an important dimension of capitalist civilization, centered on cities' . 134 
However, this is also where the regressive and reactionary trends of later 
Romanticism whose political vision of organic form becomes the feudal picture of 
society. What is at stake is that the Romantic cultural-politics was impotent to provide 
effective strategies penetrating into the kernel of capitalist reification. Not 
surprisingly, this is the reason why the aesthetic of realism reserves its future within 
the impossibility of Romantic irrealism. 
3. The Problem of Romantic Irraallsm 
Contrary to Romantic re-enchantment, realism is characterised as 
demystification of the conventional code of aesthetics. This was partly a disturbing 
factor for Marxist theorists who attempted to combine the Marxist project with the 
Romantic narrative. As Fredric Jameson claims, however, the Marxian vision of 
history can be described as 'the salvational or redemptive perspective of some secure 
future' in the romance paradigm. 135 Jameson's position seems to largely raise the 
question of the close relationship of romance and realistic narrative. The Lukacsean 
\33 Ibid. 
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principle of realism, the reconciliation of subject and object, has an affinity with the 
Romantic utopianism that tries to re-establish the correspondence between the human 
soul and nature. It is in this sense that L6wy and Sayre point out the influence of 
Romanticism on the young Lukacs. 136 
The purpose of those who strategically introduce the Romantic vision into the 
Marxian aesthetics of realism seems to lie in the presupposition that realism comes to 
be a dominant in capitalist cultural production. Jameson also indicates that realism has 
been gradually reified in late capitalism. 137 In this respect, the Romantic anti-capitalist 
tendency is to be welcomed, insofar as it tactically secures the utopian impulse 
towards the future. For Jameson, rationalisation is 'something like the "reality 
principle," the censorship of the new bourgeois social order, from which the longing 
for magic and providential mystery must be smuggled in order to tind symbolic 
appeasement' .138 From Jameson's perspective, rationalisation is included in 
reification. 
The way in which Jameson theoretically grasps Lukacs' concept of reification 
is located in the position that it is 'a synthesis of Marx and Weber' .139 In this respect, 
the concept of reification is nothing less than an elaborate Marxian conception, 'not 
merely of commodity fetishism and exchange but ofthe commodity.l()rm itself. 140 It 
is interesting that Jameson enlarges the signification of reification to subsume not 
only Weber's account of the rationalisation process, but also 'of the mind, of the 
scientific disciplines fully as much as of the psyche and the senses' .141 Strictly 
speaking, there is a difference between Weberian rationalisation and Lukacsean 
136 See L6wy and Sayre, Romanticism against the Tide of Modernity, pp. 104-7. 
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reification. Defining the ethics of modern industrial society as "the spirit of rational 
calculation", Weber's analysis of capitalism can be viewed as an insight penetrating 
into the kernel of capitalist realism. However, the distinction between reification and 
rationalisation as well as commodity fetishism resides in the fact that reification can 
be called a philosophical attempt to bring the Begr(ff(concept) of commodity form 
and fetishism into Marxist thought. Lukacs' theoretical search for the Begr(tTof 
commodification draws on not Weberian but Hegelian methodology; the Weberian 
method rejects the Hegelian dialectical view that contradictions can ultimately be 
integrated into the ideal type, and aims at constructing non-contradictory concepts. 142 
In other words, Weber's concept of rationalisation intends to provide a partial 
view of sociology, different from the study of history, which has a goal of 
dialectically selecting the ideal type. Therefore, the concept of rationalisation presents 
a more specific picture than the concept ofreification, in the sense that Lukacs' 
conceptualisation of reification systematically proposes to establish the dialectical 
Begriff of capitalism beyond a particular discipline of sociology. As Jameson claims, 
it is in this sense that 'the operative paradox of this first extraordinary systemic 
account of the logic of capitalism lies in the way in which it insists on extreme 
fragmentation as a social norm'. 143 Contrary to the Weberian sociological concept of 
rationalisation, this Hegelian Begr(ff of reification itself contains a contradiction in 
which totalisation and fragmentation always collide with each other. Put in Jameson's 
terms, 'it attempts to project a process which separates, compartmentalizes, 
specializes, and disperses: a force which at one and the same time operates uniformly 
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over everything and makes a heterogeneity a homogeneous and standardizing 
power'. 144 
In this sense, Jameson argues that 'what is synchronic is the "concept" of the 
mode of production; the moment of the historical coexistence of several modes of 
production is ... open to history in a dialectical way' .145 Therefore, there is a 
contradictory relationship between the practical and the epistemological dimensions 
within the concept of reification; the reified historical situation always interrupts the 
conceptualisation ofreification. As Jameson properly points out, it is in this sense that 
Lukacs' theoretical approach to reification leads us to think 'a collective project not 
merely capable of breaking the multiple systemic webs of reification, but which must 
do so in order to realize itself .146 Thus, it is meaningless to draw the clear distinction 
between romance and realistic narrative, because those narrative strategies can be 
regarded as aesthetic attempts to surmount the empirical dimension of the capitalist 
reality principle. 
Lowy and Sayre draw on this presumption in order to legitimise their 
argument: if the realistic critique of capitalism retrospectively emerges from a 
reactionary value system, 'it is because they look toward the past that they criticise 
the present with so much acuity and realism' .147 Nevertheless, there is an undeniable 
difference between romantic narrative and realistic narrative. Lowy and Sayre tacitly 
overlook the fundamentally distinctive aspects that distinguish two narratives into 
different political layers. This tendency within their consideration of the relationship 
between Romanticism and realism leads them to focus on the mimetic function of 
realism. More importantly, I suggest, is the idea that realism is not simply an aesthetic 
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category but rather the possibility of an artwork, as such, in modem cultural 
production. To adapt Franco Moretti's notion of Weltliteratur, 148 the possibility of 
realism designates not the name of an aesthetic object, but a problem. 
The dialectical framework that Lukacs employs to criticise the symbolic mode 
of representation proposes to solve the problem of Weber ian formalism. According to 
Lukacs, it is impossible 'to reach an understanding of particular forms by studying 
their successive appearances in an empirical and historical manner'; 149 Lukacs 
deliberately eliminates Weberian sociological positivism, while silently retaining 
Weber's critique of capitalism by means of the Romantic perspective. In this respect, 
Lukacs argues: 
So that if ... the categories describing the structure of a social system are not 
immediately historical, i.e. if the empirical succession of historical events does 
not suffice to explain the origins of a particular form of thought or existence, 
then it can be said that despite this, or better, because of it, any such conceptual 
system will describe in its totality a definite stage in the society as a whole. lso 
Here, Lukacs points out the kernel of the Romantic critique of capitalism, an 
antagonism towards capitalist reification at the very moment when the historical 
transformation of cultural forms rapidly explodes into the every social field. 
Nevertheless, the Romantic critique does not fundamentally grasp the matrix of 
capitalism; it merely pursues its project within the aesthetic dimension, blaming the 
chaotic collapse of traditional codes on the disappearance of the correspondence 
between the human soul and nature. The Romantics' political strategy is exclusively 
revealed in their relatively reactionary attempt to maintain the traditional value system 
148 See Franco Moretti, 'Conjectures on World Literature', New Left Review, I (2000),54-68. For a 
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of aesthetics. The only way the Romantics preserve traditional values is in their 
venture to intentionally separate aesthetics from values. 
In this way. the Romantic symbol becomes an aesthetic monad that is utterly 
original and not in the old sense 'imitated'; 'concrete', yet fluid and suggestive; a 
means to truth, a truth unrelated to, and more exalted than that of positive science. or 
any observation depending upon the discursive reason; out of the flux of life. and 
therefore, under one aspect, dead; yet uniquely alive because of its participation in a 
higher order of existence, and because it is analogous not to a machine but to an 
organism; coextensive in matter and form; resistant to explication; largely 
independent of intention. and of any form of ethical utility. I S I 
These contradictory aspects of Romanticism seem to arise from the aesthetic 
ideology that develops into the critique of capitalist secularisation. In other words, 
Romantics tactically allow the relativity of values in the secular world. while exalting 
their aesthetic ideal to the transcendental dimension. This attempt consists of the 
structure of Romantic utopianism in which something such as "System" beyond 
everyday empirical reality is mystically presupposed. No doubt, Romantic 
melancholy symptomatically arises from this contradictory existential status in which 
the utopian strategies of Romantic aesthetics are always secularised by the capitalist 
market system. Benjamin's analysis of Romanticism aims at investigating this 
impotent situation in which Romantics cannot maintain their dominance of cultural 
power thereby imposing on them 'the disintegration of the aura in the experience of 
shock,.152 Just as Lukacs witnesses the limit of Romantic politics, Benjamin observes 
the problem of Romantic aesthetics. 
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From The Origin o.fGerman Tragic Drama to 'The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction'. Benjamin' s aesthetics consistently aims at establishing a 
new category of "art". which is unlike the Romantic definition of the artwork, in the 
era of consumer society. In his consideration of photography, Benjamin decisively 
reveals the theoretical intention that the Romantic notion of "art" no longer retains its 
validity, precisely because it lacks the insight that technology dialectically opens a 
new direction in the production of the artwork. For Benjamin, the Romantic concept 
of the artwork that influences theoreticians of photography is fetishistic and 
fundamentally anti-technological, and does not successfully grasp the new mode of 
production of the work of art. 153 More importantly, Benjamin' s argument 
presupposes that technology provides a way in which optical experience constitutes 
the category of reality. Dialectically observing the effect of technology in the field of 
cultural production, Benjamin argues that 'to an ever greater degree the work of art 
reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility' .154 This is where 
Adorno and Horkheimer's criticism ofthe culture industry comes into its own. 
4. Critique of the Culture Industry 
There is a widespread preconception of Adorno's criticism of the culture 
industry, a preconception that Adorno's analysis of popular culture is dominated by 
his positive reception of high art, and that Adorno himself overtly tended towards the 
elitism of modernism, rejecting popular culture. 155 However, what Adorno really 
wants to describe in his critique of the culture industry is not the way in which the 
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form of the high art is superior to the form of the low art; but rather the impossible 
condition of conventional aesthetic production: the collapse of the aesthetic condition. 
the very condition in which the work of art can produce its own autonomy. It is 
interesting that Adorno and Horkheimer distinguish the culture industry from "mass 
culture". In 'Culture Industry Reconsidered'. Adorno reveals the intention that was 
implicit in their criticism of the newly emerged system of the cultural production. 
In our draft. we spoke of 'mass culture'. We replace the expression with 'culture 
industry' in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its 
advocates: that it is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously 
from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art. I S6 
The term "culture industry" gives rise to the consideration of the relationship 
between culture and industry. Adopting Benjamin's presupposition of the relationship 
between the work of art and massive technical reproducibility. Adorno develops the 
idea that the long-lasting dichotomy of high and low culture is no longer possible in 
the total system of the culture industry. Adorno plainly acknowledges the positive 
aspect of low culture as rebellious. 157 What Adorno really intends to say with his 
analysis of cultural production in the new stage of capitalism is that the culture 
industry is a precise system by which the distinction of high and low culture becomes 
meaningless. 
What Adorno argues in his conceptualisation of the culture industry is the way 
in which cultural forms can obtain their autonomy, in resisting the holistically 
total ising system that 'transfers the profit motive naked onto cultural forms'. 15K For 
Adorno, the constellations of effects are implicit in the autonomy of works of art; the 
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autonomy of works of art is not a transcendental feature, which is naturally contained 
in their forms as such, but rather an acquired characteristic. In a cursory reading, 
Adorno's definition of the autonomous artwork seems to argue for the possibility of 
art in the age of the culture industry; more interestingly, it seems to me that Adorno 
defends the mediation of an artist in the process of constructing artistic forms. Adorno 
criticises Benjamin's formula of artworks, which asserts the aura of the great work of 
art, in the sense that Benjamin simply liquidates any appeal to 'the actual 
consciousness of actual workers who have absolutely no advantage over the bourgeois 
except their interest in the revolution but otherwise bear all the marks of mutilation of 
the typical bourgeois character'. 159 Partly endorsing Benjamin's observation, Adorno 
praises modernism's battles with capitalist mechanism and materiality, which 
threatens the autonomy of the work of art. The main point that Adorno raises here is 
that the decline of the aura of the work of art emerges not because of its technical 
reproducibility, but rather because of 'the fulfillment of its own 'autonomous' formal 
laws' .160 That is to say, the autonomy of the work of art can be obtained by erasing a 
magical aura from its form. 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno more plainly develops this conceptualisation of 
artworks decisively distinguished from Benjamin's formula: 
Art is motivated by a conflict: Its enchantment, a vestige of its magical phase, is 
constantly repudiated as unmediated sensual immediacy by the progressive 
disenchantment of the world, yet without its ever being possible finally to 
obliterate this magical element. Only in it is art's mimetic character preserved, 
and its truth is the critique that, by its sheer existence, it levels at a rationality 
that has become absolute. Emancipated from its claim to reality, the enchantment 
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is itself tRart of enlightenment: Its semblance disenchants the disenchanted 
world.1 1 
For Adorno, the mimesis of artistic technique is fundamentally paradoxical, in 
the sense that its claim to truth cannot be compatible with its aesthetic truth. Through 
introducing technology into the process of artistic production, the modern artistic act 
consequently rejects emotional spontaneity. This process necessarily excludes the 
individual from artistic creation, since the process subjects rationalisation to the 
aesthetic production. The disenchanted world of science repudiates the artistic 
enchantment in which mimesis can be perceived as sorcery with which truth is 
revealed by semblance. From this standpoint, Adorno stresses the positive aspect of 
autonomous artworks by which "critique" arises from its claim to aesthetic truth, in 
the sense that 'the renunciation of any claim to truth by the preserved magical element 
marks out the terrain of aesthetic semblance and aesthetic truth' .162 Therefore, the 
work of art, which exists in a condition of compromise in relation to the culture 
industry, can serve as the critique of its matrix, insofar as 'art inherits a comportment 
of spirit once directed toward essence, and with it the chance of perceiving mediately 
that which is essential yet otherwise tabooed by the progress of rational 
knowledge' .163 
The paradoxical state of the work of art is constituted by the condition of 
capitalism: the historical stage of the real subsumption of labour under capital in 
Marx's own terms. This is the very moment that both the aestheticisation of industry 
and the industrialisation of aesthetics emerge. Rachel Bowlby describes the 
transformation as follows: 
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In the shift to consumer society, then, modern commerce engages in a curiously 
double enterprise. On the one hand, a process of rationalization: the 
transformation of selling into an industry. The department stores are organized 
like factories, with hundreds of workers, shareholding companies, vast turnovers, 
and careful calculation of continual strategies of expansion. On the other hand, 
the transformation of industry into a shop window. This massive and 
revolutionary extension of scope is achieved by the association of commerce 
with ideological values that seem to be diametrically opposed to the mundane 
actuality of work, profits and rationality. 1M 
Alongside these alterations, signs and images that are the elements of aesthetic 
appeal come to be centred in the terrain of cultural consumption - 'what the new 
large-scale commerce shares with practices derived not from industrial production, 
but from the arts' .165 While industry was becoming more like art, art itself was taking 
on the rationalized structure of industry. 166 Observing this shift, Adorno provides a 
new formula for understanding the fate of aesthetics in the new moment of capitalism. 
In this transitional situation, technology is one of the most crucial categories that 
aesthetics must confront; technology seems to be an opponent of the traditional 
artistic production as in the relationship between photography and painting. Adorno 
considers the link between technology and the work of art as a paradoxical 
relationship, whereas Benjamin implicitly regards it as one of opposition. 
For Adorno, 'the deaestheticization of art is immanent to art ... in accordance 
with the technological tendency of art' .167 There is no distinction between high art and 
low art in the process of de-aestheticisation. Adorno does not point out that 
technology mainly causes the decline of the aura of art; he argues that the aesthetic 
production in general must be regarded as a self-destructive process in which the 
163 Ibid. 
164 Rachel Bowlby, Just Looking: Consumer Culture in Dreiser, Gi.uing and Zola (London: Methuen, 
1985), p. 6. 
165 Ibid., p. 8. 
166 See ibid. 
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work of art comes to function as a component of modern rationalism by its 
technological tendency. What is unique in Adorno's argument is the way in which his 
formulation presupposes cultural transformation by the immanent logic of artworks. 
For Adorno, the traditional cultural forms such as painting and novels give way to 
new ones such as photography and film through technological development. 168 The 
more the mimesis of artistic technique develops, the less the magical aspect of 
artworks declines. The mimesis of artistic technique is nothing less than a process that 
reproduces a new socially dominant sense of reality: 'realism is not a matter of any 
fidelity to an empirical reality, but of the discursive conventions by which and for 
which a sense of reality is constructed' .169 
From this theoretical consideration of the relationship between technology and 
realism, it is not difficult to see that Adorno identifies realism with mimetic 
technique. There is only the cultural logic in the culture industry that the more 
realistic is the more beautiful, in the sense that technology is metaphorically perceived 
as a transparent medium through which natural beauty can be perfectly reflected. In 
other words, there is an immanent demand within the technological reproduction, a 
demand that strives to complete the inadequacy of the mimetic faculty. However, the 
demand for the perfect technique cannot be fulfilled by representation, precisely 
because art is nothing less than the rationallegitimisation of a new knowledge of the 
real; art is not the imitation of natural beauty, but rather natural beauty as such. 
Regarding technology as an artistic material such as language, Adorno seems 
to underestimate the objective presence of technology, a mechanical causality of 
technology that constitutes itself outside the immanent artistic logic and imposes 
167 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory .• p. 59. 
168 See Theodor W. Adorno. 'The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel', in Notes to 
Literature, Vol. I. trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press. 1991). p. 
31. 
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formal transformations on the work of art. Strictly speaking, the system of technology 
serves as a significant alteration from the outside, but Adorno merely considers this as 
a negative effect of the culture industry. As Bowlby claims, 'the massive increase in 
book and journal output during the nineteenth century responded in part to a real 
change in market conditions'. 170 That is to say, the technological development as 
objectivity, which arises from the outside of artistic self-fulfilling laws, where the 
material accumulation gives rise to the process of commodity production in the 
capitalist system, significantly influences the change of artistic form. In a simi lar tone, 
Jameson also defends the validity of the mechanical causality in the transformation of 
artistic form as follows: 
I would want to argue that the category of mechanical effectivity retains a purely 
local validity in cultural analysis where it can be shown that billiard-ball 
causality remains one of the (nonsynchronous) laws of our particular fallen 
social reality. It does little good, in other words, to banish "extrinsic" categories 
from our thinking, when the latter continue to have a hold on the objective 
realities about which we plan to think. There seems, for instance, to have been an 
unquestionable causal relationship between the admittedly extrinsic fact of the 
crisis in late nineteenth-century publishing, during which the dominant three-
decker lending library novel was replaced by a cheaper one-volume format, and 
the modification of the "inner form" of the novel itself. 171 
The mechanical effectivity, affected by technological evolution, is not only 
restricted in the specific moment of the nineteenth century, but is intrinsically linked 
to the development of capitalism. For example, DVD in the twenty-first century can 
be seen to influence film form today as in the case of Apocalypse Now Redux. To 
quote: 
169 John Fiske, Television Culture (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 21. 
170 Bowlby, Just Looking, p. 8. 
171 Jameson, The Political Unconscious. p. 25. 
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Away from the cinemas, video has become a natural home for 'added extras' -
the US video of Natural Born Killers contains the gory footage trimmed to 
ensure its theatrical R-rating -likewise Laserdisc (where Spinal Tap's truly great 
lost scenes were first glimpsed) and now DVD, whose 'special features' are 
often a unique selling point. The DVD of Apoca~vpse NoH' was released last year 
in the States. True to form, it featured a film-length commentary by Coppola, 
plus one deleted scene: the air strike on Colonel Kurtz's compound. So, that's 
one - count it - measly scene for aficionados of a film known to exist in a five-
172 hour rough cut. 
Technology is not only the logic of technique constituting artistic form, hut 
also the mechanically material objectivity which transfonns the mode of cultural 
production from the outside ofthe subjective artistic activity. Therefore, it is feasible 
to claim that the new stage of capitalist accumulation, the process of the real 
subsumption oflabour under capital, as well as the self-fulfillment of artistic 
fonnality, specifically actuates the transition of the cultural production. For this 
reason, Adorno's fonnula must be reinterpreted as a theoretical attempt to explain the 
relationship between the transformation of the mode of production and its effect by 
which the cultural logic of the work of art symptomatically reveals the historical 
changeability of the category of reality. 
5. The Paradox of Mimesis 
There is another hidden impetus behind Adorno's analysis of the relationship 
between the work of art and reality: an aesthetic attack on Lukacs' defence of realism. 
Rejecting the kernel of Lukacsean realism, the idea of perfect form, Adorno abolishes 
Lukacs' ontological presupposition of being, a presupposition by which Lukacs 
grasps the work of art as one of the 'various forms in which men organize those 
actions and reactions of the external world, to which they are always exposed, in some 
172 Andrew Collins, 'The Final Cut - But Not the Last Word', Ohserver, I October 2000. 
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kind of way that will enable them to protect and develop their own existence'. 173 In 
other words, the work of art is a socially symbolic act, carried out in order to fulfil an 
ontological intention. Considering that Lukacs regards the real as the whole, which 
means that the work of art is an example of the real world, a work of art is a key hole 
through which we can see the wider outside world. This is what Lukacs suggests with 
the ontological consideration of the work of art, the Lukacsean presumption about the 
genetic aspect of art in general. In this way, Lukacs confirms that art is a historical 
accomplishment gradually developed by human labour, presupposing that there are 
genetic inconsistencies between art and general social production. 
Adorno also considers the link between art and social production as one of 
connection and disconnection. However, the crucial difference between Lukacs and 
Adorno arises from the fact that Adorno's theory regards the artistic material as the 
elements of reality: the work of art is a new configuration of an image. 174 According 
to Adorno, this image is not a copy of reality, but rather 'objectivation thereby negates 
the process and reduces it to a mere as-if. 175 This image supposedly emancipates the 
elements of reality from reification - from the fixed functions in the social cultural 
system. 
The distinction between realism and naturalism, on which Lukacs' formula is 
consistently based, becomes meaningless in Adorno's definition of artworks, 
precisely because there is no integrated form of the work of art, but rather a 
paradoxically conflicting one. Therefore, it does not matter whether an artwork is 
realistic or not, because realism is not so much a stable aesthetic category as a tension 
between the formal law of an autonomous artwork and the material reality; realism is 
173 Georg Lukacs, Conversations with LukiJcs, ed. by Thea Pirkus. trans. by David Fembach (London: 
Merlin Press, 1974), p. 14. 
174 See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory. p. 280. 
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inherent in the form of artworks. Adorno sees the mimetic impulse, which Benjamin 
raises in his discussion of the mass cultural production, as a paradox that is 
necessarily internalised in its enlightenment pursuit. In this respect, the work of art 
can acquire its autonomy only through resisting realism. 
According to Christopher Prendergast, Adorno's standpoint is that, by 
achieving the autonomy from the material law of capitalism, the work of art can be 
liberating and even revolutionary, insofar as 'it was held to extricate us from the grip 
of ideology and its naturalizing habits'. 176 Yet, it is not plausible that self-consciously 
autonomous artworks could produce a distance in which the revolutionary speculation 
permanently comes to exist in its own right. This is because scientitic revolution 
fundamentally undermines 'the very foundation of freedom, by teaching us that we 
are caught in the blind determinisms and mechanisms of a purely material world' .177 
This is where Adorno's critique of power and domination remains paradoxical in the 
sense that the mimetic impulse, prompting the development of artistic technique, can 
be seen as the subjective identification with the object in the Freudian sense. In 
contrast to Lukacs, Adorno alludes to mimesis as subjective, imitative visualisation 
which bears no relation to the representation of objects. 
From this perspective, it is not uncommon to think that there is a crucial 
distinction between Lukacs and Adorno in the light of their argument over mimesis. 
Adorno consistently postulates his formula of mimesis in contrast to Lukacs. For 
Lukacs, realism is not so much related to the technique of mimesis, but rather 'the 
future perspective which it should put forward'; 17K Realism is not related to the 
question about to what degree a specific artwork has absorbed more actuality; hence, 
it depends on the future perspective whether realism can be accomplished in a work of 
.76 Christopher Prendergast, 'Modernism's Nightmare?'. New Le/i Review, 10 (2001). 141-156 (p.142) . 
• 77 Ibid. . 
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art. As we have seen, it is for Lukacs that the future perspective designates the artistic 
impulse to reach totality in its resistance against the subjective illusion of reality such 
as naturalism. Interestingly, Adorno rejects this formula in the sense that totality fails 
to contain something outside its conceptualisation: 'totality is a reified society as 
such' .179 
To abolish the concept of totality, Adorno employs Konslellation, a revised 
version of Benjamin's notion which' seeks specifically to undermine its own 
provisional architectonic ... terms' .180 To be sure, Goethe's idea of plurality of an 
artwork initially inspired Benjamin's terminology; Goethe considers the relation of 
artworks to art as 'unity in plurality - which means that the unity of art is found again 
and again in plurality of works'. 181 This conception is squarely opposed to 
Romantics' definition of the work of art as 'infinity in totality - which means that the 
infinity of art is fulfilled in the totality ofworks,.182 Positively receiving this idea of 
Darstellung, Adorno reinvents the concept of constellations, which means 'all the 
elements are present but the form of their juxtapositions, the shape of their falling out, 
is merely occasional' .183 Adorno explains this notion as follows: 
By themselves, constellations represent from without what the concept has cut 
away within: the "more" which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of 
being. By gathering around the object of cognition. the concepts potentially 
determine the object's interior. They attain. in thinking, what was necessarily 
. d ~ h' k' 184 excise lrom t m mg. 
178 Lukacs, Conversations with Lukacs, p. 36. 
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In short, constellations designate something outside Weberian sociological 
Begriffin which the actuality of contradictions must be repressed. For Adorno, thc 
inert aspect of concepts accounts for Lukacs' conceptualisation of totality. 185 Against 
the concept of totality, Adorno postulates constellations as 'everything does not 
become resolved, everything does not come out even; rather, one moment sheds light 
on the other, and the figures that the individual moments form together are specific 
signs and a legible script'. 186 It is not difficult to see that there is a surprising 
similarity between Adorno's Konstellation and Althusscr's surdeterminlltion; 
'constellation is not systemd87 but overdetermined relations in which the psychical 
dimension is closely interrelated with the material sphere. They use these categories 
to illuminate the something outside theory, in a way that borrows other disciplinary 
terms, which do not belong to orthodox Marxism, to attack the Lukacsean concept of 
totality. 188 
On the other hand, what they really wanted to do in criticising the concept of 
totality does not seem to fit with the way in which they reject the category of totality 
as such. For totalisation and totality are the elements which ratify whether any 
knowledge of reality is properly correct or not - they are supposed to prove their 
arguments to be more true than what they criticise. Therefore, it would not be far 
wrong to say that they aim at ruling out the teleological aspect, which is implicit in 
Lukacs' formulation of totality. 
Allowing for his scepticism of human reason as such, Adorno's attack on 
Lukacs is based on the analysis of enlightenment rationalism. In Adorno's sense, the 
185 See ibid., p. 51. 
186 Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1993), p. 109. 
187 Ibid. 
IS8 For this theoretical similarity, see Dieter Kliche, 'Kunst gegen Verdinglichung: BerUhrungspunkte 
im Gegensatz von Adorno und Lukacs', in Materialien, p. 243. Kliche claims that Adorno' theory of 
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conceptualisation of totality is nothing less than "Nachkonslruklion", as much as in 
the case of Freudian Nachtraglichkeif. For Adorno, the concept of totality cannot 
reach non-conceptuality. Adorno's theoretical pursuit does not allow any claim for 
realism, but rather argues the autonomy of the work of art, in I ine with rejecting the 
concept of totality. In addition, Adorno's sceptical attitude towards Lukacs is 
precisely related to the way in which Adorno grasps reification as an iron web that is 
totally universalised in administrative society. In this sense, Adorno argues that the 
omnipresence ofrepression is unperceived. llI9 
Far distinguished from Lukacs, who presupposes capitalist commodity-
structure as a cause ofreification, Adorno understands reification as a by-product of 
the enlightenment rationalism that constitutes the modern institution and power. In 
Negative Dialectics, Adorno argues as follows: 
Scientific objectification, in line with the quantifying tendency of all science 
since Descartes, tends to eliminate qualities and to transform them into 
measurable definitions. Increasingly, rationality itself is equated more 
mathematico with the faculty of quantification. While perfectly corresponding to 
the primacy of a triumphant natural science, this faculty is by no means inherent 
in the concept of the ratio itself, which is blinded mainly when it balks at the 
idea that qualitative moments on their part are susceptible of rational 
• 190 
conceptIon. 
For Adorno, reification does not arise simply from the commodity structure, 
but rather from the principle of thought thereby identifying nature with reason. The 
identification is the very faculty of the mimetic impulse that Benjamin eonceptualiscs 
in his consideration of the relationship between art and technology. In contrast to 
mimesis fundamentally presumes the "symptomatic character" of reflection, which constitutes the 
structure of analogies. 
189 See Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schr((ten. Vol. 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1972). p. 
377. 
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Benjamin, Adorno suggests that the mimetic faculty of technology is the ideological 
mechanism, which is related to the demand for self-preservation. 
A significant factor in Adorno's consideration of mimesis lies in the way in 
which he denotes the demand for self-preservation as the logic of man's dominance of 
nature. With progressive enlightenment that alienates man from nature, the mimetic 
mode of human behaviour and mythical and metaphysical mode have declined. This 
gradually changing historical phase leaves the old modes to be thought of as secret 
and props up a paradoxical condition that realism still stays at the centre of the 
cultural power. In particular, the mimetic behaviour yet constitutes the baleful belief 
of rationalism, which identifies nature with reason. This identifying principle of 
thought gives rise to the exchange system in which values are identified with the 
materiality of commodity. 
Adorno's scepticism regarding rationality leads to a rejection of any possible 
autonomy of subjectivity in the administrative society. To quote Adorno and 
Horkheimer: 
Subjectivity has given way to the logic of the allegedly indifferent rules of the 
game, in order to dictate all the more unrestrainedly. Positivism, which finally 
did not spare thought itself, the chimera in a cerebral form, has removed the very 
last insulating instance between individual behavior and the social norm. The 
technical process, into which the subject has objectified itself after being 
removed from the consciousness, is free of the ambiguity of mythic thought as of 
all meaning altogether, because reason itself has become the mere instrument of 
the all-inclusive economic apparatus. 191 
For Adorno, the social situation in which human beings become a mere 
functional instrument of a total system produces the death of the suhject. In other 
words, the autonomy of the subject that Kantian philosophy proclaimed no longer 
)9) Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 30. 
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exists in the administrative society. The subject becomes an object - the very status 
that Lukacs calls reification. This reified state can be regarded as completely totalised 
immanent relations whereby the distance between the subject and the object totally 
disappears: put it in Adorno's own terms, it is the "uusweglos geschlossene 
Immanenzzusammenhang (hopelessly unified immanent connection),'. 192 For Adorno. 
the administrative society means a total system not allowing any self-consciousness. 
Interestingly, Adorno's understanding of reification is based on Lukacs' formula; 
Adorno also uses this notion to indicate the situation in which the qualitative is 
measured by the quantitative. Although Adorno is interested in the way in which the 
exchange principle is related to the identifying thought in his analysis of reitication. 
whereas Lukacs stresses the identification ofthe subject and the object in the process 
of achieving totality. 
In Lukacs' sense, reification can be overpowered only by 'constant and 
constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely 
relating to the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by 
becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the total 
development' .193 Adorno criticises this formulation as the violence of identity 
thinking thereby ruling out the possibility of non-conceptuality; the concept of totality 
deliberately implicates the forced identification of the subject and the object. 
Furthermore, Adorno strategically emphasises an epistemic rupture that results from 
the issue of Auschwitz; Adorno's theoretical pursuit is based on the philosophical 
shift from the ontological problematic to the cognitive one. According to Adorno, 'an 
imperceptible change has taken place in the philosophical need: from a need for 
192 See Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1966). p. 395. 
193 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 197. 
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substance and solidity it has turned into a need to avoid the spiritual reitication which 
society has carried out and categorically dictated to its members' .1')4 
This is a far different position from what Lukacs suggests in History and Class 
Consciousness: 'only when the consciousness of the proletariat is able to point out the 
road along which the dialectics of history is objectively impelled, but which it cannot 
travel unaided, will the consciousness of the proletariat awaken to a consciousness of 
the process, and only then will the proletariat become the identical subject-object of 
history whose praxis will change reality' .195 That is to say, for Adorno there is no 
subjectivity to achieve self-consciousness such as class-consciousness in the 
administrative totalising system. 
In contrast to Lukacs who endorses Marx's dialectical consideration of 
capitalism, a consideration that capitalism produces 'its own grave-diggers', 196 
Adorno plainly rules out any important role of working class in the administrative 
society. This is a symptomatic turning point in Marxist theory, in the sense that 
Adorno's theoretical revision intrinsically rejects the category of the working class as 
the weapon of destruction for the capitalist system: the working class is no longer 
revolutionary, while the media of the consumer society effectively paralyses the 
individual workers. From this perspective, Adorno grasps experience rather than form 
as the most significant element in the process of the subjective perception; form is 
already always contaminated by enlightenment rationalism: form inherently contains 
the paradoxical aspect of technology. 
Adorno's sceptical argument of the subject arises from the presupposition that 
there is nothing to do for the subject, even if recognising the structure of repression in 
the modern society. What Adorno describes as the symptomatic example of 
194 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 90. 
195 Ibid. 
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desperation, which the subjective perception of the structure produces, is the 
philosophy of Existentialism. Adorno argues that' if society could be seen through as 
a closed system, a system accordingly unreconciled to the subject, it would become 
too embarrassing for the subject as long as they remain subjects in any sense'. 197 In 
this respect, the existential anxiety is 'the claustrophobia of a systematized society'. 19M 
An important point in this consideration lies in the way in which Adorno 
suggests a new way to step out of reification in late capitalism, insofar as his 
theoretical pursuit aims at reformulating Lukacs' conceptualisation of class-
consciousness with the privileged concept of experience. In Adorno's sense, 
experience is not positive conceptualisation but rather Benjamin's notion of 
"Erlebnis", the discontinuous experience; 199 Adorno's concept of experience strictly 
designates the sensuous mimesis of the object that is not distorted by the identifying 
principle of thought. For Benjamin, experience cannot be reconstructed - 'experiences 
are lived similarities' .200 Furthermore, Benjamin claims that 'what is decisive here is 
not the causal connections established over the course of time, but the similarities that 
have been lived,?OI In this respect, it is not difficult to see that Benjamin's theory of 
experience strongly repudiates the positivistic realism that has recourse to the idea of 
"Erfahrung", the continuous experience, the very idea that paves a way to the 
identifying principle of thought. What is implicit in Benjamin's consideration is that 
to learn by experience is the way to break the web of reification. 
As has been discussed, for Benjamin the masses' habitual beliefs of reality 
repudiate any sensuous experience. Thus, the urgent philosophical task is to make the 
196 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Verso, 1998), p. 50. 
197 Adorno, Negative dialectics, p. 24. . 
198 Ibid. 
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masses learn by experience, a task to restore lived similarity in the moment of 
mimesis. In this sense, it is not far wrong to say that Benjamin's theory of experience 
is closely related to his consideration of the mimetic faculty. Adorno theoretically 
draws on Benjamin's formulation to support his argument of the way in which the 
subject can escape from the iron web ofreification. Adorno applies Benjamin's 
conceptualisation of experience for his reformulation of class-consciousness. On the 
condition that the working class no longer exists in its own right, the category of 
class-consciousness, which defines the identity of proletariat, cannot be properly 
reserved. The society that Adorno assumes in his discussion does not allow any 
contlict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but rather the administrative 
relation between the elite and the mass. Therefore, it is important that the subject 
decides to awake himself out of the habitual cognition of the object. This is the point 
where Adorno adopts Benjamin's category of habit in relation to mimesis. 
Adorno's strategy of de-reification specifically belongs to the subjective 
decision, the decision to learn by experience without any attempt to identify 
subjectivity with the object; the subject is not so much an element of the constituted 
objectivity but rather an agency of the object. This is what is different from Lukacs' 
formulation in Adorno's account of the relationship between the subject and the 
object. Adorno reveals his intention to substitute the category of experience for that of 
class-consciousness by retaining the object's preponderance in formulation. In this 
respect, for Adorno realism is an aesthetic category that resorts to the identifying 
principle of thought, precisely because realism reinforces the habitual cognition. On 
the other hand, the resistance against realism means that art can promise social 
emancipation; realism is the aesthetic form of a typical instrumental reason. Adopting 
Benjamin's presumption of mimesis, Adorno regards real cognition as something 
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related to sensuous experience: mimesis is the instinctive mimicry behaviour 
immanent in all lives. This is where Adorno endorses Benjamin's conceptualisation of 
the mimetic faculty to legitimise his criticism of realism throughout his theory of the 
relationship between mimesis and art. 
This perspective of mimesis crucially leads Adorno to the way in which he 
considers enlightenment as a paradoxical process of civilisation itself, a process 
precipitating the intellectual regression. For Adorno, the enlightenment project 
increasingly destroys the sensuous mimetic faculty, while fortifying reification and 
instrumental reason; however, Adorno finds the remnants of the preserved sensuous 
mimesis in art; art is a mutated mimesis through the process of the modern 
rationalisation, by which rationality is combined with the sensuous mimetic faculty. 
In this respect, Adorno argues that 'art is a refuge for mimetic comportment'. 202 Here, 
Adorno chooses a different way from Benjamin: he does not agree with Benjamin, 
who conceptualises the autonomy of artworks as a magical aura. It is interesting that 
Adorno specifically points out the paradoxical character of art by which 'the subject 
exposes itself, at various levels of autonomy, to its other, separated from it and yet not 
altogether separated' .203 When considering that modern subjectivity is closely related 
to the Cartesian cogito, what Adorno implies with his analysis is that art is a rational 
device to disavow magical practices - the mimesis of art is possible by its rational 
feature. More importantly, yet, the paradoxical mimetic faculty of art leads to 
irrationality by means of its rationality, in the sense that all rationality aims at 
necessarily achieving something irrational. Therefore, it is not surprising that art is 'u 
response to the faulty irrationality of the rational world as an overadministcred 
202 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 53. 
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world' .204 From this perspective, Adorno describes the paradoxical aspects of art as 
follows: 
To speak of "the magic of art" is trite because art is allergic to any relapses into 
magic. Art is a stage in the process of what Max Weber called the 
disenchantment of the world, and it is entwined with rationalization ... 
Nevertheless, the cliche about the magic of art has something true about it. The 
survival of mimesis. the non conceptual affinity of the subjectively produced with 
its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and to that extent as 
"rational".205 
In this respect, 'art is rationality that criticizes rationality without withdrawing 
from iC206 - art is not prerational or irrational. The mimetic faculty of art endows art 
with the privileged character whereby artworks preserve a spiritual mode of conduct. 
In this sense, the character of art as knowledge is precisely based on the way in which 
'art completes knowledge with what is excluded from knowledge,207 - the non-
conceptuality of the sensuous experience. This is where an emancipating element of 
art comes to exist in its own right. For Adorno, it is only art that can lead the subject 
to the objective experience, the experience that 'is not directly accessible to discursive 
conceptualization,.208 This character allows artworks to have a paradoxical function in 
a totalising society. As Adorno puts it, 'if it holds true that the subjective rationality of 
means and ends ... requires spurious irrational enclaves and treats art as such, art is 
nevertheless the truth of society insofar as in its most authentic products the 
irrationality of the rational world order is expressed' .20Q No doubt, this is the very way 
in which the dialectic of art reveals its truth through its participation of enlightenment. 
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Adorno raises the critical issue of realism in his analysis of the character of 
artworks, an issue of how the subject breaks the deadlock ofreification in late 
capitalism. However, it seems to me that Adorno simply overlooks the fundamental 
distinction between artworks and reality. What Adorno attempts to do in his 
discussion of art lies in the way in which he challenges the conventional difference 
between the subject and the object. To legitimise his theoretical reformulation of this 
dualism, Adorno also draws psychoanalytic categories into Marxist theoretical 
contexts, while secretly communicating with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche,210 as in the 
cases of other theorists like Althusser and Zizek. 
Adorno regards concepts as mental tools, 'tools for the adjustment and domination of 
reality by a subject motivated essentially by desire for self-preservation' .211 Adorno 
comes to focus on the system-generating ego principle, 'the connecting link between 
the unity of the subject'.212 Therefore, the de-reification is possible only through its 
own mediation of concept, precisely because it is the concept that 'turns against the 
reifying tendency of conceptual thought' .213 More importantly, Adorno signifies this 
self-conquering character of the concept as the combination of a mimetic moment and 
conceptuality. Adorno explains the way in which artworks paradoxically reveal truth 
by their autonomy - their non-conceptuality of the mimetic moment. In other words. 
subjectivity, whereby art constitutes its autonomy, can speak of truth, insofar as the 
subjective rationality of means and ends, which contains the irrational character 
within it, truly produces artworks overcoming the irrationality of rationalisation. 
What is implicit in Adorno's analysis is that art symbolically constitutes its 
cultural logic of the real in the process of its imitating capacity. From Lukacs' 
2\0 For these influences, see Albrecht Wellmer, 'Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic 
Redemption of Modernity', trans. by Maeve Cooke, Telos, 62 (1984-85), pp. 89-115. 
211 Ibid., p. 91. 
212 Ibid. 
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standpoint, this is not the problem of the artistic form as such, but rather that of 
reality. On the other hand, for Adorno the reality of artworks is nothing less than a by-
product of its image feature; thus, truth is hidden under the imaginary nexus of 
meanings. In Adorno's sense, whether art could speak of social truth depends on its 
negation ofthe conventional cultural code system; by means of this negative strategy, 
the autonomous artwork comes to exist as a critique. 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that Adorno's idea of art presupposes the 
incorporation of philosophy and art. This seems as if Adorno also deserves his own 
criticism of Brechtian and Sartrean committed plays. Adorno denounces those plays 
as 'vehicles for the author's ideas' .214 Even though Adorno stresses the mediated 
function of form, he does not elucidate the way in which the work of art tinds its own 
path to step out of traditional philosophical ideas. It goes without saying that this is 
the paradox of Adorno's formulation; his aesthetic theory cannot provide the proper 
category to consider the non-philosophically realistic tendency of the contemporary 
cultural politics such as postmodernism. In short, Adorno's aesthetic judgements 
cannot be free from the suspicion of traditionalism. This other side of Adorno's 
aesthetic raises an interesting problem of realism, the problem of the relationship 
between memory and representation. 
6. The Mimetic Moment 
Endorsing Benjamin's understanding of experience, Adorno reformulates the 
utopian possibility of "mimesis" in late capitalism. Adorno's defence of mimesis is 
far different from Lukacs' realism - Adorno mainly focuses on the technical aspect of 
art in his analysis of the relationship between mimesis and knowledge. I n Adorno's 
213 Ibid. 
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sense, what must be repudiated in the classical realistic mode of representation is the 
identifying principle of thought, which Benjamin criticises in terms of the philistine's 
conviction of experience. 
Adorno's presupposition is that the artistic logic of realism is another 
technological adaptation of the identifying principle of capitalism: realism reinforces 
the conviction of the subjective experience by means of its category of reality. This is 
squarely in concord with the perspective of modernism in which artistic experiments 
finally end up in the technical impasse, as one of the characters in The Waves 
acknowledges. It is the utopian impulse towards truth that perplexes these technical 
pursuits in the aesthetic production of modernism. Bernard, the phrase-maker in this 
novel, confesses: 
After a long lifetime, in a moment of revelation, I may lay hands on it, but now 
the idea breaks in my hand. Ideas break a thousand times for once that they globe 
h I . 215 t emse yes entIre. 
For Adorno, the revelation ofthe "true story" is related to the incessant 
experiments of artistic techniques against worldly realism: 'the anti-realistic moment 
in the modem novel, its metaphysical dimension, is called forth by its true subject 
matter, a society in which human beings have been tom from one another and from 
themselves' .216 No doubt, the way in which Adorno finds the utopian moment in these 
aesthetic pursuits resides in the paradoxical characteristic of experience raised by 
Benjamin. For Benjamin, experience must be grasped as paradoxical; 'it can be 
hostile to spirit and destructive to many blossoming dreams'. and at the same time 'it 
214 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Commitment', in Aesthetics and Politics, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and 
others (London: Verso, 1980), p. 182. 
21S Virginia Woolf, The Waves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 129. 
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is the most beautiful, most untouchable, most immediate because it can never be 
without spirit' .217 
The fundamental discrepancy between dream and experience results from the 
idea of representation, the idea of something that cannot be represented in what we 
know in our knowledge of experience. Representation always already presupposes the 
sublime object in its own right; representation is a symbolic system in which the 
individual fantasy comes to be combined with the collective ideology. In a similar 
B .. h . b I ., I ' '18 I . tone, enJamm argues t at 'a so ute expenence IS ... anguage:- anguage IS 
systematic and symbolic framework by which our knowledge of experience is 
constituted. Interestingly, Lukacs alludes to this aspect of experience in his later 
consideration of realism, in the way that encapsulates different meanings. To quote 
Lukacs: 
Ifwe are speaking of the concept of realism, what I mean by this is a kind of 
literature which, in polemical writings about the Soviet era, I called realism from 
Homer to Gorky. I took this in a literal sense, without wishing to compare Gorky 
with Homer, rather in order to say that a common tendency is involved, which is 
not one of techniques of expression, of style, etc., but rather an orientation to the 
real, essential nature of mankind, persisting through a developmental process. 
The problem of realism is related to this, and so realism is naturally not a 
stylistic concept. Rather, the art of any time - and this is the essential thing-
relates the immediate problems of its age to the general development of mankind 
and links them with it. a connection which may of course be quite hidden from 
the writer himself?19 
For Lukacs, the work of art becomes the memory of humanity through the 
symbolic systematisation of experience. It may be said that this similarity between 
216 Theodor W. Adorno. 'The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel', in Notes to 
Literature, Vo/.J, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). p. 
32. 
217 Walter Benjamin, 'Experience', in Selected Writings, volume I: 1913-1926. trans. by David 
Lachterman, Howard Eiland and Ian Balfour (London: Belknap. 1996). p. 5. 
218 Walter Benjamin, 'On Perception" in Selected Writings, Volume I: 1913-1926. trans. by David 
Lachterman, Howard Eiland and Ian Balfour (London: Belknap, 1996), p. 96. 
219 Lukacs, Conversations with Lukacs, p. 37. 
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Lukacs and Benjamin derives from their early career decisively developed in the neo-
Kantian mood,no in the sense that neo-Kantian aesthetics defines the work of art as a 
symbolic form associated with the logic of WeltanschauunR. However, there is an 
undeniable difference between them: Lukacs and Benjamin plainly presuppose that 
the mode of production imposes the change of a category of real ity, while neo-
Kantian aesthetics postulates the transcendental category of WeltanschauunR to 
explain the formal transformation. Like Lukacs, Benjamin also distances himself from 
the tradition ofneo-Kantianism.221 
What Lukacs strives to manifest with the notion of "an orientation to the real" 
means the way in which the writer himself consistently searches for reality, stepping 
out of the habitual category of reality. In this way, realism is not so much an aesthetic 
ideology as methodological stance serving as the process of total isation, a total ising 
process in which writers or artists find the hidden connection between their artistic 
activity and the general development of mankind. Therefore, Lukacs believes that 
realism is the only aesthetic expression of Marxism, in the sense that the realistic 
mode of representation promises the criterion of the scientific perspective, the 
category of totality. This aspect of realism is specifically related to the problem of 
knowledge, which is necessarily acquired through the process of "imitation".:m 
There is no doubt that Lukacs' formula, from the outset, presupposes a 
theoretical norm different from Adorno's. To put the problem of imitation as the 
central category in his consideration of realism, Lukacs particularly postulates artistic 
production as a way of making a "likeness" through the process of imitating nature. 
220 In his first curriculum vitae, Benjamin writes that he attended the lecturt!s delivered by Cassirer and 
Simmel. See Walter Benjamin, 'Curriculum Vitae (I)', in Selected Writings, Volume I: lc)I3-1c)26, 
trans. by David Lachterman, Howard Eiland and Ian Balfour (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), p. 422. 
221 See Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 1998), p. I. 
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This seems to be different from Adorno's formulation of art, for Adorno stresses the 
technical aspect of the artwork that immanently desires to become nature as such. It 
may be easy to see that Adorno's theory of the aesthetic sets forth the idea that the art 
does not aim at producing a replica of nature, but rather a creature to rival nature. 
However, a more important point is that Adorno explicitly stresses the mimetic 
moment in the process of the artistic production. For Adorno, art is not so much the 
replacement of mythology, but reification of the mimetic moment. The way in which 
Lukacs' understanding of "imitation" as a significant category of art, whereby art 
historically becomes an element in the totality of human activities, is surprisingly 
similar to what Adorno glimpses in his consideration of the mimetic moment. 
Lukacs at once admits the technical characteristic as an essential part of 
artistic form, but also claims that art is ultimately independent of technique. For 
Lukacs, the performed aspect of content is more important than formalistic technique 
- the future perspective of artworks. Unlike Adorno, Lukacs does not tind the utopian 
impulse in the technological aspect of mimesis as such, but rather a typical figure of 
human lives that appears in the process of history. In a sense, mimesis is a libidinal 
investment concentrating on the object. Adorno believes that this desire can allow an 
understanding of desire itself through its utopian goal. 
What Adorno suggests in his defence of the mimetic moment is similar to the 
Freudian conceptualisation of sublimation - an activity that leads desire to the non-
sexual object. Mimesis is the identifying desire with the object, and at the same time, 
the disenchantment of the object. In this way, "writing", whereby 'second nature 
recognizes itself as first nature', is a process in which the mimetic activity proceeds in 
222 For Lukacs' own discussion of this problem, see Georg Lukacs • . 4'e.l'fhefik I (Neuwied: Luchterhand. 
1972), p. 160. 
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several dimensions towards imitating the 0~ject.223 For Adorno. mimesis is not an 
image itself but the condition of the image; the mimetic process becomes dupl icated 
through its conscious reflection of the object, separating the loved object from the 
hated object. 
The desire for identification comes into conflict with a longing for difference. 
the demand for novelty in Benjamin's terms. Mimesis secretly points to something 
differently new, while reinforcing the existing knowledge of reality. However. there 
arises the question about Adorno's defence of the mimetic moment for cognitive 
emancipation, when considering the aestheticisation of the culture industry. For the 
paradoxical mimetic moment of artistic technique, which functions as both 
opportunities of semblance and difference, seems impotent when it comes to finding a 
way out of reification that broadly influences our recognition of reality in consumer 
society. 
The differentiation of products by commercial branding is analogous to the 
way in which artistic technique provides a new style to the old form in the process of 
artistic production. The technicality of artistic form is always ready for external 
commodification to seize on it. Adorno's criticism aims to attack this commercial use 
of the artistic technique in the culture industry; yet, it is difficult to find today those 
thriving technical experiments free from the iron cage of commercial aestheticisation. 
In the situation of late capitalism, where the autonomy of artworks is no longer 
possible, the utopian impulse towards truth, which is immanent in the mimetic 
moment, seems to square the circle, in the sense that the identifying desire of mimesis 
cannot create the new category of "novelty". Unfortunately, the differences floating 
on the surface of this new situation are not based on the distinction between the old 
m See Theodor W. Adorno, 'The Essay as Form', in Noles to Litera/ure. Vol. /, trans. by Shicrry 
Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 20. 
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and the new as much as Adorno assumes. This is the very circumstance that Jameson 
regards postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism. 
Undermining the ground on which realism stands in its own right. Adorno's 
attack on realism aims at disenchanting the principle of realism, transforming the 
reality, the truth of realism, into appearance. After Adorno, this demystification of 
realism continues on its way throughout various theoretical considerations of realism 
and representation. Consequently, this pursuit discloses that 'the concept of 
modernism, realism's historical counterpart and its dialectical mirror-image, is not 
equally contradictory,;224 modernism historically arose from the ruin of realism as an 
aesthetic symptom, tactically responding to the transformation of the cultural 
condition of realism. 
The introduction of technology into aesthetic production gives rise to the 
transition of the traditional category of reality. In this way, realism loses its proper 
aesthetic position, in the sense that the total ising system of the culture industry 
deconstructs the distance between the work of art and the spectator. 
Adorno's formulation of the culture industry seems to serve as the theoretical 
analysis of how the identifying principle of thought underpins the aesthetic production 
in the situation of late capitalism, in which the real subsumption of labour under 
capital comes to dominate the system of production. In this sense, Adorno's 
formulation of the work of art provides the way in which the problem of the 
relationship between reality and representation moves from an ontological category to 
an epistemological category. That is to say, Adorno pushes Benjamin's notion of 
experience beyond Lukacs' concept of totality to the utopian dimension of cognition. 
224 J 'R tl . . C I' arneson, e eetlOns In one uSlon', p. 198. 
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Adorno's theory assumes the way in which writers give up the classical 
representation paradigm, which is supported by the belief that the subjectivity 
properly reflects the object, adapting the anti-realistic perspective. To theoretically 
legitimise his argument, Adorno draws on Benjamin's presupposition of experience 
throughout his analysis of mimesis. Adorno suggests that mimesis is nothing less than 
the objectification of subjectivity in order to create the new knowledge of reality 
against the old one. Adorno attempts to find the possibility of emancipation in this 
process of creation - the new knowledge or category of reality can promise the 
liberating space for the subject. In this formula, the classical concept of representation 
is no longer sustainable, insofar as the dichotomy of the subject and the object 
incessantly supports the way in which realism is possible. As a result, Adorno 
attempts to clear up the condition of artistic production through the investigation of 
mimesis. However, his pursuit remains utopian in the newly emerged state of 
postmodernism, in the sense that, in this new circumstance, novcJty as such simply 
precipitates into the commodity by the total system of late capitalism. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REALISM AND METHOD: BRECHT AND SARTRE 
Introduction 
There is no doubt that one cannot delineate the whole contour of the Marxist 
debates revolving around realism without Brecht; he is the thinker who suggests not 
only the idea but also the method in a series of aesthetic disputes. Epic theatre is the 
method that embodies the Brechtian idea of realism. 
The Brechtian conceptualisation of epic theatre suggests that the category of 
realism can be achieved by rejecting old literary and theatrical apparatuses. For 
Brecht, a specific form is nothing less than a part of "Great Method", a method that is 
consistent with the way of living. I In this way, the Brechtian category of method 
always already includes an ethical and a political as well as an epistemological 
dimension: this is the precise goal which Brechtian realism aims at accomplishing 
throughout its aesthetic practice. Therefore, the Brechtian concept of technique 
reveals the way in which one can produce a particular effect in the process of cultural 
practice, and invents a mode of perception. 
The Brechtian idea of realism is woven in with various practical dimensions, 
in particular, the pedagogy of theatre. Brecht stresses the pedagogical function of 
realism, which can be carried out by the effect of estrangement. Sartre, however, 
repudiates the Brechtian pedagogy; for Sartre, Brechtian epic theatre mainly provides 
a judgement, rather than a communicative correlation between actors and audience. 
Sartre raises not the question of the pedagogical function of theatre, but rather the 
question of the way in which the audience's intellection can be re-educated by the 
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image in theatre; in Sartre' s formula, the most important element in theatre is to 
expose the contradictory aspect of subjectivity through action. 
Sartre's formulation of theatre presupposes the transcendental unity of actors 
and audience; everybody shares the equal capacity to think and to communicate with 
each other; there is no distinction between actors and audience. In Sartre's sense, 
actors can be the audience and vice versa; they can achieve a communicative 
correlation through the analogical image of the other. 
In this chapter, I contend that Sartre's criticism of Brecht raises several 
important issues about realism. More importantly, my concern in this chapter is to 
explore the way in which Brecht and Sartre constitute the logic of realism against the 
conventional category of reality. First, the chapter examines Brecht's idea of realism 
that is embodied in his formulation of epic theatre. Second, my discussion investigates 
the interrelation between Brecht's concept of estrangement-effect and Benjamin's 
conceptualisation of dialectical image, in considering the Brechtian category of 
method in his formulation of realism. Finally, the chapter provides an argument about 
Sartre's criticism of Brecht, emphasising Sartre's attempt to reformulate the issue of 
Brechtian realism in a changed situation, a situation in which actually existing 
socialism loses its authenticity, and bourgeois cultural dominance totalises the realm 
of aesthetic production as well as the mode of production. 
1. Theatrical Realism 
The point at issue in Brecht's discussion of realism can be defined in relation 
to theatre. Brecht's idea of theatre arises from the cultural context of Marxist 
aesthetics; his argument aims at attacking Lukacs' formulation of realism, which is 
I See Fredric Jameson, Brecht and Method (London: Verso. 1(98), p. 109. 
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based on the traditional framework of representation; hence. Brecht's theory of 
realism cannot be considered separately from the aesthetic debates among other 
Marxist theorists. An important element in Brecht's aesthetic resides in the way in 
which his conceptualisation of realism rightly reveals the problem of Lukacsean genre 
criticism. Brecht claims: 
The formalistic nature of the theory of realism is demonstrated by the fact that 
not only is it exclusively based on the form of a few bourgeois novels of the 
previous century (more recent novels are merely cited in so far as they exemplify 
the same form), but also exclusively on the particular genre of the novel. But 
what about realism in lyric poetry, or in drama?2 
Here, what Brecht calls "the formalistic nature of the theory of realism" 
alludes to Lukacs' argument of realism. a theory that regards "a few bourgeois 
novels" as the standard form of realism. For Brecht, Lukacs' theory of realism is too 
ideal, and then cannot be actually applied to the revolutionary aesthetic production. 
Brecht criticises Lukacs' conceptualisation of realism in the sense that such realism 
merely provides an inert criterion for academic literary critics. In addition, it is for 
Brecht that Lukacs' theory of realism ignores the possibility of formalistic 
experiments and fails to serve any applied example except novels. 
What Brecht points out in his criticism of Lukacs seems a valid argument 
insofar as Lukacsean realism can simply be limited to the genre criticism. However. 
Lukacs also implies the practical aspect of realism and plainly presupposes the 
practical dimension of his theory of realism throughout his aesthetic works. focusing 
not on an author's political tendency but his or her attitude towards reality. As Eugene 
Lunn stresses, there is a similarity between Brecht and Lukacs in such a way that 
2 Bertolt Brecht, • Against Georg Lukacs', in Aesthetic,I' and Politics. trans, by Rodney Livingstone 
(London: Verso, 1980), p. 70. 
152 
'their dispute remained, with all its freedom from Stalinist crudities, within the 
parameters of Communist cultural discussion and political militancy'. J 
In this respect, what Brecht intends to point out in Lukacs' theory of realism is 
that Lukacs limits the various practices of realism to a specific literary genre, 
especially the novel. Therefore, it is difficult to see that Brecht can be an alternative to 
Lukacs; but rather Brecht's idea of realism serves as a supplementary formula for 
Lukacsean realism, providing the expanded theory of realism to other genres such as 
lyric poetry and theatrical drama. That is to say, as Lunn properly elucidates, 'the 
tendencies to divide the field up between them and to see the two positions as 
antithetical and mutually exclusive are real errors, ones made frequently in the many 
attempts to reconstruct their "debates" as a means of championing Brecht's 
contributions' .4 
From this perspective, Brecht's rejection of Lukacs can be regarded as an 
aesthetic attempt to establish a new method beyond bourgeois literary conventions. 
Brecht sees traditional literary technique as a bourgeois cultural legacy that 
revolutionary artists must abolish. For Brecht, the individual dimension of aesthetics 
is nothing less than an ideology. As Adorno says, Brecht seeks 'to translate the true 
hideousness of society into theatrical appearance, by dragging it straight out of its 
camouflage,. 5 In Brechtian realism, the form of theatre is a vessel, a temporary 
usefulness, in which the vortex of real contradictions is revealed as such without any 
representational apparatus. 
3 Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study olLllk(Jes. Brecht. Beni{lmin and 
Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 77. 
4 Ibid. Lunn's argument rests on the consideration of the historical situation in which the aesthetic 
debates in West and East German, which revolve around the contrast between Brecht and Lukacs, were 
produced. Throughout those debates, Brecht was commonly used as an anti-Lukacsean figure. For a 
detailed discussion of this, see Karin Brenner, Theorie der Literuturgeschichte und A.I'thetik hei Georg 
Lukacs (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), P. 10. 
5 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Commitment', in Aesthetics and Politics, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and 
others (London: Verso, 1980), p. 183. 
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What is relevant to Brecht's idea of realism is that the alternative aesthetic, the 
revolutionary principle of cultural production, must be a critique of the traditional 
system of representation. In Brecht's sense, realism is not only for literature: 'it is a 
major political, philosophical and practical issue and must be handled and explained 
as such,.6 When regarding such an important problem, which is an independent matter 
of general human interest, Brecht strives to reformulate the traditional discourse of 
realism constituted by the principle of representation. 
Like Benjamin's case, Brecht's position seems quite simple: realism must he 
linked not to 'the good old days but to the bad new ones'. 7 Brecht" s aesthetic 
experiments, of course, aim at abolishing the aesthetic convention of the old 
descendant class, the bourgeois cultural legacy , and his theory of realism purports to 
defend the premature aesthetic of the working class. Brecht's idea of realism is 
fundamentally different from Lukacs' formulation of realism, which stresses the 
revolutionary mediation between bourgeois culture the proletarian culture. What 
Brecht warns Lukacs about is that if artists regard the classical form of the artwork as 
an aesthetic standard for their contemporary aesthetic production, it is strategically 
wrong and not useful for the production of an appropriate aesthetic practice for the 
new historical situation. In other words, form is not a universal and transcendental 
entity independent from its own historical situation; thus, form must be changed in 
line with newly constructed aesthetic demands. 
As Fredric Jameson claims, the important point of Brechtian realism resides in 
the category of 'usefulness,.8 For Brecht, the useful is related to learning something 
from aesthetic practice, a learning that not only belongs to philosophical speculation 
but also to amusement; Brecht argues that 'if there were not such amusement to be 
6 Brecht, 'Against Georg Lukacs', p. 76. 
7 Ibid., p. 69. 
154 
had from learning the theatre's whole structure would untit it for teaching'. <) This is 
where Brecht formulates his theory of the epic theatre, a theory that the realistic 
theatre must provide a distance between the spectator and the artistic apparatus. 
Brechtian epic theatre does not aim at producing a harmonious form for resolving 
social contradiction, but rather at showing the contradictions, which exist. 
The essential point of the epic theatre is that the pre-given artistic apparatus is 
an obstacle for realising the real, an ideological illusion whereby the spectator cannot 
come to grasp things. Ver.fremdungseffekt, defamiliarisation or, better still, the effect 
of estrangement, is nothing less than a moment of Erlehnis, the shock of dialectical 
thinking in Benjamin's terms. Brecht applies this theory for his dramas; he designs the 
role of a narrator or an announcer who interrupts the audience's empathy to the 
actor's performance and gives rise to the effect of estrangement. In the opening scene 
of The Resistible Rise q( Arturo Vi, for instance, Brecht seems to show this quite 
explicitly: 
THE ANNOUNCER: 
Friends, tonight we're going to show-
Pipe down, you boys in the back row! 
And, lady, your hat is in the way! -
Our great historical gangster play 
Containing, for the first time, as you'll see 
The truth about the scandalous dock subsidy. 
Further we give you, for your betterment 
Dogsborough's confession and testament. 
Arturo Ui's rise while the stock market fell. 
The notorious warehouse fire trial. What a sell! 
The Dullfeet murder! Justice in a coma! 
Gang warfare: the killing of Ernesto Roma! 
All culminating in our stunning last tableau: 
Gangsters take over the town of Cicero! 
Brilliant performers will portray 
The most eminent gangsters of our day.lu 
8 See Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. I. 
9 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre: The Development olan Aesthetic, ed. and trans. by John Willett 
(London: Methuen, 1964), p. 73. 
10 Bertolt Brecht, Plays: Three, trans. by John Willett and others (London: Methuen, 1(87), p. 119. 
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Alongside this, Brecht also draws on classical techniques such as the singing 
of the chorus to produce a distance between the theatre and the audience. Similarly, 
Brecht appropriates the way in which actors directly speak to the audience, as is the 
case with The Threepenny Opera and The Mother. In The Threepenny Opera, Brecht 
sets up Peachum's opening speech to the audience in line with a large sign lowered 
from a grid. II This technique allows the character to have a conversation with the 
audience and, at the same time, lets them know that this is nothing less than a 
dramatic performance. In this sense, it is difficult to say that such a speech is simply a 
monologue that is common in any traditional theatre. Brecht endows the character 
speaking to the audience with an independent role from other actors, thereby 
explaining the procedure of dramatic events and synthesising the subject matter. 
This effect reminds the audience that they should recognise the theatrical 
apparatus in advance and does not attempt to solve any social contradiction with the 
symbolic meaning of dramatic performance. In this way the Brechtian concept of 
estrangement-effect is based on the assumption that 'a contradiction is not an opinion 
or an ideology in that sense; an estrangement is not exactly a philosophical concept. 
let alone a system; change may make you act, and even think, but perhaps it is not 
itself something you can teach'. 12 Brechtian pedagogy is nothing less than learning 
without teaching. In this respect, Brecht argues that the epic theatre appeals 'less to 
the feelings than to the spectator's reason'. 13 
Brecht does not follow the traditional criterion, a criterion that audience's 
empathy with theatrical characters is necessary in the performance; but rather 
II See Bertolt Brecht, Plays: One, trans. by Peter Tegel and others (London: Methuen. 1988). p. 68. 
12 Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. 90. 
13 Ibid., p. 23. 
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suggests that the emotional compliance with apparatuses must be renounced for 
creating a new category of reality. To quote Brecht: 
The modesty of the avant-garde's demands has economic ground of whose 
existence they themselves are only partly aware. Great apparati like the opera, 
the stage, the press, etc., impose their views as it were incognito. For a long time 
now they have taken the handiwork (music, writing, criticism, etc.) of 
intellectuals who share in their profits - that is, of men who are economically 
committed to the prevailing system but are socially near-proletarian - and 
processed it to make fodder for their public entertainment machine, judging it by 
their own standards and guiding it into their own channels ... Their output then 
becomes a matter of delivering the goods. Values evolve which are based on the 
fodder principle. And this leads to a general habit of judging the apparatus by its 
suitability for the apparatus without ever judging the apparatus by its suitability 
for the work.14 
This is the presupposition on which Brechtian realism is based: the critique of 
established aesthetic judgement. Brecht believes that so-called great art hides its 
interests in the guise of transcendental form, 'great art serves great interests' and 
'epochs without great interests do not have great art' .15 For Brecht, those interests 
belong to intellectuals who desire to seize the cultural power, and the category of 
reality in a specific era is a mode of ideology accidentally crystallised by a particular 
group or class. Brecht argues: 
In our epoch there are several classes of human beings who have quite different 
interests and correspondingly different intellectual response. So if great art were 
to be produced today, it could only ever be produced for one of these classes; it 
would then promote the interests of this class, and this class alone would respond 
• 16 to It. 
14 Ibid., p. 34. 
15 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Art and Politics, ed. by Tom Kuhn and Steve Giles. trans. by Laura 
Bradley, Steve Giles and Tom Kuhn (London: Methuen, 2003), p.33. 
Ib lbid. 
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Brecht does not approve of the presupposition that there is a universal 
foundation of aesthetic production entirely free from any material interests. From this 
standpoint, Brecht criticises Lukacsean realism as an inert aesthetic useful only for 
academic critics. 
However, it is to be noted that Brecht's way of understanding the relationship 
between intellectuals and aesthetic production seems to be less elaborated than the 
way in which Antonio Gramsci draws a distinction between "traditional" intellectuals 
and "organic" intellectuals. In a Gramscian sense, the concept of traditional 
intellectuals means the group of professional intellectuals, which has an inter-class 
status in society, the group that Brecht assumes tries to universalise the interest of a 
particular class across the whole of society. 
Seemingly, a famous Gramscian proposition, 'all men are intellectuals',l7 
alludes to the contradictory situation in which 'not all men have in society the 
function of intellectuals'. 18 This is where a Gramscian pedagogical strategy comes to 
exist in its own right; organic intellectuals are those who struggle to transform non-
intellectuals into intellectuals. The Gramscian idea of intellectuals seems to be based 
on the category of mediation: 'the relationship between the intellectuals and the world 
of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social group but is, in 
varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of 
superstructures' . 19 
In contrast to the Gramscian conceptualisation of intellectuals, Brecht 
criticises the idea of mediation as an ideology in his conceptualisation of "great art". 
However, paradoxically, Brecht's consideration of aesthetic production as a 
17 Antonio Gramsci, Selections/rom the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by QlIintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 9. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 12. 
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pedagogical procedure seems to assume the mediated relationship between artists and 
spectators. As Adorno points out, the process of Brechtian aesthetic reduction of the 
political truth involves innumerable mediations, which Brecht's own formulation 
rejects.20 This is where Brecht's idiosyncratic idea of actors and audience in theatre 
raises an interesting issue about realism, to which I now tum. 
2. Realism as a Method 
The logic of Brechtian realism is clearly revealed in his argument about the 
relationship between popularity and reality. Brecht claims that 'the workers judged 
everything by the amount of truth contained in it; they welcomed any innovation 
which helped the representation of truth, of the real mechanism of society; they 
rejected whatever seemed like playing, like machinery working for its own sake, i.c. 
no longer, or not yet, fulfilling a purpose' .21 The way in which Brecht stresses the role 
of the working class in aesthetic judgement precisely constitutes his idea of realistic 
artwork, the work of art in which the real situation of social contradictions is 
completely represented. 
Today, Brecht's presupposition about realism, whereby he postulates the 
category of the working class as a good criterion of aesthetic judgement, might be 
regarded as the naivete of orthodox workerism. However, I would like to suggest that 
the way in which he sets up the category of the working class as a guideline of realism 
implies a more philosophical meaning like Lukacs' conceptualisation of class-
consciousness. While the Lukacsean concept of class-consciousness denotes an 
absolute category of collective cognition in capitalist society. Brecht stresses the 
actual experience of the working class, the detailed experience of everyday life under 
20 See Adorno, 'Commitment', p. 183. 
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capitalism. Brecht does not endorse the early Lukacs' workerism, but rather develops 
his own way of understanding realism: the working class is the very agent of changing 
the category of reality, as is the case with Benjamin's consideration of the relationship 
between the habitual perception of reality and the epistemological category of reality. 
Like Benjamin's dialectical image, the standstill moment of shock, Brechtian 
realism aims at breaking the habitual perception whereby the masses reproduce the 
dominant category of reality; on the other hand, unlike Benjamin, Brecht endorses 
workerism in his formulation of realism. However, it is difficult to say that Brecht's 
workerism is the by-product of utopianism as in the case of the early Lukacs: for 
Brecht, the working class stands for a new need. In Brecht's sense, historical progress 
derives from a new need, while regress only gratifies old needs with new stimuli.22 
That is to say, the most important point of progress is to create a new object of 
mimetic desire, the new objectivity. Brecht focuses on the dialectical way in which a 
new object creates a new need and vice versa. In this sense, the working class, an 
innovative bearer of new needs, should be located in the heart of cultural production 
and regarded as the new criterion of art. This is the Brechtian idea of cultural 
revolution: positive about form but negative about content. 
Brecht argues that literature should give the working class truthful 
representations. The meaning of truthful representation in Brecht's formulation is 
nothing less than an aesthetic practice showing raw social contradictions by 
distancing the audience from literary or artistic apparatuses. For Brecht, realism 
functions as a shock of dialectical thinking. In Brecht's terms, truthful representation 
mean "usefulness" to the working masses. Such representation should he intelligihle 
21 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. 110. 
22 See Brecht, Brecht on Art and Politics, p. 102. 
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and acceptable to the people.23 This may let us conjure up a simple idea that the 
realistic is the popular; but Brecht suggests a more complex layer of popularity. By 
explaining the linguistic context of Volksliimlich, he sets out an ideological struggle 
revolving around the term of popularity. To quote Brecht: 
We shall remind ourselves that powerful institutions have long prevented this 
'folk' from developing fully, that it has been artificially or forcibly tied down by 
conventions, and that the conception Volkstiimlich has been stamped as a static 
one, without background or development ... Our conception of 'popular' refers 
to the people who are not only fully involved in the process of development but 
are actually taking it over, forcing it, deciding it. We have in mind a people that 
is making history and altering the world and itself. We have in mind a fighting 
people and also a fighting conception of 'popularity' .24 
Here Brecht attempts to demystify the traditional usage ofthe word 
"popularity" in the German cultural context. A significant point in Brecht's definition 
is that the popular means something discernible to the extensive masses, 'taking over 
their own forms of expression and enriching them / adopting and consolidating their 
standpoint / representing the most progressive section of the people in such a way that 
it can take over the leadership' .25 This statement gives a clue to understanding the 
Brechtian idea of realism in relation to usefulness; Brecht classifies professional 
artists and actors in the Gramscian category of functional intellectuals. Distinguishing 
amateur actors from professional ones in his formulation of pedagogy, Brecht argues 
that 'professional actors, together with the existing theatre apparatus, should be used 
in order to weaken bourgeois ideological positions in the bourgeois theatre itself: and 
the audience should be activated'. 26 
13 
- See Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. 107. 
24 Ibid., p. 108. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Brecht, Brecht on Art and Politics, p. 88. 
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As Jameson claims, this Brechtian pedagogical tactic gives rise to the way in 
which 'the spectacle as a whole should try to demonstrate to the audience that we are 
all actors, and that acting is an inescapable dimension of social and everyday life'. 27 
Undoubtedly, this is the primary principle of Brechtian realism, the principle that 
intellectuals function as educational instruments to educate people to be statesmen 
and philosophers. For Brecht, true philosophy is true politics: 'politicians have to be 
philosophers, and philosophers have to be politicians'?!! No doubt, this is the kernel of 
Brecht's theatrical realism that Benjamin insightfully observes in his study of epic 
theatre: the aesthetic effort to fill in the orchestra pit, 'the abyss which separates the 
actors from the audience like the dead from the living,.2l) For Benjamin, Brecht's epic 
theatre is an attempt to change 'the functional relationship between stage and public, 
text and performance, producer and actors' .30 
This presupposition leads Benjamin to analyse the task of epic theatre: the 
rational utilisation of gesture. To quote Benjamin: 
27 J 
The gesture has two advantages over the highly deceptive statements and 
assertions normally made by people and their many-layered and opaque actions. 
First, the gesture is falsifiable only up to a point; in fact. the more inconspicuous 
and habitual it is, the more difficult it is to falsify. Second. unlike people's 
actions and endeavours, it has a definable beginning and a definable end. Indeed. 
this strict, frame-like, enclosed nature of each moment of an attitude which, atter 
all, is as a whole in a state of living flux, is one of the basic dialectical 
characteristics of the gesture. This leads to an important conclusion: the more 
frequently we interrupt someone engaged in an action, the more gestures we 
obtain. Hence, the interrupting of action is one of the principal concerns of epic 
theatre.31 
arneson, Brecht and Method, p. 25. 
28 Brecht, Brecht on Art and Politics, p. 89. 
29 Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. by Anna Bostock (London: Verso, 1998), p. I. 
30 Ibid., p. 2. 
31 Ibid., p. 3. 
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In this way Brecht claims that 'plays and production style should turn the 
spectator into a statesman; that's why one should appeal not to the emotion in the 
spectator which would permit him to abreact aesthetically, but to his rationality' .-'2 
This is where, unlike Lukacs. Brecht does not criticise modernism as the illness of 
representation; Brecht probably knows the positive side of rationalisation, the 
reification of modernism. In addition, Brecht is interested in re-adopting modernist 
experiments, the usefulness of its apparatus. 
It is interesting that this idea gi ves rise to Brecht's positi ve attitude towards 
technology and influences Benjamin's famous technology essays. As Jameson 
remarks, Benjamin's understanding of the relationship between technology and 
realism is indebted to Brecht, and furthermore Brecht is an influential source for the 
Marxist Benjamin who is notably distinguished from the early mystical Benjamin.33 
Benjamin's emphasis on non-sensuous experience through the dialectical image is 
couched in the Brechtian idea of realism, realism as a method. 
The Brechtian idea of the relationship between the artwork and technology 
bears no relation to the positivistic view of technological progress that Bcnjamin 
criticises in his theses on history.34 Brecht's conceptualisation of progress seems to be 
influenced by his understanding of dialectic: 'dialectic is a method of thinking. or, 
rather, an interconnected sequence of intellectual methods, which permit one to 
dissolve certain fixed ideas and reassert praxis against ruling ideologies,.:lS It is 
palpable that Brecht rejects official dialectical materialism by claiming that nature 
does not work dialectically. For Brecht, dialectical methods are bctter applied to 
societal conditions than natural ones, in the sense that the nature of society is 
32 Brecht, Brecht on Art and Politics, p. 88. 
33 See Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. 38. 
34 See Walter Benjamin, 'On the Concept of History', in Selected Writings, Volume -I: 193R-19-10, 
trans. by Edmund Jephcott and others (London: Belknap, 2003), p. 394. 
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dialectical. Thus, if Brecht is another guidance for Benjamin's Marxism, The 
Brechtian conceptualisation of the dialectic influences Benjamin's idea of historical 
materialism, 'which has annihilated within itself the idea of progress' .36 
On the other hand, the way in which Benjamin understands Brecht serves as 
an insight which can be used to approach the precise Brechtian idea of realism, 
realism as the shock of thinking. Brechtian realism aims at provoking the thinking of 
shock throughout the interaction between theatre and audience; it always already 
presupposes the theory of pedagogy. What Brecht expects with pedagogical realism is 
to produce a new knowledge, a new category of reality, by changing the way in which 
the masses think about the world. A significant factor in Brecht's pedagogical idea of 
realism resides in his conceptualisation of a theatre in which there is no distinction 
between actors and spectators; actors are simultaneously students.37 Interestingly, this 
is the point where Brecht meets Sartre with the notion of "commitment". 
3. Sartre's Critique of Brecht 
There is a similarity between Brecht and Sartre in their conceptualisations of 
commitment. For both Brecht and Sartre, the category of commitment arises from 
their convictions that the work of art is definitely related to history. However, there is 
an undeniable difference between their ideas of commitment. In contrast to Brecht, 
who definitely presupposes the militant way of participating in the historical process, 
Sartre's formulation of commitment is based on the phenomenological 
conceptualisation of subject; the self is not completed with the Cartesian (.'ogito. but 
rather through an ongoing project of engaging in the world. 
35 Ibid., p. 104. 
36 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (London: 
Belknap, 1999), p. 460. 
37 See Brecht, Brecht on Art and Politics, p. 88. 
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Unlike Brecht, Sartre is a theorist who is more concerned with the reification 
of language, and draws an elaborated distinction between poetry and prose: for Sartre, 
poetry is beyond the utility of language, while prose is within it. Sartre argues that 
'the empire of signs is prose; poetry is on the side of painting, sculpture, and music'. 38 
For Sartre, a poet is 'certain of the total defeat of the human enterprise and arranges to 
fail in his own life in order to bear witness, by his individual defeat, to human defeat 
in general' .39 In Sartre's sense, this is the precise way in which a poet partakes in the 
world, the way of the loser wining, whereas a prose-writer does it through 'a greater 
success' .40 It seems to me that this presupposition constitutes a backdrop of Sartn:an 
realism, the realism of analogical representatives. 
In The Psychology of the Imagination, Sartre argues that the work of art is 
something 'to make an object 'appear" .41 By this argument. Sartre describes the way 
in which 'while perception is observation of a real thing (three faces of cube) and 
while conception gives us at once the knowledge of the object (the cube has six 
faces), imagination gives us only a profile, an Abschattung, which cannot bc 
investigated further' .42 No doubt, this presumption constitutes the very kernel of 
Sartrean realism rejecting the Cartesian correspondence between subject and object. 
in such a way as to separate the self from consciousness. 
As formulated in The Transcendence (~f the Ego, which constitutes the 
preliminary ideas of Being and Nothingness, Sartre claims that 'the ego is not directly 
the unity of reflected consciousness' ,43 This is followed by the assumption that 
38 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, trans. by Bernard Frechtman (London: Routledge. 1993). p. 4. 
39 Ibid., p. 25. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of the imagination, trans. by Bernard Frechtman (London: 
Routledge, 200 I), p. 20. 
42 Benjamin Suhl, lean-Paul Sartre: The Philosopher as a Literary Critic (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970), p. 19. 
43 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory ()jCon.l'cio/lsne.\·.I'. trans. by 
Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), p. 60. 
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There exists an immanent unity of these consciousnesses: the flux of 
consciousness constituting itself as the unity of itself. And there exists a 
transcendent unity: states and actions. The ego is the unity of states and of 
actions - optionally, of qualities. It is the unity of transcendent unities, and itself 
transcendent. It is a transcendent pole of synthetic unity, like the object-pole of 
the unretlected attitude, except that this pole appears solely in the world of 
fl . 44 re ectlOn. 
For Sartre, a state is the intermediary category between the body and Erlehnis, 
while an action is nothing other than a transcendent object.45 In this sense, it is not 
difficult to say that a method can be regarded as an action, a transcendent object of 
reflective consciousness. What is implicit in Sartre' s defence of the self is that the 
category of subject is necessary in the mode of representation. Based on this 
presupposition of subject, Sartre postulates the concept of ana/ogon, the mode of 
analogous representatives. This idea is constituted by Sartre's phenomenological 
formulation of an imaginative consciousness and a reflective consciousness: . an 
imaginative consciousness is a consciousness of an object as an image and not 
consciousness of an image', and a reflection consciousness is 'a second 
consciousness' whereby the belief in the existence of the image appears.46 Sartre goes 
on to explain: 
44 Ibid. 
It is then that I say: I have an image ofa dog; I 'see' the Pantheon. The 
contradiction of which wejust spoke is a phenomenon of belief which is placed 
in the realm of reflection. What does one mean when one reports 'having an 
image'? One means that one has an intervening object before consciollsness 
which functions as a substitute of the thing. This belief: if it does not go beyond 
a belief, is justified: the object exists, it is the analogue.47 
45 See Ibid., p. 69. 
46 Sartre, The Psychology of the Imagination, p. 99. 
47 Ibid. 
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This is Sartre's idea of realism, the realism that tells the truth through fiction. 
Sartre retains this idea of analogous representation in his formulation of writing. In a 
Sartrean sense, literature is 'the work of a total freedom addressing plenary freedoms 
and thus in its own way manifests the totality of the human condition as a free product 
of a creative activity' .48 Sartre argues that the most important task for writers today is 
not to destroy words but to construct words. 
In this way Sartre seems to remind us of the Brechtian idea of realism, when 
he claims that 'the function ofa writer is to call a spade a spade'.'"'!) However, in 
Sartre's sense, what is called a spade is not an actually existing spade. For Sartn!, the 
designated spade is nothing less than a justified object as an analogue. Sartre applies 
this idea only for prose, not for theatre. Sartre acknowledges that theatre is a di tTerent 
mode of aesthetic production, which uses action rather than language. For Sartre, a 
word is not an image: 
The function of the acoustic or optic phenomenon which we call the word has no 
resemblance whatsoever to the physical phenomenon, the picture. The only 
common trait between the consciousness of a sign and that of an image is that 
each is directed in its own way towards an object through another object. But in 
the one the intercalated object functions as analogue, that is, fills consciousness 
in place of another object, which is, in short, present by proxy; in the other type 
of consciousness it is restricted to directing consciousness on certain objects 
which continue to be absent. 50 
In the dramatic representation, an action is just an image, whereas a word is an 
analogue in the literary representation. This distinction applies to the way in which 
Sartre distinguishes a dramatic performance from a literary writing. For Sartre, only 
poetical language functions in the same way as images. In such a case, language is 
48 Sartre, What is Literature? p. 206. 
49 Ibid., p. 210. 
50 Sartre, The Psychology q[the Imagination, pp. 94-95. 
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nothing less than a mirror of the world, a thing alienated from both a poet and the 
world. That is to say, Sartre regards an image as 'the physical aspect of the word'. 51 
Sartre argues that 'the way in which we hear ourselves speak is not exactly the 
same as the way in which we speak'. 52 For Sartre, what cannot be reached by our 
recognition is 'not an object but an image' .53 The image is not a by-product of 
reflection because it has not an object. The image is a non-reflected picture because it 
is out of reach; the image is out of objective judgement, but rather the consequence of 
self-justification and self-judgement. In On Dramatic Style, Sartre argues that an 
action is related to a moral life in such a way that 'every act comprehends its own 
purposes and unified system; anyone performing an act is convinced that he has a 
right to perform it; consequently, we are not on the ground of fact but of right'. 54 This 
means that the individual who decides to act must justify his own action by reason 
and believes "he is right to undertake it' .55 This means that an action is always carried 
by the moral judgement and needs to be reflected by reason to discover its own moral 
implication. 
Sartre's formulation of the image repudiates a traditional view to the 
relationship between image and thing in itself, a view that gives the image the status 
of thing, a thing that is a lesser version of an original thing. According to Peter Caws. 
Sartre redefines the conventional preconception of image as follows: 'the thing 
perceived is in-itself but not for-me; perceived it is in-itself and for-me; in image it is 
for-me but not in-itself .56 In this respect, Sartre argues that "for consciousness, to 
exist is to be conscious of its existence. It appears as a pure spontaneity. confronting a 
51 Sartre, What is Literature? p. 7. 
52 Ibid., p. 87. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Jean-Paul Sartre, Sartre on Theatre, ed. by Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, trans. by Frank 
Jellinek (London: Quartet Books, 1976), p. 13. 
55 Ibid., p. 14. 
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world of things which is sheer inertness'. 57 Here, it is not far wrong to say that Sartre 
endorses the Hegelian category of being in-itself and being for-itself to explain the 
interaction between consciousness and object. Caws explains: 
The qualities of the sheet of paper do not depend on me, they present themselves 
to me, they are 'for-me' (pour rnoi) but at the same time they are inert, and 
inertia is the defining characteristic of the in-itself. The in-itself has no 
spontaneity, neither mine nor that of others. But the thing-like character of the 
in-itself cannot be shared by my consciousness, whose mode of being is self-
awareness; consciousness is in the first instance for-me - but that amounts to 
. h .. C' • If'i8 saymg t at It IS lor-Itse : 
According to this. the correspondence between subject and object is 
impossible. There is the reification of the image in the process of representation, 
which is produced by the reflection of consciousness. Therefore, in Sartre's sense, art 
is nothing less than the compensation for the impossible representation of individuals; 
individual men are not real objects to each other, but rather images. This is what 
Sartre presupposes when he refers to the impossibility of representation: 'arts exist 
because you never wholly manage to see a man face to face: so you have images; and 
you have images, you have special relations to them, relations of participation'. 5') 
In Sartre's sense, an image is a particular relationship between individuals; an 
image is produced by a certain form, an action, 'a movement intended to show 
something else,6o as in any performance of theatre. As has been discussed, this is an 
ironic situation in which fiction conveys the truth through its image. In this way, 
Sartre's idea of realism - strictly speaking, it is nothing other than another side of his 
philosophical project which pursues something beyond the conventional binary of 
56 Peter Caws, Sartre (London: Routledge, 1979). p. 32. 
57 lean-Paul Sartre, Imagination, trans. by Forrest Williams (London: Cresset Press, 1(62). p. 2. 
58 Caws, Sartre, p. 32. 
59 Sartre, Sartre on Theatre, p. 90. 
60 Ibid. 
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realism and idealism - assumes that "otherness" is objectivity. We are permanently 
objectified by other people; our relationship with other people is always already 
reified by our own perceptive process. In this way, Sartre considers an image not as a 
mental picture but the consequence of an intentional object, the activity-based visual 
perception. This image can necessarily be produced by man's commitment. 
This image does not contain any prejudicial meaning, because it is a thing that 
'sends back to the poet his own image, like a mirror' .61 This is a quite different 
position from what Brecht takes in his formulation of epic theatre; Brecht clearly 
stresses the important role of rational explanation, which causes the estrangement-
effect throughout dramatic performances. For Brecht, an image is a by-product of 
empathy that must be disenchanted by the thinking of shock. 
Not surprisingly, Sartre criticises Brechtian epic theatre, precisely because 
Brecht compels the spectator 'to judge rather than participate'. 62 Sartre regards such a 
Brechtian tactic as an obstacle to commitment. For Sartre, judgement is 'an adherence 
of my will and a free commitment of my being,;63 judgement rules out 'neutral and 
floating ideas which are neither true nor false,.64 To put it in another way. Sartre 
argues that the Brechtian theatre does not allow us to join in the way in which we 
freely engage into our being, because it endows us with a judgmental criterion, a 
criterion that precludes the unbiased ideas. In Sartre's sense, the impartial ideas lead 
us to establish the communication between men and the reciprocal correlation 
between actors and spectators. Sartre applies this idea to his own political drama. Les 
Mains Sales. This drama sets out from a prologue, in a similar structure to Brecht's 
61 Sartre, What is Literature? p. 8. 
62 Sartre, Sartre on Theatre, p. 78. 
63 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Cartesian Freedom', in Literary and Philosophical Essays. trans. by Annette 
Michelson (London: Rider and Company, 1955). p. 171. 
64 Ibid. 
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The Resistible Rise afArturo Vi, yet the effect of the prologue is designed in a quite 
different way. The voice of a radio announcer says: 
German troops are retreating along the whole front. The Red Army has captured 
Kischner, forty miles from the IIIythian frontier. Wherever possible, I1lythian 
troops are refusing to engage; several detachments have already deserted to the 
Allies. IIIythians, we know you were forced to take arms against the U.S.S.~., 
we know the deeply democratic feelings of the Illythian people. and we ... 6~ 
This is a very Sartrean technique for the constitution of dramatic effect; this is 
a speech-act whereby Sartre attempts to convey the implication of words through the 
surface meaning. At the outset, this announcement reminds the audience of such a 
familiar historical context in which those events really happened, and is subsequently 
followed by the revelation that the surface meaning is merely a political camouflage 
hiding a deeper sense. As Rhiannon Goldthorpe claims, 'the apparent 
straightforwardness of the infonnation results from a curious combination of a readily 
available external context for the spectator or reader,.66 However, such a familiar 
external context is increasingly faded by a series of actions, 'while the textual context 
will become more and more complex, making the retrospective ascription of 
significance to those two opening sentences more uncertain,.n7 From time to time. 
Hugo's actions and verbal events disclose the hidden message of the play. No doubt. 
this is what Sartre posits in his formulation of realism: realism is nothing less than an 
attempt to find a more complex meaning of events beneath the purely informative 
meaning of words. In this respect, this play shows that the real message of the play is 
located in actions, not words. 
65 Jean-Paul Sartre, Crime Passionnel, trans. by Kitty Black (London: Methuen, 1961), p. 7. 
66 Rhiannon Goldthorpe, Sartre: Literature and Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984),p.1I7. 
67 Ibid. 
171 
From this standpoint, Sartre rejects the way in which Brecht draws a 
distinction between epic theatre and dramatic theatre. For Sartre, insofar as we rule 
out bourgeois individualism and pessimism, it is not difficult to bring out 'the dual 
aspect of all individual acts, that is to say that each individual is only an expression of 
what Brecht called the social gestus, the totality, the social totality, of the 
contradictions within which the person concerned lives' .68 As is the case with 
dramatic theatre, it is undeniable that epic theatre also expresses the social ~esllls 
throughout the individual adventure, though Brecht does not concern the category of 
subjectivity in his formulation of epic theatre. Sartre rather argues that Brecht was 
never able to find 'room for subjectivity' .69 
Furthermore, for Sartre, there is a more important problem than this: the 
conditions assumed by Brecht in his idea of epic theatre have changed; Sartrc stresses 
that 'the bourgeoisie has now been in control of the theatre for about a hundred and 
fifty years' .70 Sartre remarks: 
It controls it in the first place through the price of land, which rose so high in the 
nineteenth century that the workers, as you know, had to leave the inner city. and 
offices and bourgeois buildings are there now and all. or nearly all, the theatres 
too are in the center of town. The bourgeoisie also controls the theatre through 
the price of seats, which has constantly to be raised if the theatre is to show a 
profit ... And lastly, it controls it through the critics.71 
What Sartre implies here is that the circumstance surrounding theatre today is 
more complicated than the one in which Brecht produces his theory of theatre. In 
contrast to Brecht, Sartre's idea of theatre presupposes a condition in which bourgeois 
cultural power dominates all aesthetic production, and where the totalising system of 
68 Sartre, Sartre on Theatre. p. 114. 
69 Ibid., p. 120. 
70 Ibid. 
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the culture industry does not allow any possibility of revolutionary cultural production 
and operationalises people's ideas of culture. As Sartre claims, this is the milieu 
within which 'the bourgeois dictatorship over the theatre has created a bourgeois 
theatre,.72 From this standpoint, Sartre does not identify dramatic theatre as such with 
bourgeois theatre; but rather regards bourgeois theatre as the reification of dramatic 
theatre. For Sartre, Brecht's epic theatre is an attempt to solve the reification of 
bourgeois theatre, in which there is nothing else but the image of madness, the 
reification of participation. 
According to Sartre, Brecht does not understand what is really problematic in 
bourgeois theatre; Sartre argues that 'the bourgeois audience is mad, not because it 
participates, but because it participates in an image that is an image oflunatics'. 7.1 In 
other words, the image in which the audience participates is crucial: the problem is 
how to change the image, because participation is a general and necessary activity in 
any theatrical performance; yet, Brecht is concerned not just to change the image, but 
to produce a distance between audience and theatre by interrupting empathic 
participation. To resolve the reification of participation in bourgeois theatre, Sartre 
turns his attention to the possibility of communication between actors and spectators, 
repudiating Cartesian realism, the idea of correspondence between consciousness and 
reality. It is not difficult to see that Sartre still endorses his early formulation of 
perception to explain the communicative aspect of aesthetic realism. To quote Sartre: 
71 Ibid. 
We shall best account for the original phenomenon of perception by insisting on 
the fact that the relation of the quality to us is that of absolute proximity (it "is 
true," it haunts us) without either giving or refusing itself, but we must add that 
this proximity implies a distance. It is what is immediately out of reach. what by 
definition refers us to ourselves as to an emptiness. Contemplation of it can only 
72 Ibid., p. 79. 
73 See ibid., p. 97. 
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increase our thirst for being as the sight of the food out of reach added to 
Tantalus' hunger. Quality is the indication of what we are not and of the mode of 
being which is denied to US. 74 
From this standpoint, Sartrean realism always already implies the category of 
the subject that should carryon the participation of being; the realistic perception of 
the object cannot be immediate, and it must be mediated by action. It should be noted 
that Sartre tacitly abolishes the Brechtian pedagogy of theatre with this 
presupposition; Sartre conceptualises "gesture" as an individual image, while Brecht 
regards it as something collective. As Jameson points out, what is lacking in Sartre' s 
formulation is the category of history, even though Sartre shares the idea of 
"Erlebnis" with Brecht and Benjamin.75 For Brecht, the pedagogy ofgestus is 'more 
than a mere theme or motif, and begin to appreciate the structural originality of its 
relationship to form as such' .76 Brecht's conceptualisation of geslus presupposes 
clearly the way in which the collective audience recognises social contradictions 
through a theatrical performance. Therefore, the Brechtian concept of gesture always 
implicates the pedagogical methodology, in such a way that 'the dramatic 
representation is the showing of showing, the showing of how you show and 
demonstrate,.77 Sartre, however, regards gesture as just a movement; the gesture 
refers to an act that actors intend to denote. From this standpoint, Sartre maintains that 
'since gestures signify acts in the theatre, and since theatre is image. gestures are the 
image of action' .78 
74 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenol()~ica/ Ont%KI', trans. by Hazel 
E. Barnes (London: Routledge, 1969), p. 187. 
75 See Fredric Jameson, Sartre: The Origins of a Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
~. 208. 
6 Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. 93. 
77 Ibid., p. 91. 
78 Sartre, Sarlre on Theatre, p. 91. 
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Unlike Sartre, Brecht does not consider gesture as a neutral image, but rather 
as a method whereby actors transmit the new way of thinking. In other words, the 
Brechtian conceptualisation of gesture plainly supposes the objective image, the 
dialectical image at a standstill, but it is not related to Sartre's idea of image, the 
image that shows the truth through its fiction, whereby individuals can be in 
communication with each other. This is where Adorno's criticism of Brecht and 
Sartre can be seen to be valid: if Brecht's gesture is not an image in the sense that 
actors show social contradictions through their actions, Brecht has to accept Adorno's 
criticism, the criticism that Brecht simply reduces aesthetic truth to political truth 
without any consideration of mediation. Sartre would know this problem. when he 
claimed that 'intellection is not the mechanical result of a pedagogic procedure, but 
rather that its origin lies solely in my deliberate willing, my application, my refusal to 
be distracted or hurried, in the undivided attention to my mind - to the radical 
exclusion of all external forces'?~ However, Sartre cannot be free from Adorno's 
criticism that the Sartrean principle of commitment 'slides towards the proclivities of 
the author, in keeping with the extreme subjectivism of Sartre' s phi losophy, which for 
all its materialist undertones, still echoes German speculative idealism'. so This 
constitutes the problem of Sartrean realism, that the Sartrean idea of realism is not 
related to reality outside SUbjectivity. Considering an action as a by-product of 
contradictions, and as a generator that sets up further contradictions, Sartre argues: 
A man - or a group of men - only acts insofar as internal contradictions are the 
driving force of his action; he thereby severs himself from them. and 
consequently these initial contradictions will give the actual meaning and 
purpose ofthe act he wishes to perform; and from a different angle. by severing 
himself from them he throws light on them. 81 
79 Sartre, 'Cartesian Freedom', p. 170. 
80 Adorno, 'Commitment', p. 181. 
81 Sartre. Sartre on Theatre. p. 110. 
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As an action arises from contradictions, so is it necessarily contradictory, that 
is to say, as Sartre maintains, there are several of actions at the same time, 'assembled 
and inseparable because a number of elements are pressing forward simultaneously' . X2 
For this reason, the most significant aim of Sartrean realism is not pedagogy but 
communication between men, in the sense that thinking is not so much a by-product 
of education as of a creative act, which can be seen as the assemblage of man's 
contradictory driving forces. 
No doubt, Sartre's idea ofrealism is based on his notion orman as 'the being 
through whom truth appears in the world' .83 For Sartre, realism is nothing less than 
the way in which man commits himself totally in order that 'the natural order of 
existants may become an order of truths'. 84 In short, the Sartrean commitment is a 
natural born task for man. As in the case of Descartes, there is no difference between 
the epistemic and the ethical in Sartre's formulation: the action of commitment always 
includes the category of morality, the freedom of choice. In this respect, 'commitment 
is not relative' ,85 but rather an absolute act for man's freedom, in Descartes' terms, 
the equal capacity among men, thereby judging correctly and distinguishing the true 
from the false. 86 
Although he renounces Cartesian realism. Sartre still retains the category of 
monadic man, the free being of reason, in his formulation of commitment. In this way. 
as Adorno critically observes, Sartre's conceptualisation of commitment seems deeply 
rooted in the legacy of Husserlian philosophy: 'the constitution of the world 
82 Ibid., pp. 110-11. 
83 Sartre, 'Cartesian Freedom', p. 171. 
84 Ibid. 
8S Ibid., p. 172. 
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essentially involves a "harmony" of the monads,.K7 In Husserl's formulation, the 
monads are metaphysical inventions and hypotheses; hence, there are difticulties in 
the process of experiencing the other ego. In other words, "the other has not yet 
. d h ",,, K8 attame t e sense man . 
It seems to me that this phenomenological presupposition leads Sartre to hold 
onto the Cartesian category of monadic man. Nevertheless, in his reading of 
Descartes, Sartre stresses the way in which Descartes searches for his own method. 
For Sartre, a method is more crucial than thinking as such. Sartre argues that a method 
is the way in which we construct our freedom. 89 For Sartre, it is not monads but 
methods that can be invented according to a specific situation of practice. There is no 
doubt that this is Sartre's own position, which is therefore precisely distinguished 
from what Husserl assumes in his phenomenology. 
As for Brecht, the problem is to be located in the more materialistic ambience: 
Brecht does not endorse the Cartesian ideal assumption of monadic subjectivity, of 
the man whose thinking can be free from any material condition. For Brecht, there is 
no neutral thinking independent of the material relations of interests. Brecht argues 
that 'even ifI couldn't think I might still exist, but I couldn't verify that myself.'lO 
Interestingly, Brecht's materialisation of cogito negates what Zizek calls 'the 
obsessional compulsion to think,91 in Cartesian philosophy: if I stop thinking, I will 
cease to exist. However, it is difficult to say that here Brecht aims at revealing the 
psychoanalytic dimension of modern subjectivity; but rather, Brecht's materialistic 
86 See Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditation.\', trans. by F.E. Sutcliffe 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 27. 
87 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenolo}.,.'l', trans. by Dorion 
Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 108. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See 'Cartesian Freedom', p. 175. 
90 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. 93. 
91 Slavoj Zizek, 'Introduction', in Cogito and the Unconscious, ed. by Slavoj Zilek and Renata Salecl 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 2. 
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interpretation of the Cartesian cogi/o is an attempt to provide a holistic approach to 
the relationship between individuals and social conditions. For Brecht, the way in 
which man verifies himself is the self-Iegitimisation of his material life. In this sense. 
Brecht claims that 'it has simply been asserted that thought is a kind of being; but 
there are many more kinds ofbeing,.92 
4. From Representation to Representative 
Interestingly, Sartre's criticism of Brechtian epic theatre discloses another 
aspect of Brechtian realism. As has been discussed. Brecht overlooks the mediation 
between actors and spectators; Brecht is not interested in the reciprocal aspect of 
realism, but rather the shock of thinking, the dialectic image in which social 
contradictions as such are revealed. That is to say. Brecht also regards theatre as 
representative rather than representation. For Brecht, more important is not so much 
representation as social contradictions that are revealed by representation. In this 
sense, Brecht implicitly regards representation as the aesthetic representative of 
reality as in the case of Sartre. From this perspective, Brecht's idea of epic theatre is 
simply based on the belief that theatrical representation 'can present society as an 
object to the audience' .93 For Brecht, such representation is a methodological vessel 
that enables spectators to obtain "new" intellection. As to this pedagogical aspect of 
Brecht, Jameson points out that 'the emergence of new social possibilities is 
suggested by the excitement in sheer intellection itself.94 Not surprisingly, the 
newness of change produces the excitement in Brechtian realism. To quote Jameson: 
92 Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. 93. 
93 S artre, Sartre on Theatre, p. 120 
94 Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. 92. 
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One is tempted, therefore, to pursue this line of speculation even further, and to 
assert that in Brecht, what is taught, what is shown, is ultimately always the New 
itself, and thus somehow, modernity in its most general (rather than specific and 
technological) acceptation. Learning thus displays the breaking in of the Novum 
upon the self: a dawning both of a new world and of new human relations. It 
thereby becomes inseparably associated with the great theme of change as such, 
and reinforces Brecht's insistence that change always brings the new, and his 
unwillingness to conceive of a change that would be purely retrogressive or 
d . 9~ egeneratlve. -
This idea endows Brecht with a presupposition that 'objective transformations 
are never secure until they are accompanied by a whole collective reeducation, which 
develops new habits and practices, and constructs a new consciousness capable of 
matching the revolutionary situation'. 96 In contrast to Brecht, Sartre' s idea of aesthetic 
production is constituted in the more reified condition of late capitalism; Sartre has 
recognised that change is not always new, but rather at times regressive, as is the case 
with actually existing socialism. In this sense, Sartre emphasises creativity in the 
production of new intellection. Sartre sees that official dialectical materialism turns 
out to be another metaphysics, and attempts to offer a third synthetic category 
between materialism and idealism. In the respect that materialism simply reduces 
mind to matter, Sartre argues that 'I conclude in all good faith that it is a metaphysical 
doctrine and that materialists are metaphysicians. ,97 
For Sartre, both individualism and pessimism are symptoms of a bourgeois 
dominated society: the bourgeois class imposes its own specific cultural taste on other 
classes and universalises its particular value system in modern society. Sartre's 
statement highlights a situation in which Western intellectuals have become 
increasingly disillusioned with actually existing socialism, and strive to find an 
alternative way to end capitalism. 
9S Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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Sartre's defence of dramatic theatre can be understood to mean that finding a 
solution to the reification of the image is a more urgent task than abolishing the image 
as such. Here, Sartre's conceptualisation of the duplicated aspect of the image does 
not seem far from the way in which Benjamin formulates the principle of dialectics: 
the image is a dream image at a standstill; the commodity provides the image as 
fetish. 98 In this way, Sartre still acknowledges the apparatus of traditional theatre and 
the realistic effect of empathy, which Brecht attacks as old cultural residues. Mort: 
importantly, in Sartre's idea of realism, including his conceptualisation of 
commitment, the subjective intention is a more significant element in the process of 
aesthetic production. Brecht, on the other hand, stresses the objective condition from 
which such intentions derive. In the changed cultural circumstance, Sartre' s category 
of monadic man, the contradictory unity of subjectivity, has been denounced by 
structuralism and poststructuralism ever since. However, it is difficult to say that 
Sartre is a "dead dog" of old philosophy, but rather a precursor who formulates a shift 
from the representation to the representative. This Sartrean idea of analogous realism 
influences Barthes and Jameson's formulations of realism. 
97 See Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Materialism and Revolution', in Literary and Philosophical Essays, trans. by 
Annette Michelson (London: Rider and Company, 1955), p. 187. 
98 See Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capi/alism, trans. by 
Harry Zohn (London: Verso, 1973), p. 171. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REPRESENTATION WITHOUT REALISM: THE POST-
STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE 
Introduction 
A radically new way of understanding realism was advanced by structuralism 
in the 1950s and subsequently by poststructuralism in the 1970s. This reformulation 
of realism precisely resides in the way in which the classical model of representation 
comes to be replaced by the linguistic model. The shift ofthe focal point is prompted 
by the claim that one will understand cultural systems better if one analyses them in 
terms of linguistics. There are several seminal influences to the rise of such a new 
paradigm. 
Ferdinand de Saussure's posthumously published work, Course in General 
Linguistics, is the first attempt to elaborate the idea of linguistics; Saussure recognises 
that one should isolate the suitable object for study if one wants to develop one's 
research. In this respect, Saussure argues that 'language is a well-defined object in the 
heterogeneous mass of speech facts'. 1 Saussure separates language (la langue) from 
speaking (la parole) to create the suitable object of linguistics. For Saussure, language 
is social and essential, while speaking is individual and accidental. In this sense. 
Saussure argues that 'language is a system of signs that express ideas,.2 This idea 
enables Saussure to say that 'by studying rites, customs. etc. as signs, I believe that 
I Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Wade Baskin (London: Fontana. 
1974), p. 14. 
2 Ibid., p. 16. 
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we shall throw new light on the facts and point up the need for including them in a 
science of semiology and explaining them by its laws' .3 
Alongside Saussure, Russian Formalism also crucially influences the 
theoretical transformation from the classical idea of representation to the semiological 
idea of representational structure.4 Before Roland Barthes' formulation of reality 
effect, Roman Jakobson regards realism as 'a system of artistic (linguistic) 
conventions designed to replace an earlier system of conventions that is no longer 
capable of providing the reader with fresh image ofreality'.5 Like Saussure's science 
of language, Russian Formalism arises from the way in which one detaches the 
suitable object for study. Formalism regards literature as a specialised mode of 
language, distinguished from the practical use of language. Formalism aims at 
defining the object of literary science as "literariness", which is able to make a given 
work as a literary work. In this sense, Fredric Jameson points out that 'the Formalist 
began ... with the isolation of the intrinsic itself, with the disentanglement of their 
specific object of study from those of the disciplines,.6 Jameson's claim seems to say 
that the birth oflinguistics has come about through the separation of a specific 
element from other fields of study rather than a holistic approach to totality, on the 
condition of isolation. This is the where the problems of Saussure and the Formalist 
come to exist. As Tzvetan Todorov points out, 'in the same way that Saussure reduced 
the components of language to sign(jiant and sign!/ie, without including syntax in his 
3 Ibid., p. 17. 
4 For the historical context of Russian Formalism, see Victor Erlich. Russian Formalism: l/istory-
Doctrine (Hague: Mouton, 1969). 
5 Galin Tihanov, The Master and the Slave: Lukacs, Bakhtin, and the Ideas o/Their Time (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 104. 
6 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-Hose of Language: A Critical Account o/,S,ruclura!i.\'11/ and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 43. 
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classification, the Fonnalists simplified the literary system to its syntactic and verbal 
aspects without accounting for semantics' .7 
Linguistics based on a synchronic approach to language, on the other hand, 
gives rise to the structural study of social and cultural systems. For instance, structural 
anthropology originated by Claude Levi-Strauss is based on the assumption that all 
social and cultural fonns can be understood as the relationship of signifier and 
signified - the signification oflanguage. Understanding language as a fundamental 
element of the social individual, 'all the practices that make up a social totality tuke 
place in language, it becomes possible to consider language as the place in which the 
social individual is constructed'. 8 In other words, structuralist linguistics and 
semiology provide the way in which 'a subject is produced in language able to 
represent hislherself and therefore able to act in the social totality'.'! 
In particular, the conventional conceptualisation of realism sees language as a 
transparent medium that transmits the reflection of the object: this is rejected by the 
structuralist approaches that prioritise the linguistic structure of the realistic text. The 
study of language, which overwhelmingly governed French intdlectuals in the post-
war period, has brought about one of the most significant changes in the way in which 
we understand realism today~ realism is meaningless, hecause literature no longer 
reflects the object~ but rather it constructs the object. 
Not surprisingly, this new theoretical tendency attacked the aesthetic of 
realism as an epistemological illusion. The hidden impetus hehind the study of 
language was the demand for a science of literature, in particular, a scientific 
7 Tzvetan Todorov, 'Some Approaches to Russian Formalism', in Russian Formalism: A Collec(io/l (?l 
Articles and Texts in Translation, ed. by Stephen Bann and John E. Bowlt (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, 1973), p. 19. 
8 Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, Lan~ua~e and Materialism:Deve/opments in Semiology and (hI.' 
Theory of the Subject (London: Routledge, 1977), p. I. 
9 Ibid., p. 2. 
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approach towards the mode of writing. Seeing language as the fundamental 
materiality of the human world, a significant philosophical factor in this structuralist 
perspective of language seems to lie in the way in which realism is nothing less than a 
psychical identifying mode whereby the subject produces a symbolic system to invest 
its libidinal desire. No doubt, the structuralist formula of realism seems to challenge 
the Hegelian and the phenomenological presuppositions imbued in Lukacs and Sartn:, 
who regard realism as an aesthetic mode in which the artist's intention articulates the 
mediation between form and content. In other words, what is rejected in the 
structuralist formula is the category of intention, the agency of aesthetic creativity. 
My concern in this chapter is with the essential characteristics of a structuralist 
understanding of realism and reality, particularly focusing on Roland Barthes' 
discussion of the reality effect. The chapter does not aim at dealing with the whole 
scope of Barthes' theory, but rather focuses on his formulation of the reality effect. 
which is based on his structuralist perspective of language, and provides a critical 
view ofthe way in which Barthes underestimates the category of mediation. The 
central focus of my argument is that Barthes' idea of representation is postulated by 
replacing Sartre's notion of responsibility with the concept of pleasure. 
Furthermore, the chapter investigates a poststructuralist approach such as 
Michel Foucault's, and recounts the way in which the poststructuralist 
conceptualisation of representation differs from the structuralist one. The chapter 
argues that the poststructuralist reformulation of representation still retains Barthcs' 
problem. My discussion is followed by an investigation of the similarity hetween 
Foucault's idea and neo-Kantianism, and a criticism of their underestimation of 
mediation between the mode of representation and the mode of production. 
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1. Against Convention 
Roland Barthes is a key figure who marks a theoretical turning point in the 
Marxian conception of realism as an aesthetic resolution to social contradictions. 
After Barthes, realism is defined as a reality effect, that is to say, the effect that is 
produced not by an author but by language itself. 
Although Barthes always postulates the category of history in his formulation, 
his methodology is far from that of structuralist Marxists such as Lucien Goldmann. 
whose theory, genetic structuralism, aims at combining Marxism with 
psychoanalysis. \0 The problem is that Goldmann's formulation does not pay attention 
to the distinction between the psychical and the socio-economic category of reality. 
This reductionism causes a mechanical analysis that simply regards ti.lrm as a hy-
product of social circumstance. The presupposition of Goldmann's genetic 
structuralism is that 'all human behaviour is an attempt to give a meaningful response 
to a particular situation and tends, therefore, to create a balance between the subject of 
action and the object on which it bears, the environment' . II No doubt, Barthes' 
formulation does not endorse Goldmann's idealistic Hegelian hypothesis, even though 
they share a similar idea of structure, the idea that an old structure is reformed hy new 
form. However, Barthes no longer retains the category of suhject which is firmly 
embodied in Goldmann's formula. 
There is no doubt that Barthes' argument involves a criticism of Sartre. in 
particular, the Sartrean idea of literary writing as commitment. as well as Goldmann's 
framework of genetic structuralism. Sartre's understanding of literature, argues 
Barthes, does not take account of the reified aspect of language under capital ism. 
10 See Lucien Goldmann, Towards a Sociology o.llhe Novel, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: 
Tavistock, 1975), p. 156. 
II Ibid. 
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There is no natural object which the mode of writing is supposed to reflect, but rather 
language, which is commonly regarded as a medium, or a material of writing, comes 
to be nature as such. 
Rejecting the idea of objective reality outside language, Barthes' analysis of 
literature sets out from the presupposition that the mode of writing is independent and 
self-sufficient: 'writing is a hardened language which is self-contained' .12 
Interestingly, what Barthes' formulation implies here is the reitication of language; 
language produces the very effect of objectivity. However, Barthes does not follow 
the Lukacsean fonnulation of reification, but rather redetines the effect of rei fication 
in such a way that language constructs a ghostly objectivity. Barthes argues that . a 
language is a kind of natural ambience wholly pervading the writer's expression, yet 
without endowing it with fonn or content'.13 For Barthes, language is a matrix in 
which writing is produced in a familiar gesture. Barthes describes the way in which a 
specific style of writing is produced by the whole system of language as follows: 
At the very moment when general History proposes - or imposes - new 
problematics of the literary language, writing still remains full of the recollection 
of previous usage, for language is never innocent: words have a second-order 
memory which mysteriously persists in the midst of new meanings. Writing is 
precisely this compromise between freedom and remembrance, it is this freedom 
which remembers and is free only in the gesture of choice, but is no longer so 
within duration. 14 
In this way, Barthes does not approve any possibility of subjective action 
against reification, which constitutes a kernel of Lukacsean realism. Barthes' idea 
bears no relation to the notion of realism, precisely because his formulation aims to 
12 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero & Elements afSemiology, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin 
Smith (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p. 18. 
13 Ibid., p. 11. 
14 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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reject the idea of mimesis which is based on the subject-object dialectic. However. 
Barthes does not believe that one can step out of the iron web of representation. In 
Barthes' sense, language is something to impose Necessity on subjects: no subject can 
step out of the iron cage. This means that language is structured by the logic of 
representation which is independent of any mediation between subject and object. 
Stated another way, what is repudiated by Barthes' formulation is the Sartrean 
hypothesis that there is a magical resemblance between the word and the thing 
signified. IS 
Barthes' definition of style as a Necessity designates the aspect of reitied 
language that gives rise to the absolute autonomy of writing. For Barthes, the 
reification of language lies in the correlation between the old form and the new form. 
Considering Flaubert as a writer who founded the concept of writing as craft Barthes 
explains the way in which the reification of writing is structured in capitalist society: 
What this Gregorian codification of literary language aimed at was, if not the 
reconciliation of the writer to a universal condition, at least the conferment upon 
him of the responsibility for his form, the transmutation of the writing handed 
down to him by History into an art, in other words, into an obvious convention, a 
sincere pact which would enable man to adopt a position he was familiar with in 
a nature still made of ill-matched realities. The writer then gives to society a self-
confessed art, whose rules are visible to all, and in exchange society is able to 
h . 16 accept t e wnter. 
What is at issue in this argument is that literature is a conventionalised 
activity, in such a way that the radical language of revolutionary culture becomes 
institutionalised into habitual social system. Barthes regards this function of literature 
15 See Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Writing?, trans. by Bernard Frechtman (London: Routledge, 1993). p. 
7. 
16 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero & Elements ()(Semiology, p. 54. 
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as an institutionalisation of subjectivity.17 In this respect, Barthes claims that' it is not 
granted to the writer to choose his mode of writing from a kind of non-temporal store 
of literary forms', but rather he is 'under the pressure of History and Tradition that thl.! 
possible modes of writing for a given writer are established'. 18 
Here, it is not difficult to find a remarkable similarity between Barthes and 
Benjamin. For example, Barthes' argument is similar to the way in which Benjamin 
criticises the conformism of German Social Democrats that 'managed to erase the 
name of Blanqui almost entirely' .19 It is indubitable that Benjamin metaphorically 
draws on the name of Blanqui to indicate radical utopianism in general whereby the 
class struggle, the subject of history, pushes the category of reality beyond the old 
mode of representation. 
However, there is an undeniable difference between them: Barthes does not 
assume social reality outside the system of language. In other words, Barthes' concept 
of history bears no relation to the class struggle; Barthes' formulation is based on the 
idea that history has become the total system of simulacra in which one cannot tind 
any agent of fundamental change. Unlike Marxist critics, the premise of Barthes' 
formula is that history is no longer anything but language; 'the whole of History 
stands unified and complete in the manner of a Natural Order'20 behind a language. 
What Barthes is concerned with, therefore, is not the process of writing as 
such; but rather an already composed textuality which has been laid in front of 
readers. This is precisely opposed to what Sartre formulates, a formulation that we arc 
never free of our situational condition, but we have responsibility to negate the 
obstacle of freedom. Against this Sartrean thesis. Barthes replaces responsibility with 
17 See Jameson, The Prison-House a/Language, p. 154. 
18 Bartehs, Writing Degree Zero & Elements a/Semiology, p. 16. 
19 Walter Benjamin, 'On the Concept of History', in Walter Bel?jamin: Selected Writings, I'o/. -I. 1939-
1940, trans. by Edmund Jepcott and others (London: Belknap. 2003). p. 394. 
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pleasure. Barthes' formulation is that pleasure is nothing but temporal and then the 
freedom of writing produced by the pleasure of writing is unable to be restored in the 
process of reading. 
The theoretical shift caused by Barthes' idea of representation emerges in such 
a way that the Sartrean idea of realism, more precisely, of "analogical 
representatives", which is based on the rejection of the conventional dichotomy 
between realism and idealism, is criticised as an unscientific understanding of 
narrative. This tendency leads Barthes to focus on description rather than narration in 
his argument of narrative. 
2. The Reality EHect 
In a short essay on reality, Barthes claims that description has 'an aesthetic 
function' in Western culture.21 While narration is a 'circuit of choices and alternatives 
which makes narration look like a vast traffic control centre, provided with referential 
(and not merely discursive) temporality',22 description has no predictive aspect in this 
sense; description's structure is 'analogical' and 'purely additive,' that is to say, 
'insignificant notation' .23 In short, description appears to be "useless details" by 
which narrative is brought to the question as to whether everything in narrative is 
meaningful, or significant. The purpose of Barthes' essay is to examine the 
characteristics of description, in the sense that it does not have a communicative but 
an aesthetic function; Barthes formulation of narrative rejects any possibility of 
narration involving goal-oriented activity. The point of Barthes' investigation lies in 
20 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero & Elements a/Semiology, p. II. 
21 Roland Barthes. 'The Reality Effect'. in French Literary Theory Today, ed. by Tzvctan Todorov 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). p. 12. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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the way in which it reveals the logic of description in terms of not only semiotics in 
particular, but also realism in general. 
Even if, for Barthes, realism is the 'totalitarian ideology of referent', reflecting 
a type of writing associated with nineteenth-century materialism, what he presupposes 
in terms of realism is that readers would undermine the self-referentiality of realist 
writings. In S/Z, Barthes argues that 'the narrative tells itse(f,24 while admitting the 
role of the reader's voice. Barthes suggests the following: 
What we hear, therefore, is the displaced voice which the reader lends, by proxy, 
to the discourse: the discourse is speaking according to the reader's interests. 
Whereby we see that writing is not the communication of a message which starts 
from the author and proceeds to the reader; it is specifically the voice of reading 
itself: in the text. only the reader speaks.25 
With a cursory reading, Barthes' presentation seems to give rise to two aspects 
of narrative: self-referentiality and reader-responsiveness. As Lilian Furst suggests. 
Barthes' analysis indicates that 'intransitively and reflexively the narrative may tell 
itself; but only transitively, through its production by active readers outsidt: its 
parameters can it be actualized' .26 It is in this sense that realism can be seen as the 
particular way in which an author chooses to register his/her interests in the narrative. 
Even though the realist narrative results from a specific mode of representation, its 
actualisation rests on the reader's interest. This is where the question of the reader's 
interest arises. According to Furst, 'the locus of interest is displaced from the product 
of reading, the signification of the text through the retrieval of meaning, onto the 
24 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans.by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang. 1974). p. 213. 
25 Ibid .. p. 151. 
26 Lilian R. Furst. All is true: The Claims and Strategies of Realist Fiction (London: Duke University 
Press. 1995), p. 20. 
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process itself.27 This statement seems to provide a way in which we can understand 
the structuralist conceptualisation of reality. 
From a structuralist perspective. it is a "notary institution", a systematic 
arrangement of differences. through which the writer manages narrative - there is no 
longer a category such as the communication proceeding from the author to the 
reader. Thus what constructs narrative is not a specific author but a structure 
dominating society, a structure which is constructed by a language. In this respect, 
Barthes observes that reality in the literary text is an effect. For him 'concrete detail' 
in the sense of reality is the 'referential illusion', in that 'eliminated from the realist 
utterance as a signified of denotation, the 'real' slips back in as a signified of 
connotation' .28 According to Barthes, 'it is the category of the 'real', and not its 
various contents, which is being signified,29; or, to put it another way, the absence of 
the signified is the signifier of reality, in the sense that a reality effect is the basis of 
'vraisemblance'. This 'vraisemblance' contains the intention that attempts to make 'u 
pure encounter between the object and its expression,30 in terms of description. 
What is interesting in Barthes' analysis is that he proposes realism as the basis 
of modern literature including modernism. The modernist premise is the discrepancy 
between the signifier and signified; thereby one may understand this as a crisis of the 
sign; hence, every attempt to create a new literary form is nothing less than the re-
making of a new reality effect to replace an older one. Even though Barthes does not 
presuppose any possible mediation which can be effected by reality outside of 
language, his idea of representation is not very different from those Marxist theorists 
who were discussed in previous chapters. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', p. 16. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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Considering the early Barthes who wrote about Brecht, it is not surprising that 
Barthes' conceptualisation of the transformation of reality as a category seems 
parallel to Brecht and Benjamin's ideas of realism: the category of reality not fixed at 
any specific moment of history, but rather transformed by the change of habitual 
thinking. Barthes is interested in the category of reality rather than realism. In this 
sense, Jameson points out the Brechtian influence on Barthes' idea, an idea that the 
mode of reality can be changed by the estrangement-effect.31 Barthes' formulation 
assumes the realisation of reification by formal experiments, though the realisation is 
rather related to the category of mediation that Barthes' theory aims at rejecting. 
The realistic mode of constructing narrative operates beyond ideologies of 
realism; the realistic mode is the way in which the knowledge of empirical 
subjectivity - in Lukacs' sense, the autonomous illusion of abstraction - should be 
undermined by mediation. What is important is that the epistemological impulse 
prompts the dialectical correlation between subject and object. Realism cannot be 
severed from the epistemological claims that articulate a new category of reality. This 
epistemological aspect of realism is not far from what Barthes points out in his 
argument about language: 'a language is nothing but a human horizon which provides 
a distant setting of.familiarity, the value of which, incidentally, is entirely negative,.]2 
According to Barthes' conceptualisation of language, realism can be called an attempt 
to defamiliarise the familiar signification of language. No doubt, this is the way in 
which the Brechtian idea of realism teaches audiences through the shock of thinking, 
insofar as Barthes presupposes the socio-economic contradictions, the reality of the 
mode of production and of the class struggle, beyond the linguistic structure. 
31 See Fredric Jameson, Brecht and Method (London: Verso, 1998), p. 38. 
32 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero & Elements o/Semiology, p. 12. 
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Karatani Kojin also points out in his discussion of Japanese modern literature 
that realism is 'relentless defamiliarization of the familiar,.33 In analysing Japanese 
literary history, Kojin sees the concept of realism and romanticism as only the modern 
way in which description takes a key role as the principle of art. For Meiji artists, as 
Kojin claims, description was not a process of describing something, but rather the 
emergence of the thing itself.34 The problem of realism is, therefore, not only aesthetic 
but also political, in the sense that it seems to be connected closely to the process of 
modernisation. This is where Barthes sees a reality effect as the basis of 
vraisemblance which forms 'the aesthetic of all standard works of modernity' .35 
The real cannot exist in narrative by means of description, since descriptive 
notation is empty content in which the real has been eliminated. Suffice it to say that 
the real has always-already happened in the past. As has been discussed, it is in this 
sense that Lukacs endorses the epic narrative rather than description in his defence of 
realism. For Lukacs, description is superficial technique enacted by observation. In 
Jameson's sense, the descriptive notations are "the strategies of containment" inherent 
in the ideological inversion. Jameson thus defends Lukacs' achievement in which 
these strategies 'can be unmasked only by confrontation with the ideal of totality 
which they at once imply and repress' .36 
Barthes' consideration of realism underestimates the role of narration in 
realism whereby the "auto-manifestation" of narrative in realism - but not in 
romanticism or symbolism - essentially comes to be equivocal. It seems that Barthes' 
understanding of realism tends towards description rather than narration. because his 
33 Karatani Kojin, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, trans. by Brett de Bary, et. al. (Duhram, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1993), p. 29. 
34 See ibid, pp. 30-31. 
35 Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', p. 16. 
36 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative a.l' a Social/v Svmholic Act (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981), p. 53. . . 
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formulation rejects the category of mediation between subject and object. This might 
be said to be the consequence of the "bending stick", as is the case with Althusscrian 
Marxism, which repudiates any possibility of mediation caused by its anti-humanistic 
mood. As Paisley Livingston maintains, 'to say that events involving agency must 
figure in every narrative utterance need not be taken as an especially severe 
restriction, particularly if one recalls that in the context of a narrative's content. the 
most diverse array of items can appear as agents' .37 In other words, there is not only 
one agent in a narrative; therefore, the important point does not lie in the question 
about whether narratives represent the agency truthfully, but rather whether their logic 
of form truly includes 'some representation of agents and their purposive strivings' ."'x 
Unlike Barthes' consideration ofrealism, the Marxist aesthetics of realism 
appears to focus on a "narrator" who is a historical agent of narrative, an agent who 
intends to achieve something like communication between writers and readers. or 
actors and audiences. No doubt, Barthes' formulation of realism is caused hy his 
structuralism; it seems to me that such an understanding of realism results from the 
way in which the structuralist perspective understands history and reality. 
Even though structuralism provides the basis for criticising idealism, 
paradoxically speaking, it is not able to stand on the ground of reality but on its own 
scientific position. On the other hand, the problem of structuralism arises in its 
scientific perspective of the signifier as such. This is where Barthes also 
acknowledges the limitation of structuralism as follows: 
On all levels - that of the argument, that of discourse, that of the words - the 
literary work thereby offers structuralism the image of a structure perfectly 
homological (present-day investigations tend to prove this) to the structure of 
37 Paisley Livingston, 'Narrative', in The Routledge Companion to A esthetics, ed. by Berys (Jaut and 
Dominic Mciver Lopes (London: Routledge, 200 I). p. 278. 
38 Ibid. 
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language itself; derived from linguistics, structuralism encounters in literature an 
object which is itself derived from language. Henceforth, it will be understood 
that structuralism may attempt to found a science of literature, or more exactly a 
linguistics of discourse, whose object is the "language" of literary forms, 
apprehended on many levels: a new project, for hitherto literature has been 
approached "scientifically" only in a very marginal fashion - by the history of 
works, or of authors, or of schools. or of texts (philology) . .19 
Alongside Barthes. Jameson points out that 'the originality of Structuralism 
lies in its insistence on the signifier' .40 As the object of study is the significr as such 
isolated from what it signifies, so 'the essential place of structure is that of the 
organization of signifiers among themselves' .41 According to Jameson, 'the privileged 
objects of structuralist investigation are very often non-verbal sign-systems' Y 
Jameson's criticism leads us to conclude that the scientific perspective is interested 
not in reality but in knowledge about reality. A problem seems to lie in the way in 
which this structuralist formula is applied to the analysis of the relationship bctwccn 
narrative and history. 
Even though he discards realism and mediation, Barthes still retains the 
category of representation; in short, Barthes' conceptualisation of aesthetic production 
is nothing less than an idea of representation without realism; crucial is that 
representation is the mode of cultural production, the code system producing 
narratives. Barthes argues: 
Representation is not defined directly by imitation: even if one gets rid of notions 
ofthe 'real', of the 'vraisemblable', of the 'copy', there will still be 
representation for so long as a subject (author, reader, spectator or voyeur) casts 
39 Roland Barthes, . From Science to Literature', in The Rustle of LanglUlge. trans. by Richard Howard 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 6. 
40 Jameson, The Prison-House of Language, p. 111. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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his gaze towards a horizon on which he cuts out the base of a triangle, his eye (or 
his mind) forming the apex.43 
According to this formula, any subject can constitute the sovereign position in the 
mode of representation; the system ofrepresentation, the geometrical paradigm 0 f the 
linear perspective vision, always already contains a slot into which any subject can he 
inserted. Inversely, this means that no subject can be a creator. only a spectator: more 
important is the gaze of the spectator, precisely because the mode of representation 
does not need a subject but a meaning.44 Barthes' conceptualisation of the relationship 
between gaze and representation anticipates the return of representation in a 
postmodern phase. In the following, my discussion seeks to investigate the way in 
which poststructuralism reformulates the structuralist idea of representation in 
Foucault's analysis of classical representation. 
3. Foucault's Reformulation of Representation 
In The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Michel 
Foucault analyses Vehizquez's Las Meninas in order to unveil the secret of classical 
representation that is raised around the problem of the gaze. before starting his 
argument of the metaphysical condition of humanity. What is explained by Foucault's 
analysis of this picture lies in the way in which the sovereignty of power intluences 
the constitution of cultural forms. This is a different point of view from Barthes' 
position; Foucault denies the neutrality of subject and the equality of each subject in 
the mode of representation. From this standpoint, Foucault stresses the function of the 
43 Roland Barthes, 'Oiderot, Brecht, Eisenstein', in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath 
(London: Fontana. 1977), p. 69. 
44 See ibid., p. 75. 
196 
concealing power through which cultural form comes to exist. More importantly, 
Foucault considers power as what is outside form. To quote Foucault: 
In the great volute that runs around the perimeter of the studio, from the gaze of 
the painter, with his motionless hand and palette, right round to the finished 
paintings, representation came into being, reached completion, only to dissolve 
once more into the light; the cycle was complete. The lines that run through the 
depth of the picture, on the other hand, are not complete; they all lack a segment 
of their trajectories. This gap is caused by the absence of the king - an absence 
that is an artifice on the part of the painter.45 
Throughout his analysis of the picture, Foucault raises the question of the 
relationship between representation and power. Interestingly, Foucault's idea of 
representation presupposes something outside the mode of representation, in such a 
sense that linguistic and social codes are designed to repress the corporeal impulses 
and drives.46 In this sense, Foucault's presupposition of something outside text has no 
relation to the Marxian idea of reality. Like Barthes, Foucault also maintains that the 
picture reveals the structure of classical representation and the definition of the space 
that it constitutes in front of us; Foucault's analysis follows the structuralist 
disenchantment of the way in which representation provides us the knowledge of 
reality at the mimetic moment. 
In this way, Foucault deconstructs the presupposed condition of classical 
representation, which is commonly regarded as "transparency" bctween rcference and 
referent. Foucault's attempt cannot be said to be something new, because Barthes and 
other structuralist methods had already argued it. However, unlike Barthes, Foucault's 
45 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology ufthe Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 
1994), pp. 15-16. 
46 This is a general tenet which can be found in various poststructuralist attempts such as Gilles 
Deleuze and Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard. About this, see Peter Dews, 'Power and Subjectivity in Foucault', 
New Left Review, 144 (1984) 72-95 (p. 72). 
197 
claim focuses on the sovereign gaze, the symbolic power of the code system that 
constituted the classical system of representation. Foucault notes: 
Representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its 
images, the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures 
that call it into being. But there, in the midst of this dispersion which it is 
simultaneously grouping together and spreading out before us, indicated 
compellingly from every side, is an essential void: the necessary disappearance 
of that which is its foundation - of the person it resembles and the person in 
whose eyes it is only a resemblance. This very subject - which is the same - has 
been elided. And representation, freed finally from the relation that was 
impeding it, can offer itself as representation in its pure fonn. 47 
What is implicit in Foucault's argument is that the hidden gaze of the 
sovereign is the most important element constituting the hierarchical order of 
representation. From this perspective, Foucault does not endorse what Barthes 
formulates in his analysis of representation; Foucault rejects the idea that narrative is 
a neutral spatiality in which any meaning can be produced by reading. In contrast to 
Barthes, Foucault's formula is more sceptical about the idea of realism. 
Foucault's formula purports to reject the conventional presumption of mimesis 
since Plato's Republic - illusionism. Furthermore, Foucault's argument even rejects 
the dialectic of mimesis that is suggested by Benjamin and Adorno. In his discussion 
of the essay as form, for instance, Adorno implicitly reveals the way in which the 
dialectic of mimesis achieves truth. In Adorno's sense, the essay serves as an image in 
which the object becomes visible through its mobility - the essay gains its truth from 
its untruth.48 Mobility, the lack of solidity, is the most significant element of the 
essay; the unstable feature of the essay does not allow mimesis to copy but recovers 
the object. Adorno's formulation of essay is partly rejected by Barthes' idea of 
47 Foucault, The Order a/Things, p. 16. 
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writing: the mode of writing has no object to be restored. However. Barthes does not 
abolish the creative reproduction of meanings in style. 
The mimetic process of recuperation in Adorno's formulation of 
representation can be grasped in historical terms in relation to the utopian impulse. In 
this sense, Barthes still retains the utopian aspect of style. Unlike Barthes who does 
not accept the category of material historicity, Adorno bases his consideration of 
representation on the historical transformation of the mode of production. However. 
adapting an anti-realistic perspective, Adorno's theory resides in the way in which 
writers give up the classical representation paradigm that is supported by the helief 
that subjectivity properly reflects the object. Adorno also acknowledges that the 
classical concept of representation is no longer sustainable, insofar as the dichotomy 
of the subject and the object incessantly supports the way in which realism is possible. 
In contrast to Barthes' stress on the production of meanings by readers, Adorno 
clearly emphasises the condition of artistic production through his formulation of 
mImeSIS. 
Similar to Barthes' analysis of the reality effect, undermining the ground on 
which realism stands in its own right, Adorno's attack on realism aims at 
disenchanting the principle of realism, transforming reality, the truth of realism. into 
appearance. Alongside Adorno, this demystification of realism continues on its way 
throughout various theoretical considerations of realism and representation in non-
Marxian aesthetics. As Jameson points out, for example, E.H. Gomhrich's 
consideration of the technique of realism as the generator of the realistic illusion is 
another attempt to injure realism's truth-value, like Barthes' conception orthe reality 
48 See Adorno, 'Essay as Form', in Noles to Literature, Vol. I, trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 20. 
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effect.49 However, paradoxically, the possibility of realism could not have been ruled 
out by their criticisms. The contradictory aspect of realism is to say that 'the concept 
of modem ism, realism's historical counterpart and its dialectical mirror-image, is not 
equally contradictory, and in ways which it will be instructive to juxtapose to the 
contradictions of realism itself .50 As Jameson claims, this critical analysis of realism 
reveals that 'neither of these sets of contradictions can be fully understood, unless 
they are replaced within the broader context of the crisis of historicity itself. 51 
Foucault's idea of representation, the idea that there is representation in the 
visible state, yet at the same time no foundation that enables representation to exist in 
its own right, can be grasped as such a formulation that is imbued with the crisis of 
historicity. Unlike Barthes and Adorno, Foucault totally defies the possibility of 
cognition through the mimetic process and the production of meanings; Foucault 
rejects the presupposition that man has a mimetic faculty, and that the style of his 
writing is the symptom of a utopian impulse. 
For Foucault, representation as such is the very embodiment of sovereign 
power; hence, the most important point is to resist the representational system as such. 
However, it is not difficult to criticise Foucault's analysis of representation; the 
category of transparency can be grasped as "coding" for the foundation of 
communication in a particular society. The process of achieving the communicative 
code system is not a one-way traffic as Foucault describes. The system of 
representation is not simply constituted by the gaze of the powerful sovereign, hut 
rather by something real like class struggle. In other words, a specific representational 
system is the mediated correlation between sovereignty and other powers. This is 
49 Fredric Jameson, 'Reflections in Conclusion', in Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso, 1980), 
Pc' 198. 
o Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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where the idea of realism, which emphasises mediation between real ity and artists, is 
still crucial to produce a particular mode of representation. 
4. The Neo-Kantian Idea of Representation 
It seems to me that Foucault's understanding of representation is an alternative 
version of the neo-Kantian conceptualisation of "perspective" in classical paintings, in 
the sense that Foucault's formula focuses on the homogenous spatiality produced by 
the totalising mode of representation. According to Craig Brandist, 'Foucault presents 
the most systematic poststructuralist attempt to develop a neo-Kantian scheme of 
regional validities and to relate this to discourse in life'. 52 This neo-Kantian tendency 
in Foucault's analysis of representation results in 'no attempt to assess the adequacy 
of any historically generated form of social consciousness against a world ex isting 
independent of knowledge, but only an attempt to uncover the preconditions tl1r 
historically specific oeuvres' .53 A significant factor in the neo-Kantian idea of 
classical representation is that a specific Weltanschauung imposes a specific category 
of reality on aesthetic production. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the neo-
Kantian idea of representation in order to understand the philosophical background of 
Foucault's formulation. Now, since it is beyond the scope of my thesis to describe all 
of the philosophical trends within neo-Kantianism, I will restrict myself to a 
discussion of Erwin Panofsky's formulation of representation, which is influenced hy 
Ernst Cassirer. 
In his essay 'Perspective as Symbolic Form', Panofsky argues that perspective 
is nothing less than that "symbolic form", by which the social code of homogeneous 
52 Craig Brandist, 'Neo-Kantianism in Cultural Theory: Bakhtin. Derrida and Foucault'. Radical 
Philosophy, 102 (2000), 6-16 (p. II). 
53 Ibid. 
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and transcendental space is systematically structured in modern cultural production. 
To quote Panofsky: 
In a sense, perspective transforms psychophysiological space into mathematical 
space. It negates the differences between front and back, between right and left, 
between bodies and intervening space ("empty" space), so that the sum of all the 
parts of space and all its contents are absorbed into a single "quantum 
continuum." It forgets that we see not with a single tixed eye but with two 
constantly moving eyes, resulting in a spheroidal field of vision. It takes no 
account ofthe enormous difference between the psychologically conditioned 
"visual image" through which the visible world is brought to our consciousness, 
and the mechanically conditioned "retinal image" which paints itself upon our 
h . I 54 P YSlca eye. 
Encouraging the view that the advent of perspective was historically 
incidental, Panofsky critically investigates the effect of mathematically resituating 
reality in the symbolic form. He suggests that a significant problem of perspective 
springs from the 'fundamental discrepancy between "reality" and its construction' in 
the sense that the retinal image is 'a projection not on a flat but on a concave 
surface' .55 This disparity between reality and its representation leads "aesthetic space" 
and "theoretical space" to a recasting of 'perceptual space in the guise of one and the 
same sensation: in one case that sensation is visually symbolized, in the other it 
appears in logical form'. 56 
Panofsky's account of perspective theoretically employed Cassirer's 
conceptualisation of "symbolic form" in order to connect the history of perspective to 
the formation of a Weltanschauung. Cassirer was a philosopher who applied the 
Kantian critique of reason to the cultural field by considering the symbol as the 
54 Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. by Christopher S. Wood (New York: Zone 
Books, 1997), p. 31 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., p. 45. 
202 
common category of forms of human thought, imagination and experience.~7 This 
attempt might be called a revised method of neo-Kantianism, aimed at investigating 
the reification of aesthetic ideology in the light of the horizontal scope of history. 
According to Galin Tihanov, Cassirer's The Philosophy (~lSymholic Forms is 'a 
powerful attempt at redefining the Kantian forms of human experience into Hegelian 
stages in the historical growth of human consciousness and culture'. 58 The most 
significant factor in Cassirer's formula lies in the fact that it defines "scicnce"" as a 
symbolic form; "science" is no less the absolute standard of truth than a system of 
symbols, in the sense that all human experience occurs through the process of 
symbolisation. As Tihanov indicates, neo-Kantianism and Lehemphi/o",ophie, which 
is one of its contemporary trends, are 'both hostile to positivism and willing to admit 
that the source of value lies in the singularity of individual phenomena rather than in 
abstract generallaws,.59 In this respect, it is not difficult to see that Panofsky's 
analysis of perspective was indebted to neo-Kantianism, which is sceptical of thc 
ideology of science and technology. 
Associating subjective experience with the experience of space, Panofsky 
proposes to disclose the secret of art history: perspective is not relatcd to outside 
reality but rather the symbolic form of Weltanschauung whereby the a priori 
knowledge of reality is retrospectively reconstituted as reality. In other words, 
perspective is nothing less than the objectification of subject. Therefore, Pano["ky"s 
definition of perspective is to collapse the distinction between aesthetic perception 
and cognition in general. 60 
57 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 3 vols. trans. by Ralph Manheim (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, \955). 
58 Galin Tihanov, The Master and the Slave: Lukacs. Bakhtin. and the Ideas o(Their Time (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 24. . 
59 Ibid., p. 22. 
60 See Christopher S. Wood. 'Introduction', in Perspective as Symholic Form. p. 13. 
203 
In a similar tone, Robert D. Romanyshyn describes the way in which the 
aesthetic mode of perspective becomes identified with the epistemological mode of 
general cognition. According to Romanyshyn, the invention of linear perspective 
painting in fifteenth-century Italy has profoundly influenced our contemporary 
world;61 the linear perspective vision is the geometrical paradigm by which our eyes 
mathematically judge what is natural or artificial. As Romanyshyn describes the effect 
of perspective, 'when the vertical depth of the world as a matter of levels is replaced 
by a horizontal depth as a matter of spatial distance, the things which belong to this 
former depth retreat inside' .62 In the formulation of perspective. that is to say, 
'everything that cannot be explained, that cannot be measured and made equal 
through the rule of number, disappears,.63 
The way in which perspective obtains the central position in aesthetic 
epistemology resides in its homogenising space through the absolute centric point of 
an observer imagined as standing on a horizontal dimension.64 To ratify this centric 
point, perspective necessarily endows the human eye with a central function as the 
measure of reality. This is not very different from the way in which Barthes 
conceptualises the mode of representation: the mode of representation is constituted 
by the logic of geometrical perspective. In this respect, Barthes argues: 
The 'Organon of Representation' (which it is today becoming possible to write 
because there are intimations of something else) will have as its dual foundation 
61 See Robert D. Romanyshyn, Technology as Symptom and Dream (London: Routledge, 1981)), p. 32. 
62 Ibid., p. 44. 
63 Ibid. 
64 For more detailed discussion of the aesthetic invention of perspective, see Samuel Y. Edgerton. nIL' 
Renaissance Rediscovery o/Linear Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 43. Alberti's 
text, quoted in this book, explains the linear perspective as follows: 'as it passes through the centric 
point, this line may be called the centric line. This is why men depicted standing in the parallel furthest 
away are a great deal smaller than those in the nearer ones, a phenomenon which is clearly 
demonstrated by nature herself, for in churches we see the heads of men walking about, moving at the 
more or less the same height, while the feet of those further away may correspond to the knee level of 
those in front'. 
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the sovereignty of the act of cutting out [dec()UpaKe] and the unity of the subject 
of that action. The substance of the various arts will therefore be of little 
importance; certainly, theatre and cinema are direct expressions of geometry 
(unless, as rarely, they carry out some research on the voice, on stereophony), 
but classic (readable) literary discourse, which has for such a long time now 
abandoned prosody, music, is also a representational, geometrical discourse in 
that it cuts out segments in order to depict them: to discourse (the classics would 
have said) is simply 'to depict the tableau one has in one's mind' .115 
According to Romanyshyn, this privileging of the human eye signifies 
precisely the symbolic centralisation ofhumanity.66 This is the reason why both 
structuralism and poststructuralism centralise the problem of representation in the 
presupposition that the change of representational mode is nothing but the 
transformation of reality. However, it is difficult to admit that only the centralisation 
of the human eye imposes perspective as symbolic form, which produces the idea of 
homogenous space. Strictly speaking, the human eye is nothing less than one of the 
human body's organs that makes the individual gaze a subjective experience. Thus, 
what is inevitably demanded for its homogenising space is the duplicate mirror-
structure of ideology in which the individual gaze is identified with the others. 
Panofsky's neo-Kantian consideration of perspective as symbolic form can be 
criticised by the Althusserian formulation of ideology,67 in such a way that his 
conceptualisation of symbolic form overlooks the ideological function of perspective 
whereby heterogeneous aesthetic experiences are absorbed into the transcendentally 
homogeneous space. Unlike a few postmodemist arguments, all differences are not 
perfectly vanished in the homogeneous space produced by perspective. Paradoxically, 
Panofsky himself also acknowledges the differentiating aspect of the homogeneous 
space as follows: 
65 Barthes, 'Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein', p. 70. 
66 See Romanyshyn, Technology as Symptom and Dream, p. 44. 
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We shall speak of a fully "perspectival" view of space not when mere isolated 
objects, such as houses or furniture, are represented in "foreshortening," but 
rather only when the entire picture has been transformed - to cite another 
Renaissance theoretician - into a "window," and when we are meant to believe 
we are looking through this window into a space. The material surface upon 
which the individual figures or objects are drawn or painted or carved is thus 
negated, and instead reinterpreted as a mere "picture plane." Upon this picture 
plane is projected the spatial continuum which is seen through it and which is 
understood to contain all the various individual objects.68 
A significant factor in Panofsky's discussion lies in the function of perspective 
whereby "all the various individual objects" are supposedly contained in "the spatial 
continuum". Insofar as the transformation of a mere picture plane into a "window". 
through which the human eye looks at the world, can be regarded as an ideological 
effect, the question as to how the spatial continuum contains the individual objects 
inevitably is tied in with the problem of constructing a perspectival plane. In other 
words, the modulation of the perspectival homogeneity gives rise to an ideological 
edifice whereby the individual objects are essentially reduced to a single order. It 
seems to me that Althusser's formula of ideology explains this properly: the reduction 
of the individual objects into the homogeneous singularity does not mean that all 
subjects are one-sidedly absorbed into the Absolute Subject. 
It is rather that the duplicate mirror-structure of ideology effectively endows 
the individual subjects with the self-consciousness of themselves. In addition, the 
perspectival worldview in the seventeenth century was grounded on the conviction 
that 'nature's divine quality appeared in the harmony that linked its diversity to the 
67 For Atlhusser's formulation of ideological effects, see Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation', in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. trans. 
by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). 
68 Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, p. 27. 
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fundamental unity constituted by God's own presence,.6l) The perspectival plane was 
closely related to the ideological illusion that makes us think nature or the world as 
the heavenly harmony of God. Thus, the homogeneous space is no less an actually 
existing space than an insulated abstractive idea of space - the physical reality in the 
homogeneous space is totally eclipsed by the idealisation of its spatial ity. Therefore, 
the problem is not the structure of the abstractive idea of spatiality, but rather the way 
in which the isolated abstract comes to be realised by mediation. For me, neither 
poststructuralism nor the neo-Kantian formula of representation can fundamentally 
resolve this problem, precisely because both formulations deliberately eliminate the 
category of mediation between the mode of representation and the mode of 
production. 
The poststructuralist view of cultural production does not reject the category 
of representation as such, as in the case of structuralism. Yet, the poststructuralist 
theory of representation discards the any utopian perspective of language which is 
embedded in structuralist formulas. endorsing the presupposition that representation is 
an iron web whereby the cultural power continuously reproduces its own category of 
reality. In this respect, it is true that the way in which poststructuralism understands 
representation is very different from a Marxian view of realism. Unlike the Marxist 
formulation of mediation between the abstract and the concrete as the dialectic of 
representation, poststructuralism grasps what is represented in cultural form as the 
mere artificial edifice that bears no relation to truth. 
This is little more than a structuralist perspective of cultural production, a 
perspective that regards all cultural forms as the compound combination of signified 
and signifier. Based on such an aesthetic logic. postmodern cultural production in 
69 Louis Dupre, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutk's of Nature and CII/ture (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 230. 
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general comes to recuperate the category of representation against modernism. whose 
purpose is to reject representation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REALISM AND CULTURAL THEORY: JAMESON 
Introduction 
It would be fair to say that the rise of cultural theory is related to the political 
frustration of Western Marxism. Paraphrasing Perry Anderson, Terry Eagleton 
observes that 'Western Marxism's shift to culture was born partly out of political 
impotence and disenchantment'.' Yet this is not the same as suggesting that the 
advent of cultural theory means the end of Marxian issues. It is rather a 
methodological adaptation of Marxism that emerges from the more reified condition 
of academic system. In this sense, Eagleton also acknowledges that the advent of 
cultural theory is a theoretical challenge to the way in which the humanities has 
collaborated with the reification of higher education.2 
What is at stake for Eagleton is that cultural theory has eschewed the political 
dimension of Marxism to accommodate a changed condition. This means that it is 
better to forget the ideological aspect of Marxism for its methodological application. 
as in the case ofTeZ Qel group. Any kind of theory is thus 'a symptom of the fact that 
we can no longer take those practices for granted,.3 The inversion of the Marxian 
distinction between theory and practice is vital in cultural theory. Through this 
process, theory comes to be stressed as the pre-condition of historical change. Not 
surprisingly, this is the very procedure through which the Marxian idea of realism is 
abandoned. 
However, it seems to me that Fredric Jameson has written against the grain of 
other cultural critics as he attempts to retain the ideas of realism in his adaptation of 
I Terry Eagleton, After Theory (London: Allen Lane, 2003), p. 31. 
2 See ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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cultural theory. As Sean Homer argues, Jameson is a theorist and cultural critic who 
'can appropriate and incorporate the insights of alternative and non-Marxist theory 
while retaining Marxism's overarching historical narrative,.4 From this perspective, 
this chapter examines Jameson's idea of realism in relation to his formulation of 
dialectical criticism. In exploring Marxism and Form I will follow two directions. 
First, the chapter engages Jameson's text by analysing his dialectical method. 
Jameson's valorisation of form as the logic of content underwrites his dialectical 
criticism whereby theory is deconstructed by a dialectical style. Jameson's style is 
essentially connected with his idea of realism in relation to mediation. Jameson 
believes that a dialectical style would function in the same way as realism works in 
the process of human perception. 
Secondly, the chapter considers the influence of Sartre and Lukacs on 
Jameson, rather than that of Benjamin and Adorno, and distinguishes between their 
conceptions of totality. I want to argue that Sartre's theoretical framework gives 
Jameson a way of interpreting Lukacs by means of his dialectical criticism. This 
chapter avoids the discussion of the relationship between Jameson and Benjamin and 
Adorno, because the aim of my discussion is to account for Jameson's formulation of 
realism, focusing on Jameson's theoretical idea of the dialectical relation between 
totality and narrative. In Jameson's argument about the relation of realism to the 
category of tot ali sat ion, Benjamin's and Adorno's preference for modernism rather 
than realism would not be significantly considered. What interests Jameson in 
Benjamin's and Adorno's writings on modernism is the category of utopian impulse. 
which is immanent in the structure of narrative. More significantly, Jameson's 
definition of form as the cultural logic of the mode of production is deeply motivated 
3 Ibid., p. 27. 
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by Lukacs' conceptualisation of fonn as the logic of content. As Steven Best and 
Douglas Kellner point out, Jameson's conception of cognitive mapping, which the 
chapter will later consider as the alternative realism in late capitalism, is nothing less 
than a continuing project of his earlier Lukacsean theory of narrative. 5 For this reason, 
the chapter does not include a discussion of Benjamin's and Adorno's influences on 
Jameson's formulation of realism. 
From this perspective, there are two further issues in my discussion of Sartrc 
and Lukacs in relation to Jameson's idea ofrealism. First, my intention in this chapter 
is to argue that these two theorists are the most influential models for Jameson's 
criticism. So, I will claim that Jameson's interest in form is related to his approach to 
Sartre and Lukacs. Jameson argues that for dialectical thought there is no content 
except total content.6 Here is the point where Jameson relies on Lukacs' concept of 
totality as well as Sartre's notion of total is at ion in order to emphasise fonn. 
Lukacs and Sartre both stress fonn in order to solve epistemological problems. 
These problems emerge from the new socio-economic condition, in which the Kantian 
system, in Lukacs' terms, 'classical middle-class philosophy', no longer succeeds in 
connecting to the totality. Lukacs believes that 'class consciousness', through which 
Lukacs aimed at laying the foundation of knowledge to obtain totality in capitalism, is 
'the a priori limits or advantages conferred by affiliation with the bourgeoisie or the 
proletariat upon the mind's capacity to apprehend external reality,.7 Secondly, I move 
to Jameson's concept of fonn in relation to ideology. For Lukacs, 'the concept of 
ideology already implies mystification, and conveys the notion of a kind of floating 
4 Sean Homer, Fredric Jameson: Marxism. Hermeneutics, Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 
1998), p. 5. 
~ See Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Inlerro1{ations (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), p. 189. 
6 See Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories (~(Literalure 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 306. 
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and psychological world view, a kind of subjective picture of things already by 
definition unrelated to the external world itself.8 Even a proletarian worldview, 
therefore, is ideological. so that it must be interpreted in relation to historical reality. 
It is interesting that Jameson contrasts Lukacs' concept of ideology with positivistic 
demands for the ultimate standard of truth. Jameson criticises such demands because 
it is impossible to understand anything in the world without subjective distortions or 
ideological transformations. I want to argue that this is where Jameson's formulation 
of mediation can be considered as a resolution to the reitication of cultural theory. 
Finally, the chapter investigates Jameson's theoretical intervention in the 
debates around postmodernism, focusing on his ambivalence towards the relationship 
between Marxism and postmodernism. My concern in this discussion is that 
Jameson's delineation of postmodernism is problematic, in the sense that his 
periodisation is overly applied to legitimise his own aesthetic presupposition of 
postmodernism. Alongside this, the chapter turns to consider Jameson's reformulation 
of realism in terms of narrative. Furthermore, I contend that Jameson's idea of realism 
can be found in his conceptualisation of cognitive mapping. 
1. Form and Style 
Fredric Jameson is a \\Titer whose work seems to call for a dialectical reading, 
in the sense that his work is nothing less than the result of a process of dialectical 
thinking in which he accounts for everything in terms of mediation. This dialectical 
characteristic secures the way in which Jameson's commentary intervenes in other 
theories, since "metacommentary" is the most extrinsic feature in the dialectic. From 
Sartre: The Origins oia STyle, which grew out of his doctoral dissertation, to recent 
7 Ibid., p. 182. 
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work on Brecht, Jameson has consistently developed a rigorous critique of literature, 
culture, and contemporary philosophy. Although, paradoxically, his role in the 
theoretical arena seems to owe less to his Marxist orientation than to his engagement 
with the debate on postmodernism. 
Indeed, most works dealing with Jameson's theory today focus on his analysis 
of post modernism. As Jameson himself confesses, the combination of Marxism and 
postmodernism seems to be 'peculiar or paradoxical, and somehow intensely 
unstable' , so that 'the two terms carry with them a whole freight of pop nostalgia 
images,.9 Jameson humorously reveals the incongruous image occasioned by a 
general preoccupation with Marxism and postmodernism, which is that of 'a small. 
painstakingly reproduced nostalgia restaurant - decorated with the old photographs, 
with Soviet waiters sluggishly serving bad Russian food - hidden away within some 
gleaming new pink and blue architectural extravaganza' .10 In the context of this 
atmosphere in which one always already understands Marxism as an old-fashioned 
ideology, the most pressing work for a contemporary Marxist critic is to deconstruct 
such prejudices. It is interesting that this argument alludes to the aim of Jameson's 
project: to elaborate Marxist methodology in the condition of "demarxification". To 
achieve this, Jameson tries to prove that Marxism serves as an absolute historical 
horizon for other theories; Marxism is a matrix of theory through which any 
theoretical idea is produced. In a sense, Jameson's whole project is little else than an 
attempt to substantiate this presupposition. 
What Jameson clarifies here is not so much his conversion to postmodernism. 
but rather his dialectical position in relation to Marxism and postmodernism. lie is 
8 Ibid., p. 182-3. 
9 Fredric Jameson, 'Marxism and Postmodemism', in The Cultural Turn: Selected U'''ilin~s IIl1lhe 
Pos/modern. 1983-1998 (London: Verso, \998), p. 33. 
10 Ibid. 
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adamant that 'this new topic is not alien to my earlier work but rather a logical 
consequence of it' .11 According to Jameson, his inter- or cross-disciplinary thinking is 
no more than the realisation of dialectical thinking. Perry Anderson's estimation of 
Jameson seems to provide a proper defence of this; Anderson, in his recent book-
length study on Jameson, has the following to say: 
The Western Marxist tradition was attracted to the aesthetic as involuntary 
consolation for impasses of the political and economic. The result was a 
remarkable range of reflections on different aspects of the culture of modern 
capitalism. But these were never integrated into a consistent theory of its 
economic development, typically remaining at a somewhat detached and 
specialized angle to the broader movement of society: taxable even with a certain 
idealism, from the standpoint ofa more classical Marxism. Jameson's account of 
postmodernism, by contrast, develops for the first time a theory of the 'cultural 
logic' of capital that simultaneously offers a portrait of the transformations of 
this social form as a whole. This is a much more comprehensive vision. Here, in 
the passage from the sectoral to the general, the vocation of Western Marxism 
has reached its most complete consummation.12 
Anderson, who definitively accounted for the historical emergence of Western 
Marxism in his early works, \3 now evaluates the significance of Jameson's 
accomplishment as the culmination of that tradition. 14 What interests Anderson in 
Jameson's thinking is the way in which he correlates cultural forms and economic 
process, the very idea of mediation which is based on the Hegelian formulation of the 
relationship between essence and appearance: appearance belongs to essence. This 
idea leads Jameson to understand the cultural logic of capitalism in collaboration with 
socio-economic development. No doubt, as Jameson strongly argues, this results from 
an essential aspect of dialectical thinking, its holistic approach on method. Thus, 
II Ibid., p. 34. 
12 Perry Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity (London: Verso, 1998). p. 72. 
13 See Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976), pp. 29-30. 
14 See Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity, p. 72. 
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Jameson seems to suggest that we cannot understand literary and cultural texts unless 
we work dialectically to understand the social whole, and vice versa. 
In Marxism and Form, Jameson argues that 'the tautological movement which 
we have described within the work of art, in which from a certain elevation 
intrinsically fonnal considerations suddenly dissolve into problems of content, is 
reproduced outside the work in the relationship between the content and its historical 
context' .15 The merely fonnal consideration of the work of art gives the way in which 
tautology in criticism happens, since fonn reserves its logic in relation to content. 
As for other Hegelian theorists, who are taken as examples for dialectical 
thinkers in Marxism and Form, Jameson seems to rely on the principle that form must 
be understood in accordance with content and its historical context, since it always 
emerges as a reference to historical events and situations. Thus, Jameson argues that 
even for those writers, whose works appear to have no relation to historical reality, it 
must be supposed that their works are imposed by 'the novelist, who despairs of 
evolving any genuine events from the colorless stream of experience itself .16 That is 
to say, every text has its origins outside itself, whether it directly describes historical 
events or not. In Benjamin's terms, those works cannot resist bearing 'the marks of 
the situation which gave rise to it' .17 Similarly to Benjamin, who tinds the remnants of 
historical situation within Baudelaire and Proust in terms of allegory, Jameson 
develops his thinking about the correlation between narrative and reality through the 
notion of allegory. As Benjamin suggests, allegory is a form of narrative in which 
15 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 352. 
16 Ibid., p. 201. 
17 See Walter Benjamin, 'Some Motifs in Baudelaire', in Charles Baudelaire: A Lvri" foet ill the Era 
a/High Capitalism, trans. by Harry Zohn (London: Verso, 1997), p. 1 \3. . 
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history remains as a '"trace", so Jameson argues allegory happens when we know we 
cannot represent history, but we also cannot not do iL I8 
Jameson argues that history is always perceived in the form of narrative, since 
making narrative in order to understand the world is 'the central function or instance 
of human mind' .19 Insofar as history can be considered narrative, it must be 
interpreted in other hermeneutic levels, because history always reminds us that 
narrative cannot be completed by itself, but rather it needs to be thought in relation to 
its given historical situation. Accordingly, as Jameson claims, the meaning that the 
world has a narrative structure does not suppose that we can tell a simple story about 
it, or that there are representational techniques existing for doing that.20 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that for Jameson literary history, or even the history of 
philosophy, is nothing more than innovation in form, since history consists of 
interpretations, in which new narratives intervene in old narrative structures. In this 
respect, Jameson's dialectical criticism includes the hermeneutic project, in which his 
emphasis on dialectical thinking is thinking about history in relation to totality. 
Jameson's idea of narrative cannot be separated from his formulation of 
totality. The concept oftotality is the hidden impetus by which Jameson's criticism 
formulates the correlation between narrative and history. It is interesting that Jameson 
understands dialectical thinking as the way in which we try to undo what we represent 
18 See Fredric Jameson, 'Marxism and Historicity of Theory: An Interview with Fredric Jameson', Nt:w 
Literary History, 29 (1998), 353-83 (p. 376). For Benjamin's argument about allegory, see The Origin 
a/German Tragic Drama, trans. by John Osborne (London: Verso, 1998), p. 31. For Benjamin, 
representation is allegorical process whose activity is the place of truth. Allegory could not exist if truth 
were clearly realised. This activity, 'representational impulse in truth', does not suppose the whole 
presentation of truth, but rather must eternally represent itself. In this sense, just as Jameson argues that 
form is content, so Benjamin says that 'form is meaning'. 
19 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (New York: 
Cornell, 1981), p. 13. 
20 Jameson, 'Marxism and Historicity of Theory' p. 376. 
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at every moment in a unified way, and 'see the contradictions and multiplicities 
behind that particular experience' .21 
Based on his reading of theorists from the Frankfurt School, and alongside 
Lukacs and Sartre, Jameson challenges the preconception that Marxism can no longer 
provide concepts for the analysis of modern culture, that it is, in short, an out-dated 
ideology. Jameson's antagonism toward positivism, in particular, is clearly revealed 
in his endorsement of Adorno's difficult style. Jameson notes, first of all, the hostility 
of the Anglo-American tradition toward a dialectical style, and then criticises 
positivistic demand for clarity, simplicity and quick reading without any attention to 
the materiality of language and the form of sentence construction, in which real 
thought seems to be embodied.22 Jameson's argument about style is compelling, and 
can be seen as a strategy against capitalist commodification and reduction. However, 
his justification of his difficult style is also questionable, as with Adorno's criticism of 
popular culture, Jameson remains open to the charge of elitism. Considering the case 
of Adorno, how can we understand Jameson's difficult style as an attempt to grasp the 
complicated reality of contemporary capitalism? 
As Jameson indicates, his style is privately tied up with his pleasure in writing 
the hope that 'we are not too alienated or instrumentalised to reserve some small place 
for what used to be called handcraft satisfaction,?3 Yet this seems an inadequate 
explanation for Jameson's writing in a difficult style. To a certain extent, his style is 
designed to stimulate us to think about reality, since his writing always draws 
attention to many parallel interactions between the subject and the world. In the last 
chapter of Marxism and Form, Jameson defends dialectical thought that tries 'to 
21 Ibid., p. 375. 
22 See Marxism and Form, p. xiii. 
23 Fredric Jameson, 'Interview' with L. Green, Jonathan Culler and Richard Klein, Diacritics, 12 
(1982), 72-91 (p. 88). 
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widen its own attention to include them in its awareness as welL2 .. It is in this sense 
that dialectical thinking is faced with 'the operative procedures of the nonreflective 
one', since it refuses 'to complete the application of such procedures.'25 For Jameson, 
dialectical thought aims 'not so much at solving the particular dilemmas in question. 
as at converting those problems into their own solutions on a higher level, and making 
the fact and the existence of the problem itself the starting point for new research'. 2() 
He continues as follows: 
This is indeed the most sensitive moment in the dialectical process: that in which 
an entire complex of thought is hoisted through a kind of inner leverage one 
floor higher, in which the mind, in a kind of shifting of gears, now finds itself 
willing to take what had been a question for an answer. standing outside its 
previous exertions in such a way that it reckons itself into the problem, 
understanding the dilemma not as a resistance ofthe object alone, but also as the 
result of a subject-pole deployed and disposed against it in a strategic fashion -
in short, as the function of a determinate subject-object relationship.27 
In other words. his writing attempts to be double-edged: on the one hand. it 
serves to present reality in light of totality; on the other hand, it aims to give pleasure 
by which we willingly participate in reading the dialectical sentence. Thus, the 
difficulty of reading Jameson is no less than the difficulty of comprehending total 
reality in our socio-economic condition as well as to give entertainment rather like 
solving a jigsaw. Here is the point where Eagleton's analysis of Jameson's style tinds 
its mark. 
As Eagleton says, 'language must be reinvested with the materiality of which 
one form ofreification has robbed it, but the historical conditions are simply not as 
24 Marxism and Form, pp. 307-9. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
218 
yet ripe to do that without the risk of fetishizing it in another direction' .28 So. 
Jameson's style can be seen as the reflection of this contradiction in which the 
concrete deconstructs the abstract in a dialectical way, sinct! the dialectical thought is 
nothing but the elaboration of dialectical sentences.29 More than a mere rhetorical 
strategy, therefore, Jameson's style must be understood in relation to his position 
regarding the dialectic as the only way in which one can realise the reitied reality. 
For Jameson. the task of dialectical criticism is not to do with constructing 
mediations between private and public, between individual and socio-economic 
realities, between the existential and history, but to do with making the meditative 
relationship visible.3o For such mediation is the place of the concrete; in other words. 
two dimensions are always related in our experience. In short, dialectical criticism is 
concerned with the "representation" of reality. 
Jameson introduces the notion of ideology as "optical illusion" in describing 
the act of a dialectical criticism as sort of correction for that distorted image. The 
"optical illusion" is an inverted relationship of form and content, which happens in the 
process of human perception. Clint Burnman's attention to this seems to be valid in 
terms of the way in which he relates "optical illusion" to "visual metaphors" that are. 
in Jameson's terms, utopian compensations for the reification of the senses caused by 
capitalism.31 Yet, more than a rhetorical device, Jameson uses the term "optical 
illusion" to suggest something that forestalls our perception of totality in capitalism. 
As Jameson quotes from The German Ideology, "optical illusion" is nothing but 
"ideology" in which men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera 
28 Terry Eagleton, Against the Grain: Selected Essays. /975-/985 (London: Verso, 1986), p. 69. 
29 See Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. xii. 
30 See ibid., p. 406. 
31 Clint Burnham. The Jamesonian Unconscious (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). pp. 50-51. 
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obscura. 32 This 'ocular inversion as a figure for the seeming autonomy and self .. 
sufficiency of the intellectual and cultural realm' is 'paradoxical to the degree to 
which in it a socially conditioned and historically determined mystification is 
described in terms of a permanent natural process' .33 So, as Jameson says, 'both class 
consciousness and that inherent and more natural tendency of consciousness toward a 
kind of unconscious idealism are still identified' .34 In this sense, Jameson's defence of 
History and Class Consciousness depends on Lukacs' concept of ideology. In Lubes' 
terms, as Jameson claims, 'ideology already implies mystification, and conveys the 
notion of a kind of floating and psychological world view, a kind of subjective picture 
of things already by definition unrelated to the external world itself . .l~ 
Jameson applies this idea of ideology to a more general explanation of human 
understanding, in order to emphasise form. Accordingly, what Jameson wants to say 
with Lukacs is that 'access to a totality is once again reinvented' in form. since the 
privileged historical moments, in which practice itself breaks out. would disappear as 
soon as practice stops. Therefore, his hermeneutic project seems to proceed in the 
shadow of Luk::lcs' concept of ideology, to the extent that his emphasis on form is 
inspired by Lukacs' theoretical framework. In short, Jameson accepts Lukacs' 
insistence on the mediated relationship between reification and totality. In Jameson"s 
terms, Lukacs' defence of literary realism is related to the concept of totality :~(l For 
Lukacs' realism is not simply a matter of accuracy or reflecting, but it is characterised 
by 'narration rather than description' ,37 For ideology as a natural process in human 
understanding already dominates the relationship of subject and object. .Just as much 
32 See Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 369. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
3S Ibid., p. 182-83. 
36 See Jameson, 'History and Class Consciousness as an "Unfinished Project"', p. 49. 
37 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 196. 
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'the retina of the eye' creates an inverted figure of the world, as ideology does by 
means of "subjective distortions". 38 
It is important that we should stress the fact that this distortion is nothing to do 
with the real relationship of form and content. The real relationship must be 
represented as "visible" in itself. As Lukacs believed, and Jameson also claims, this is 
the principle of realism. This "visible" means not so much transparency as in a mirror, 
but rather a mode of narrative which is followed by the category oftotality.:1<l Later 
on, this image oftotality will be reformulated in Jameson's concept of "cognitive 
mapping". This idea seems to be close to Lukacs' concepts of totality and narrative. In 
this sense, Jameson regards history as the dialectical process not of the being but of 
the becoming, of a collectivity; to put in bald terms, it is an unpredictable dialectic 
moving towards totality. This is the reason why Jameson's Marxism requires the 
formulation of realism for the totalisation of social reality using a dialectical method. 
My interest in the following is concerned with this area of Jameson's criticism, and 
entails his conceptualisation of realism. 
2. Jameson and Lukacs 
In his discussion of Lukacs' works, Jameson strongly refutes the view that 
Lukacs' works must be divided into two parts: the early Lukacs who began with 
Hegel and the late Lukacs who became a demagogue for the communist party.40 
Jameson challenges the critical emphasis on the discontinuity between Lukacs' early 
38 Ibid., p. 370. 
39 This is the way in which Lukacs defines the mode of realism as reflection in proper proportion. 
40 For example, see Theodor W. Adorno, 'Reconsideration under Duress', in Aeslhelics LInd Politic.\'. 
trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1980), pp. 151-52. After describing Lukacs' early 
works as the origin of autobiographical myth, Adorno's criticism of Lukacs' late work becomes 
increasingly hostile arguing that 'he took the crudest criticisms from the Party hierarchy to heart. 
twisting Hegelian motifs and turning them against himself; and for decades on end he lahoured in a 
series of books and essays to adapt his obviously unimpaired talents to the unrelieved sterility of Soviet 
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works and later works. For Jameson, this biographical myth of Lukacs, on which 
some critics depend in order to justify Lukacs' discontinuous "periods", presents a 
two-fold disadvantage: 
On the one hand, the passage from one period to another falls outside the myth 
proper. Thus the transitions from one position to another turn out either to 
exceed ... or to fall short of ... what even the most sympathetic historical 
consciousness my be expected to relive and to understand from the inside. On 
the other, the various periods may now be played off against each other without 
our having to commit ourselves to any of them. So the young Marx was used 
against the older one; and early Lukacs ... serves to discredit the later 
theoretician of realism; indeed, the final Lukacs, with his return to the beginning., 
is bound to suggest the failure and the vanity of the whole enterprise:H 
For Jameson, however, textual inconsistencies in Lukacs' works 'alert us to 
the possibility of conceptual ising the relationship between the idea of "totality'" and 
the 'later account of realism in some other way than as break, substitution, 
compensation, formation' .42 The critics of Lukacs, Jameson claims, 'came prepared to 
contemplate the abstract idea, but in practice they find themselves asked to sacrifice 
too much' .43 According to Jameson, historical materialism is 'irreducible to pure 
reason or to contemplation' ,44 thus Lukacs' continuity cannot be conceived of in 
terms of abstract ideas, but rather "history" itself, the history from which Lukacs' 
theory emerged, since coherence comes from "outside", not from "inside". In this 
sense, Jameson argues that 'Lukacs' life work fails to be understood from the inside, 
------------------------_._----------.-_._----
claptrap, which in the meantime had degraded the philosophy it proclaimed to the level of a mere 
instrument in the service of its rule'. 
41 Jameson, Marxism and Form, pp. 162.63. 
42 Fredric Jameson, 'History and Class Consciousness as an "Unfinished Project''', Rethinking 
MARXISM, no. 1 (1988), pp. 49·72. (p. 50). 
43 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 160. 
44 Ibid., p. 161. 
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as a set of solutions and problems developing out of one another according to their 
. I' d ' 4~ own mner OglC an momentum.' 
Jameson keeps this position when he defends Sartre's "conversion" to 
Marxism. Turning against the customary description, which depicts Sartre's Critique:' 
of Dialectical Reason as an attempt to reconcile existentialism and Marxism, Jameson 
suggests that' Marxism was not something to which Sartre came to after 
existentialism, but rather an interest concurrent with it, which has coexisted with the 
other philosophy throughout Sartre's career' .46 Consequently, it is not enough to think 
of Jameson's devotion to Lukacs and Sartre as merely the result of his private 
enthusiasm, even if he seems to be definitely fascinated by both theorists in his first 
study. It is rather much more plausible that Jameson's commitment to both is 
inevitable in his search for a method through which he can engage with American 
critical contexts. 
Considering the dominant figure of Heidegger, which pervaded Western 
philosophy at that time, it seems somewhat unusual that Jameson took Lukacs and 
Sartre for his theoretical models. When he studied in Germany in the early )950s, the 
German intellectual scene was dominantly Heideggerian.47 It seems to me that Lucien 
Goldmann's comparative consideration of Lukacs and Heidegger can serve as a clue 
for Jameson's adaptation of Lukacs rather than Heidegger. 
As Goldmann remarks, Lukacs and Hcideggcr stand for the two poles of the 
principal European philosophical currents.48 In his argument Goldmann indicates the 
common basis of Heidegger and Lukacs in their intellectual debt to Ilusserl. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, p. 207. 
47 See Jameson, 'Marxism and the Historicity of Theory'. p. 357. 
48 See Lucien Goldmann. Lukacs and Heidegger: Toward a New Philosophy, trans. by William Q. 
Boelhower (London: Routledge, 1977), p. 2. For the problem of Goldmann's linking Lukacs to 
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According to Goldmann, and contrary to structuralism, Lukacs and Heidegger believe 
that 'man is not opposite the world which he tries to understand and upon which he 
acts, but within this world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between 
the meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the universe and that which he is 
trying to find or introduce into his own existence' .49 
It is undeniable that there is a marked similarity between Lukacs and 
Heidegger in rejecting the transcendental subject upon which Husserl's 
phenomenology is founded. Even though these two theorists start from this common 
basis, there is a fundamental difference between Lukacs and Heidegger. That is. 
Lukacs considers the historical subject to be collective, whereas Heidegger supposes 
it to be the individual. For Jameson, therefore, Lukacs seems to be the tigure at that 
turning point where existentialism found the exit to history, just as Sartre tried to 
overcome his own philosophical limitations by means of Marxism, but ultimately 
failed. Thus, I contend that Lukacs is the pivotal figure through which Jameson 
resolves his philosophical dilemma and develops his own dialectical criticism out of 
his existential formation. 
To understand Jameson's criticism, we must go further into this discussion of 
the relationship between Lukacs and Jameson; for Jameson. Lukacs is a key model of 
the dialectical philosopher. 50 For example, the influence of Lukacs' formulation on 
Jameson's criticism is mainly related to the notions of totality and narrative. 
Alongside these, one of the most powerful Lukacsean concepts affecting Jameson's 
formulation is reification. In History and Class Consciousness. Lukacs suggests using 
----------------------------------_._--
Heidegger, see Istvan Feher, . Lucien Goldmann tiber Lukacs und Heidegger', in .lahrhllch cia 
lnternationalen Georg-Lukacs-GesellschaJt. 1996 (Bern: Peter Lang, 1(97), pp. 153·67. 
49 Ibid., p. 6. 
so Christopher Pawling suggests that Lukacs is an undeniable linkage between Marxism und Form mId 
The Political Unconscious. See Christopher Pawling, 'The American Lukacs?: Fredric Jameson and 
Dialectical Thought' (forthcoming). 
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this concept in order to explain 'the riddle of commodity-structure' .~l Lukacs 
elaborates Marx's idea of alienation in a criticism of the static relationship to objects 
in middle-class philosophy. As Jameson points out, Lukacs launches an attack on the 
dilemma of classical philosophy, to put it in simple terms, the impossibility of its own 
perceptions, which never comes to terms with the thing-in-itself, in order to justify 
"proletarian thought". For Lukacs, this thought is the privileged capacity by which a 
worker can totalise reality, and this capacity is oriented by the nature of the worker's 
situation. Due to his initial alienation, the worker sees 'elements of the outside world 
as objects of his thought', and even the worker perceives himself to be 'an object'. ~2 
According to Jameson, Lukacs' conceptualisation of rei fication is a 
development of Marx's description, not merely of commodity fetishism and exchange 
but of the commodity form itself, which is now enlarged to include Weber's account 
of the rationalization process, and Taylorisation; furthermore it encompasses not 
merely the work process, but also the reiftcation of mind, and scientific disciplines 
just as much as the psyche and the senses.53 This conception of reification is crucial to 
the idea of totality. In Lukacs' words, totality is always already deconstructed by 
reification in capitalist society, so that we necessarily need to interpret form, which at 
times appears to be manipulated by the "optical illusion" of ideology, if we want to 
obtain totality. 
As has been discussed, Lukacs' notorious criticism of modernism fllcuses on 
this ideological aspect of the aesthetic pursuit that attempts to attain eternity by means 
of abstraction. It is at this point, in his explanation of the basis of the chief conceptual 
opposition in Lukacs' criticism on the Hegelian opposition of the concrete and the 
51 See Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge. 
MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 83-110. 
52 See Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 187. 
53 See Jameson, 'History and Class Consciousness as an "Unfinished Project"'. p. 52. 
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abstract, that Jameson accepts Lukacs' examination of literature. 54 Jameson never 
takes Lukacs' position against modernism, but rather elaborates what Lukacs really 
wanted to say with his criticism of modernism. Lukacs' emphasis on realism rather 
than modernism is related to his basic conceptual categories: a split between the 
subject and object in modem times. In short, Lukacs' idea of literary realism is 
nothing more than the possibility of totality in the epistemic dimension. 
In this sense, realism is a way in which writers resist reification. This is the 
point where Jameson agrees with Lukacs in terms of realism. In considering the 
conceptualisation ofreification, Jameson suggests that Lukacs' History and Class 
Consciousness, the first systemic account of the logic of capitalism, is based on a 
paradox, given the way in which 'it insists on extreme fragmentation as a social 
norm' .55 This is what Jameson indicates about Marx's Capital. As Jameson says. this 
is the sense in which Lukacs' conception of reification invokes some radically 
different class logic - a 'collective project not merely capable of breaking the multiple 
systemic webs of reification, but which must do so in order to realize itself. 56 
In his discussion of this Lukacsean idea of realism, Jameson never hesitates to 
say that Lukacs' attempt is not to involve 'some restoration of the "unity" between the 
subject and the object, some invocation of a "reconciliation" between these 
fragmented and damaged zones ofbeing,;57 it is rather connected to a framework in 
which 'various kinds of knowledge are positioned, pursued and evaluated' .511 Such a 
definition of totality will emerge in Jameson's later criticism through the concepts of 
"transcoding" and "cognitive mapping" as Jameson's attempts to theorise the logic of 
the postmodern reality. Jameson argues: 
S4 See Jameson. Marxism and Form. p. 163. 
ss Jameson, 'History and Class Consciousness as an "Unfinished Project"', p. 52. 
S6 Ibid. 
S7 Ibid., p. 53. 
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We cannot, however, return to aesthetic practices elaborated on the basis of 
historical situations and dilemmas which are no longer ours. Meanwhile. the 
conception of space that has been developed here suggests that a model of 
political culture appropriate to our own situation will necessarily have to raise 
spatial issues as its fundamental organizing concern. I will therefore 
provisionally define the aesthetic of this new (and hypothetical) cultural form as 
an aesthetic of cognifil'e mapping.59 
Consequently. here is the crucial point where Jameson strives to set Lukacs 
free from the alleged criticism in which Lukacs has been regarded as nothing but a 
failed communist theorist. For Lukacs. realism is the way in which writers can refute 
reification by means of the dialectic working in the relationship between abstract and 
concrete. It is this sense that in the aesthetic realm realism has the same function as 
"the consciousness of the proletariat" in the socio-economic realm. 
Needless to say, this is the reason why Jameson calls for a form of dialectical 
criticism whereby we can realise and totalise the capitalist reality that is always 
already reified by commodification and fetishisation. This sense seems to account for 
his commentary on Joyce's Stephen, who describes history as a nightmare from which 
he is trying to awake; 'one cannot awake', observes Jameson, 'until one has tirst 
measured the extent and the intensity of the nightmare' .60 In this formula, Jameson 
reformulates the orthodox Marxian doctrine of the relationship between theory and 
practice, a doctrine that practice gives rise to theory and vice versa. The 
presupposition constituting such a reformulation is that reality is always already 
mediated. It is crucial to understand the structure of mediated correlation. Once 
encapsulated in abstractive form, it might be realised by the process of mediation 
between theory and practice. 
58 Ibid., p. 60. 
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As we have seen so far, Jameson's theoretical approach to Sartre and Lukacs 
provides the methodology for a reformulation of the category of realism in the newly 
articulated cultural conditions after the 1960s. Throughout his theoretical intervention 
into the anti-realistic literary context, Jameson draws on the legacy of Marxism and 
realism in his method of dialectical criticism. However, the way in which Jameson 
attempts to retain the positive aspect of realism is different from the approaches of the 
previous theorists such as Lukacs. This is where the question of Jameson's formula 
comes to exist in its own right. Jameson's consideration of realism is definitely linked 
to his own interest. raising the issue of form at the hermeneutic level. In this respect, 
Jameson's formulation of realism must be traced to the historical context of 
"demarxification" after the decline of Western Marxism. 
In his defence of interpretation, Jameson indicates that, in the tirst place, the 
absolute historical and collective level of narratives is designed to achieve the final 
meaning.61 In a sense, only the act of reading can push the emptiness towards infinite 
interpretation as a process. Considering this argument symptomatically, it is 
remarkable that Jameson's attitude towards narrative seems to depend mainly on the 
act of interpretation rather than that of making narrative. Whereas previously Jameson 
drew on Lukacs' realism in order to revise old-fashioned Marxist criticism, Jameson's 
concern now seems to be lacking a fully developed concept of narration which Lukacs 
emphasised as the principle of realism; Jameson rather focuses on the epistemological 
claim of realism. Jameson's idea of realism is given in the concluding chapter. 'The 
Existence of Italy', to Signatures of Visible. In the following. my discussion turns to 
investigate the way in which Jameson reformulates the Marxian idea of realism in his 
59 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism. or. the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1991), p. 51. 
60 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 305. 
61 See Jameson, The Political Unconscious, pp. 30-31. 
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dialectical consideration of the relationship between realism and modernism and 
postmodernism. 
3. Jameson and Realism 
Jameson refutes the Lukacsean formulation of realism in articulating his 
consideration of cultural production, and tactically draws on the semiotic analysis of 
structuralism to reject the classical mode of reflection theory. However. Jameson still 
reformulates the kernel of Lukacsean realism, the idea that a critic has to combine the 
examination of the writer's view of the world with the analysis of form. While Lukacs 
sees the writer's attitude towards the world as the condition of aesthetic creation. the 
main concern in Jameson's formulation is that realism is an opposite category to the 
aesthetic formality. More recently Jameson argues that realism is 'a peculiarly 
unstable concept owing to its simultaneous, yet incompatible, aesthetic and 
. I' I I' , 62 J . eplstemo oglca calms. ameson contmues: 
These two claims then seem contradictory: the emphasis on this or that type of 
truth content will clearly be undermined by any intensified awareness of the 
technical means or representational artifice of the work itself. Meanwhile, the 
attempt to reinforce and to shore up the epistemological vocation of the work 
generally involves the suppression of the formal properties of the realistic "text" 
and promotes an increasingly nai"ve and unmediated or reflective conception of 
aesthetic construction and reception. Thus, where the epistemological claim 
succeeds, it fails; and if realism validates its claim to being a correct or true 
representation of the world, it thereby ceases to be an aesthetic.: mode of 
representation and falls out of art altogether.63 
It is interesting that Jameson's formulation of the antithesis between realism 
and aesthetics tacitly follows Sartre's idea of the relationship between reality and 
beauty. In his observation of "pure literature", Sartre argues that beauty is the height 
62 Fredric Jameson, Signatures of the Visible (London: Routledge. 1992). P. 158. 
of uselessness, which resists the bourgeoisie's ideology ofutilitarianism.M This is 
constitutive for Sartre's formulation of the relationship between reification and the 
artwork: the pure beauty of the artwork can overcome the reification of the culture 
industry by denying the real. 65 
However, the problem is that Sartre's formulation of the artwork is more 
metaphysical than other Marxist theorists; Sartre presupposes the pure category of 
beauty which can be accomplished by the authentic life of artists. For Sartre, pure 
beauty is an ideology that tells truth through its fictional form: it gives rise to pure 
negativity whereby artwork wears its ideological reification out by asserting its own 
66 
autonomy. 
Sartre's theory of the artwork assumes that the aesthetic dimension is 
established by epistemological frustration. The aesthetic is the absolute inverse of the 
epistemological. In this way, Jameson's formulation adapts the way in which Sartre 
sees the aesthetic dimension as an outcome of political and epistemological failure. 
Needless to say, Jameson does not endorse Sartre's existentialist presupposition; yet 
his formulation. which retains the Sartrean distinction between the epistemological 
and the aesthetic, too easily overlooks the fact that aesthetic perception also 
intemalises an epistemological impulse as Benjamin's and Adorno's formulations of 
mimesis clearly show. In short, the aesthetic artifice is nothing less than a by-product 
of the epistemological impulse towards reality. 
On the other hand, the position that Jameson takes for the understanding of 
realism appears to be equivalent to that of Barthes who sees realism as a historically 
specific mode of representation. In this sense, Jameson facilitates an understanding of 
63 Ibid. 
b4 See Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature? trans. by Bernard Frechtman (London: ROlltledge, 199)), 
p.96. 
6S See ibid., p. 97. 
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the condition of realism in which a rift between the epistemological and the aesthetic 
comes out of its differentiating periodisation. Jameson does much to encourage this 
view in order to articulate the dialectics of realism, modernism and postmodernism 
respectively, which correspond to the historical phases of market capitalism. 
imperialism and late capitalism. Emphasising a break between these different 
representational modes, Jameson draws on the periodisation of capitalism in order to 
support the relationship of narrative fonns and their determination by the mode of 
production. In spite of Jameson's positive reception of the poststructuralist 
perspective, Jameson's own theoretical fonnation took place under the influence of 
Luk.:lcsean realism, in which the dominant feature of narration is the unity of subject 
and object. 
In his early writing, Jameson wrote that 'realism itself comes to be 
distinguished by its movement, its storytelling and dramatization of its content; comes 
... to be characterized by narration rather than description' .67 In this way. Jameson 
recounts Lukacs' celebration of narration; narration 'presupposes neither the 
transcendence of the object (as in science) nor that of the subject (as in ethics). but 
rather a neutralization of the two, their mutual reconciliation, which thus anticipates 
the life experience of a Utopian world in its very structure' .68 This statement seems to 
be indicative of Jameson's apparent approval of adopting the "structure" of narration 
suggested by Lukacs. Although Jameson entertains Lukacs' idea. it does not mean 
that he totally agrees with Lukacs' realism. Adapting Lukacs' theoretical category. 
Jameson supports his own arguments of non-realistic works such as modernism and 
postmodernism. Critically considering Jameson's acceptance of Lukacs, these 
66 See ibid., p. 90. 
67 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 196. 
68 Ibid., p. 190. 
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contradictory aspects of realism emerge from his theoretical framework. In Alurxism 
and Form, Jameson himself explains Lukacs' criticism of description as follows: 
It is perhaps easiest to begin with the negative part of the definition, with that 
hostile diagnosis of symbolism which will be a constant throughout Lukacs 
career: for him, symbolism is not just one literary technique among others, but 
represents a qualitatively different mode of apprehending the world from the 
realistic one ... the symbolic mode is of course not so much the result nfthe 
writer's personal aesthetic as of the historical situation itself: in their origin, all 
b· h h . 69 o ~ects ave a uman meanmg. 
The last sentence of this quotation clearly reveals how Jameson understands 
the symbolic mode. Considering symbolism, Jameson opens here a newly developed 
polemic on representation as such, that is to say, all representational modes could be 
understood as distinctive effects of history. His consideration of symbolism as a 
particular representational mode corresponding to a specific mode of production 
seems to be quite different from what Lukacs wanted to teach in his criticism of 
symbolism. 
Contrary to Lukacs' criticism of symbolism, Jameson thus argues that' in 
symbolic works of art, we strive for some meaningful relationship to the outside 
world, to objective reality, only to return empty-handed, having lived our life among 
shadows, having touched nothing but ourselves in the world around us' .70 Jameson 
calls this tendency of symbolism an ambiguity coming out of the structural condition 
by which 'the modernist writer has some personal choice in the matter, and that his 
fate is not sealed for him by the logic of his moment in history' .71 The way in which 
Jameson tries to minimise Lukacs' hostility to symbolism in order to emphasise a 
break between Lukacs and us is compelling. To quote Jameson: 
69 Ibid., pp. 196-97. 
70 Ibid., p. 198. 
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If, therefore, we set aside that part of Lukacs' work which constitutes a set of 
recommendations to the artist (and which is complicated by the fact that Lukacs 
aims here at two publics at once - at the writers of socialist realism just as at the 
"critical realist" of the West), we find that his analysis of modernism is based on 
a fundamental fact of modern art: namely, the observation of a qualitative leap in 
recent times, of an absolute difference between that literature which is ours, and 
which began around the time of Baudelaire and Flaubert, and the classical 
literature which preceded it. 72 
It is interesting that Jameson rules out Lukacs' intention to provide a 
revolutionary instruction for writers; Jameson puts his stress on Lukacs' periodisation 
ofliterary history. For Jameson, narrative is nothing less than a consequence of 
periodisation. In this sense, one can understand the way in which Jameson interprets 
Lukacs' idea of narrative, a narrative that is constructed by the use of the past tense. 73 
Nevertheless, this main feature of narrative, that is to say, the ideological synthesis of 
totality, seems not to be directly applied to Jameson's concept of narrative. Whereas 
Lukacs draws on an epic narrator to support his privileging of narration, Jameson 
takes no such figure to explain the construction of narrative throughout his works. 
Jameson rather encourages the view that realism is better understood by the notion of 
"narrative". Jameson claims as follows: 
71 Ibid. 
We ... now need to introduce yet another crucial concept, whose signal absence 
from many contemporary critiques of representation weakens and oversimplifies 
the theoretical problems at stake here: this is the notion of narrative itself, and it 
has the initial advantage of at once dispelling forever the temptations of the copy 
theory of art, and of problematizing beyond recognition many of the assumptions 
implicit in the notion of representation itself.74 
72 Ibid., p. 199. 
73 See Georg Lukacs, 'Narrate or Describe?', in Writer and Critic, trans. by Arthur Kahn (London: 
Merlin Press, 1978), p. 130. According to Lukacs, description contemporises everything. while 
narration recounts the past. 
74 Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, p. 165. 
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Rejecting the conventional pre-concept of realism - the 'passive reflection and 
copying, subordinate to some external reality' ,7) Jameson concludes that 'realism and 
its specific narrative forms construct their new world by programming their readers; 
by training them in new habits and practices, which amount to whole new subjcct-
positions in a new kind of space; producing new kinds of action, but by way of thc 
production of new categories of the event and of experience, of temporality and of 
causality, which also preside over what will now come to be thought of as reality' .76 
As Homer suggests, to take the notion of narrative rather than representation as such 
'avoids the debate over realism sliding into problems of reflection theories of art, as 
well as questions of verisimilitude, which seeks to identify the object in question with 
its representation'. 77 Endorsing the philosophical presupposition of subject and object, 
Jameson's idea of realism is located in the tradition of Hegelian dialectics, which is 
produced by Lukacs and Adorno, even though it also shares a didactic purpose of 
realism with Brecht. No doubt, Jameson's formulation champions Adorno's idea of 
the subject based on the category of mediation whereby subjectivity can be 
transformed into higher form by a Hegelian sublation.78 This means that realism is 
praxis rather than theoretical criticism. 
In a sense, this is where Jameson's theoretical framework of realism unveils 
the other side of itself. Describing realism in terms of praxis, Jameson underscores 
readers rather than writers in his polemics against the conventional reflection theory 
of art. No doubt, Jameson's formulation is influenced by Barthes' theory of writing 
and reading. Interestingly, such an idea focusing on the role of readers seems to stcm 
7S Ibid., p. 162. 
76 Ibid., p. 166. 
77 Homer, Fredric Jameson. p. 121. 
78 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Subject-Object', in The Essential Fran~furt School Reader (New York: 
Continuum Press, 1982). p. 499. 
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from Sartre's conceptualisation of knowledgeable readers in modem civil society: 'for 
the present, the writer relied on an audience of specialists' .79 However, Sartre's 
formulation still sheds light on the way in which writers establish the communicative 
correlation with readers. As Eagleton maintains, the theoretical shift from writers to 
readers in criticism is nothing less than a mirror image of a cultural transition that has 
been prompted by a political concern that 'the passive consumer of literature had to 
make way for the active co-creator'. 80 Eagleton continues: 
The secret was finally out that readers were quite as vital to the existence of 
writing as authors, and this downtrodden, long-despised class of men and women 
were finally girding their political loins. If' All power to the soviets!' had 
somethin~ of a musty ring to it, it could at least be rewritten as 'All power to the 
readers!' I 
This is the symptomatic phenomenon raised by the decline of realism in 
following the change of reality; the postmodern category of reality is now expanded 
to the field of non-realistic category such as fantasy, myth, exoticism and virtual 
reality.82 Jameson endorses Barthes' understanding of realism to the extent that the 
reality effect totally depends on readers' interest. The fact that Jameson's framework 
mainly focuses on theory causes indifference to the process of cultural production in 
the understanding of cultural texts. This tendency constitutes one of the most 
problematic aspects in Jameson's theoretical method marked by its overestimation of 
structural determination. Unlike Lukacs and Sartre, Jameson emphasises the break of 
social transformation too much, and then does not reserve a place in which an author 
79 Sartre, What Is Literature? pp. 96-95. 
80 Eagleton, After Theory, p. 53. 
81 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
82 See ibid., p. 67. 
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can establish a mediation with the audience. It seems to me that Jameson's 
periodisation causes this problem. 
Jameson still retains this idea of narrative in his consideration of modernity: 
'modernity is not a concept, philosophical or otherwise, but a narrative category', XJ in 
the sense that 'the terms 'modern' and 'modernity' always bring some form of 
periodizing logic with them,.84 It seems to me that this argument clearly reveals the 
very kernel of Jameson's formulation: 'we cannot not periodize',xs and a new 
narrative always contains the break with an old dominant narrative: hence, the act of 
periodisation is an impulse towards the alternation of present systems. However, as 
David Cunningham writes, nobody can easily deny that modernity is a periodising 
narrative, but 'this does not, in itself, justify the argument that modernity only has 
meaning as a 'projective' framework for so many 'storytelling possibilities,.IIt> What 
Cunningham's criticism highlights is the way in which Jameson simply reduces the 
complexity of modernity to a one-dimensional facet. Even though Jameson's 
formulation always aspires to the level of the dialectic, it is undeniable that his own 
writing sometimes falls into the problem ofreductionism.87 
However, Jameson's reformulation of realism raises an issue about the 
relationship between aesthetic ideologies and history. In The Political Unconscious, 
Jameson suggests that 'a narrative ideologeme whose outer form, secreted like a shell 
or exoskeleton, continues to emit its ideological message long after the extinction of 
its host'.88 This is the way in which the narrative of literary realism still includes a 
genetic element of wish-fulfilling romance. From this perspective, Jameson closely 
83 Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present (London: Verso, 
2002), p. 40. 
84 Ibid., p. 28. 
85 Ibid., p. 29. 
86 David Cunningham, 'The Anxiety of Returns', Radical Philosophy, 120 (2003), 41-43 (p. 42). 
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reads Balzac's realism, focusing on the relationship of desire and history. A 
significant factor in Jameson's analysis of early realism lies in the way in which he 
distinguishes Balzac from Flaubert, for while wish-fulfilling fantasy is linked to 
history by Balzac, it is effaced in Flaubertian realism. In a sense, Jameson's analysis 
is concentrated on a psychical motivation that produces a difference between Balzac 
and Flaubert; the formula of desire for history in Balzac is conspicuously changed 
into the formula of desire to desire in Flaubert. Furthermore, these formulas are 
crucially substituted for the formula of a negation of the negation of desire in 
naturalism and modernism. 
Following Lukacs, Jameson defines the Balzacian narrative as a rhetoric of 
transparency in which the worldview of the bourgeois class in historically ascending 
moment dominates cultural power. According to Jameson's analysis, literary 
modernism is genetically originated by the political failure of bourgeois subjectivity -
the bourgeois monadic self-confident subjectivity is subsequently declined by their 
repression of the proletariat. 89 It is in this sense that Jameson's formula is evidently a 
mixture of Hegel, inspired by Alexander Kojeve's reading of Hegel, and Freud; 
Jameson attempts to analyse the psychical foundation of the ethical problem in 
Hegel's dialectic of master and slave. 
We can see how this works as Jameson strives to reveal an ideologemc of 
Nietzsche's formula of "ressentiment". In his analysis of Gis sing, for instance, 
Jameson suggests that the ressentiment manifested in Gissing's novel reveals a 
different condition from that of Balzacian realism, in the sense that the ethical 
solution to social conflicts in Gissing's novel stands for an ideological containment in 
87 For another criticism of this reductive tendency embodied in Jameson's formulation, see Homer, 
Fredric Jameson, 187. 
88 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 151. 
89 See ibid., p. 222. 
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which 'the relative freedom of Balzacian modalization is no longer available' .'1() In a 
sense, the eventful situation of class struggle sharply requires the political position of 
working class in order to attack their class enemy. By confronting this social reality. 
literary naturalists such as Zola and Gissing more photographically described the 
aspect of class struggle than did Balzacian realism. According to Jameson, literary 
naturalism's moral solution to the real conflicts can be seen as a symptomatic 
consequence of the failure of total is at ion. Relying on Lukacs' argument about the 
novel hero as the epic individual, Jameson argues that the .r;,'ollen, a solution to bridge 
the gap between duty and being, cannot be attained by a single duty,'ll in the sense 
that the subject is constitutive only when 'the ethical subject is constitutive,.'12 In other 
words, the ethical subject comes to exist when "the desire to know a world cleansed of 
all wanting and all willing transforms the subject into an a-subjective, constructive 
and constructing embodiment of cognitive function' .'H 
Confronted with an insoluble logical paradox in an ideological contradiction. 
the political unconscious attempts 'by logical permutations and combinations to find a 
way out of its intolerable closure and to produce a "solution," something it can begin 
to do owing to the semic dissociations already implicit in the opposition'.'l4 Thereforc. 
Balzac's ideology provides the axiomatic of his narrative as the condition of 
possibility on which the mode of narrative contains the conflicts of ideology. desire 
and unconscious as in the case of the mode of production: the mode of production is a 
structural combinatoire in which various historical planes synchronically coexist. 
90 Ibid., p. 195. 
91 Ibid., p. 194. 
92 Georg Lukacs, The Theory of Novel: A Historico-phi/o.\'phical Es.\'ay on the Form.\' o/Ciretlt I~j)ic 
Literature, trans. by Anna Bostock (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 1971). p. 65. 
93 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 195. 
94 Ibid., p. 167. 
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For Jameson, it is the heterogeneity of narrative that allows Balzac's realism 
to register the hidden reality in history. Balzac's realistic narrative is properly 
operated by a psychic situation in which 'the centered subject has not yet emerged' ,95 
precisely because there is a discrepancy between Balzac's political position and 
historical reality that imposes a lack of wish-fulfilment on Balzac's imaginary ego. 
From this standpoint, what is at stake here is that Balzac's realism is not so much a 
realistic narrative in which the vivid historical reality is squarely reflected, but rather 
wish-fulfilling fantasy in which the friction of desire and reality principle always 
produces ideological closure. Therefore, the validity of Balzac's realism resides in the 
way in which the realistic narrative symbolically registers the real as a trace of 
ideological closure. Jameson's consideration of realistic narrative as wish-fulfilling 
fantasy symbolically recording insoluble psychic conflicts is followed by a new way 
of understanding the classical Marxian aesthetic criterion - the triumph of realism. To 
quote Jameson: 
It then sometimes happens that the objections are irrefutable, and that the wish-
fulfilling imagination does its preparatory work so well that the wish, and desire 
itself, are confounded by the unanswerable resistance of the Real. This is the 
sense in which Lukacs is right about Balzac, but for the wrong reasons: not 
Balzac's deeper sense of political and historical realities. but rather his 
incorrigible fantasy demands ultimately raise History itself over against him, as 
absent cause, as that on which desire must come to grief.'!6 
From this perspective, the triumph of realism resides in the symbolic narrative 
of its frustrated utopian impulse contained in the wish-fulfilling imaginary narrative; 
paradoxically, there is no "realistic" in the triumph of realism. In this way, Jameson 
does not accept the classical notion of the triumphant aspect of realism in general, in 
9S Ibid., p. 179. 
96 Ibid., p. 183. 
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the sense that the phenomenon is nothing but a consequence of premature realism and 
only appeared in the particular situation into which pre-capitalist subjectivity more 
freely involves than that of high capitalism does. That is to say, the rcitied condition 
of higher capitalism imposes the heavy weight on subjectivity, and consequently 
induces it to draw on an ethical judgement about reality. In Lukacs' terms, this is the 
function of ethics by which 'the utopian longing of the soul is a legitimate desire' .97 
According to Jameson, it is in this respect that the imaginary narrative in 
Balzacian realism is interactively combined with Balzac's desire to realise the 
ideological axiomatic. To put it in another way, there appears to be no ethics in 
Balzacian realism in the sense that pre-reified Balzac's subjectivity gives rise to a 
variety of narrative modality symbolically registered his psychical conflicts in a 
deeper layer of his narrative. It is for this reason that Jameson regards narrative as a 
symptom of the repressed political unconscious in which a tension between 
epistemological demand and aesthetic containment produces the self-cancellation of 
realism. 
Postulating History as an absolute horizon of narrative. Jameson accepts the 
model of repression by which Freud constructs his formula of psychoanalysis. 
However, Jameson never mentions here the question as to whether the Freudian 
psychoanalytic model can be applied to the analysis of the collective unconscious. 
Strictly speaking, there is a point missing in Jameson's eclecticism that leads to his 
overlooking some mediation between individual and collective dimensions; Jameson 
too easily presumes the link between the mode of production and narrative without 
any consideration of possible mediation; his identification of narrative with the 
97 k Lu lies, The Theory a/the Novel, p. 115. 
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articulation of differential desires inevitably leads to the acknowledgement of 
accordance between fantasy and narrative. 
For Jameson, the unstable subjectivity of Balzac endowing Balzacian narrative 
with heterogeneity cannot be severed from the historical situation. Subsequently. 
Jameson preserves this formula in his analysis of Gissing and Conrad. respectively 
corresponding to each stage of the mode of production from high capitalism to 
imperial capitalism. For this reason, Jameson simply neglects to investigate the 
relationship between individual fantasy as the effect of desire and the collective 
narrative as the representational system. Narrative cannot be simply identified with 
individual fantasy, in the sense that fantasy emerges from the closure of narrative. In 
short, fantasy does not need a narrator, insofar as it is like a still image as defined in 
Lacan's terrns.98 In fantasy, thus, there are no events and stories, but only frozen 
images to avoid demonstrating a traumatic scene. 
It seems to me that Jameson's positive reception of psychoanalysis allows his 
formulation of realism to miss the distinction between fantasy and narrative. In this 
sense, the combination of the mode of production and narrative, of class and c1ass-
consciousness, is merely the effect of a psychic situation in which the political 
unconscious always betrays the narrator's intention. To exploit Jonathan Arac's terms. 
however, the political is not "below" but rather "beside" psychical articulation.<l9 As 
Arac properly points out, 'the special danger of the "political unconscious" is to 
isolate the literary text just as classic psychoanalysis did the patient' ,100 
Needless to say, the concept of the political unconscious may be used to 
repress the visible "consciousness" of the text for reading the invisible trace of 
98 See Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian P~ychoanaly.~i.\' (London: Routledge. 
1996), p. 60. 
99 See Jonathan Arac, Critical Genealogies: Historical SituationsjiJr PO.l'tmodl!rn Literal)' Studics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 265. 
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unconscious. From this standpoint. "History", presupposed by Jameson's formula, 
symbolically designates the nightmarish reality principle whereby the pleasure 
principle must be frustrated. To put it another way, "History" is an unpredictable 
monster created by Dr. Frankenstein's desire that strives to destroy Frankenstein's 
autonomy. No doubt, this is different from what Lukacs aims to do with his defence 
of the realistic triumph; it must be stressed that Lukacs' realism obviously proposes to 
demonstrate how to overcome the pessimistic perspective on history. As Jonathan 
Arac points out, 'Jameson omitted the historical-political consciousness actually 
available in the work', standing in the modernist perspective that history as the realm 
f .. . h 101 o necessIty IS a mg tmare. 
As has been discussed, the way in which Jameson focuses on the structure of 
narrative rather than the agencies of constructing narrative seems contradictory; 
Jameson suggests that our task is to construct narrative, while his analysis of narrative 
results from the attempt to yoke together such theoretically incommensurable systems 
such as Marxism, structuralism and psychoanalysis. Jameson does not properly 
explain how the gap between the construction of narrative and the analysis of 
narrative structure can be dissolved; he simply presupposes the category ofpraxis by 
which such a contradiction is realised. No doubt, this contradiction gives rise to 
Jameson's theoretical dilemma. Jameson confesses: 
It seems to me that this framework that I have developed - for me an historical 
framework - is the one in which one best does that and best provides a coherent 
narrative even if it is a narrative that explains incoherence. This is what I think 
we have to do today. Then we come back to some of the things we have talked 
about, formal failure, for example. I 02 
100 Ibid. 
101 Arae, Critical Genealogies, p. 276. 
\02 Jameson, 'Marxism and Historicity of Theory, p. 369. 
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In this way, Jameson acknowledges the impossibility of such a project in 
which narrative can be a constructing mediation between idea and realisation. 
Jameson's idea of narrative is still inclined to the Sartrean idea of writing, which 
asserts that the failure of the artist's life designates the truth of the artwork, to which I 
will return. As Homer points out, this dilemma partly emerges from the condition of 
late capitalism in which 'the promise the dialectic aspires to, the unity of subject and 
object, of theory and practice, the attainment of the concrete, of the totality itselt~ can 
never be realized and the levels of abstraction and difficulty inscribed in theoretical 
texts stand as a mark of that failure'. 103 This is the milieu in which an emergent aim is 
not to begin a battle against the ruling class in particular but rather to construct a new 
subject against the "de-humanisation" of capitalism in general. 
Far from what Lukacs observes, today there is no realism but a "realism 
effect" in the sense that description has become dominant in narrative and at the same 
time narration has disintegrated into monologue or stammering. As the principle of 
realism is realised more and more in everyday life, the aesthetics of realism declines 
more and more in narrative. In other words, realism comes to be the "effect" whereby 
narrative reveals itself as the utopian impulse in which the Lukacsean reconciliation 
of subject and object is consequently failed. This is where the idea of postmodemism 
has superseded the notion of realism in the contemporary cultural scene. In this sense, 
Jameson's theoretical intervention into the debates revolving around postmodernism 
can be regarded as his own attempt to investigate the condition of realism, precisely 
because he still retains the category of subject and object throughout his analysis of 
postmodern cultural production. In the following, my concern is the way in which 
Jameson reinstates the idea of realism in postmodern culture. 
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4. Jameson and Postmodernism 
Today, Jameson is unquestionably the most important Marxist theorist 
concerned with the theoretical debates on postmodernism. Throughout a series of 
theoretical interventions into the debates of post modernism, Jameson revitalises 
Marxism and its dialectical method. The postmodern rejection of modernism prccisdy 
arises from the contemporary scepticism of subjectivity. In the various forms of anti-
rationalism, postmodernism attacks the modernist category of subjectivity. Against 
this, Jameson defends the Hegelian categories of subject and object, and endorses 
Adorno's criticism of any attempt to abandon the category of subject. 104 
In a sense, the postmodern tendency arises from the way of rethinking the 
process of linguistic signification that serves as the unique style of modernism. As 
Jameson claims, 'the explosion of modem literature into a host of distinct private 
styles and mannerisms has been followed by a linguistic fragmentation of social life 
itself to the point where the norm itself is eclipsed,.105 Therefore, the postmodcrn 
recuperation of realism raises the reconsideration of the communicative medium as 
such. In this way, Jameson's consideration of post modernism leads to an analysis or 
the way in which the technique of post modern aesthetics (for example, the 
postmodem logic of pastiche) validates its own category of real ity. 
In 'Postmodemism and Consumer Society', Jameson defines pastiche as one 
of the most significant features that appears in the postmodern phenomena. In 
particular, Jameson finds the distinctive feature of the technique of pastiche, which is 
revealed in postmodem visual art. Comparing pastiche to parody, Jameson attempts to 
103 Homer, Fredric Jameson, p. 26. 
104 See Christopher Wise, The Marxian Hermeneutics (~IFredric .Iame.mll (New York: Peter Lang. 
1995), p. 87. 
lOS Jameson, Postmodernism. or. the Cultural Logic o/Late Capitalism. p. 17. 
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draw an aesthetic distinction between modernism and postmodernism. For Jameson, 
'both pastiche and parody involve the imitation or, better still, the mimicry of other 
styles and particularly of the mannerisms and stylistic twitches of other styles' . lOll 
Jameson goes on to explain the aspect of parody as follows: 
Now parody capitalizes on the uniqueness of these styles and seizes on their 
idiosyncrasies and eccentricities to produce an imitation which mocks the 
original. I won't say that the satiric impulse is conscious in all forms of parody: 
in any case, a good or great parodist has to have some secret sympathy for the 
original, just as a great mimic has to have the capacity to put himself/herself in 
the place of the person imitated. Still, the general effect of parody is - whether in 
sympathy or with malice - to cast ridicule on the private nature of these stylistic 
mannerisms and their excessiveness and eccentricity with respect to the way 
people normally speak or write. IO? 
Distinguished from parody's hidden motive that is prompted by such a satiric 
impUlse, pastiche is 'a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody's ulterior 
motive, without the satirical impUlse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling 
that there exists something normal compared with which what is heing imitated is 
rather comic'. \08 For Jameson, the fragmentation and privatisation of modem 
literature demolishes the linguistic norm thereby mocking the private languages and 
peculiar styles. This disappearance of the linguistic matrix for parody produces the 
cultural situation in which heterogeneously stylistic experiments have been appearing 
since the 1960s. In this respect, Jameson calls pastiche 'blank parody, parody that has 
lost its sense ofhumour,.lo9 
Jameson develops this conceptualisation of pastiche as a postmodern 
technique to considering the aesthetic comparison between Vincent van Gogh and 
106 Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodemism and Consumer Society', in The Cllilural Turn: Seit'cleJ Wrilin~s 
on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 1998), p. 4. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid., p. 5. 
\09 Ibid. 
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Andy Warhol; Jameson attempts to clear up an aesthetic difference that determines 
the meaning of textual representation through the contextually different technique of 
composing the visual images. For Jameson, the distinctive factor that separates 
Warhol from van Gogh lies in the way in which Warhol's painting 'no longer speaks 
to us with any of the immediacy ofYan Gogh's footgear,.IIO In tact, it is not difficult 
to signify the glossy image of Warhol's Diamond Dust Shoes according to the 
hermeneutic paradigm. In this way, Warhol's painting can be interpreted to the deeper 
degree that its image implicates the historicity of Auschwitz or the reality of the tragic 
fire in a dance hall. However, this contextually hermeneutic gesture cannot be 
completed by Warhol's textuality itself. The text is not fixed in a single meaning, in 
the sense that its surface meaning is freely floating from Auschwitz to the dance hall, 
as in the case of the images on the cover of commercial magazines. From this 
perspective, Jameson argues: 
There are some other significant differences between the highmodernist and the 
postmodernist moment, between the shoes of Yan Gogh and the shoes of Andy 
Warhol, on which we must now very briefly dwell. The first and most evident is 
the emergence ofa new kind of flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of 
superficiality in the most literal sense, perhaps the supreme formal feature of all 
the postmodernisms to which we will have occasion to return in a number of 
III 
other contexts. 
Jameson's conceptualisation of depthlessness seems to properly explain the 
postmodem aspect in contemporary visual art. However, there still remains the 
question of mediation between text and artist's action or motivation for creating the 
category of flatness or depthlessness by means of his technical experiments. In other 
words, it is surely possible that Warhol's action influences the textual depthlessness in 
110 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 8. 
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the process of reproducing actually exiting images. Jameson presupposes the hidden 
mimetic impulse actually prompting Warhol's repetitive aesthetic production, yet 
avoids considering the artist's attitude towards reality, which may determine the logic 
offonn. 
Different from Jameson's analysis that posits pastiche as the non-intentional 
technique, thereby erasing the trace of the subjective action, Thomas Crow finds "the 
reality of suffering and death' and 'straightforward expression of feeling' 112 
underneath Warhol's glossy images of commodity fetishism. This interpretation 
seems to reveal the hidden political action originally producing Warhol's technique of 
pastiche; pastiche as a technique always already raises the problem of the subjective 
action, which is supposed to determine its formality. In this respect, Jameson's 
conceptualisation of pastiche as a neutral practice distinguished from the modernist 
technique of parody seems problematic, because it is difficult to say that pastiche aims 
at creating nothing through its own action. In short, pastiche also presupposes the 
category of mediation, insofar as the subject using the technique intends to involve 
with the object. 
The problem is that Jameson's periodisation is too reductive, when drawing a 
distinction between modernism and postmodernism. As Homer points out, Jameson's 
periodisation of literary moments corresponding to the change of mode of production 
'can be recapitulated at different levels and historical stages with a well-nigh Hegelian 
obsession for ternary schema', and is always 'at risk of collapsing into a mechanistic 
fonnalism' .113 Peter Nicholls also indicates the problem of Jameson's distinction 
between modernism and postmodernism; according to him, such a rigid line of 
III Ibid., p. 9. 
112 Thomas Crow, 'Saturday Disasters: Trace and Reference in Early Warhol', in RenmstruL·tinR 
Modernism, ed. by Serge Guilbaut (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990). pp. 313-17. 
113 Homer. Fredric Jameson, p. 124. 
247 
demarcation between modernism and postmodernism gives rise to Jameson's 
controversial definition of postmodernism.11 4 In such a reductive way, Jameson 
simply forgets the presence of writers who do not fit in his definition, a definition that 
postmodernism is associated with spatiality, non-narrative, and immanence, while 
modernism is related to temporality, narrative and memory. As Nicholls writes, there 
is a question as to 'how otherwise to account for what we might regard as the main 
strand of recent American fiction - work by Toni Morrison, Robert Coover, Ishmael 
Reed, Jayne Anne Phillips, Bobbie Ann Mason, Don Delillo (the list could be much 
longer) - which is distinguished above all by precisely its preoccupation with 
questions of narrative and memory' . lIS 
Depending on this problematic periodisation, Jameson's formulation entertains 
the technique of pastiche as the new formal logic of realism responding to the 
postmodern category of reality. In this respect, Jameson celebrates Doctorow's 
literary strategy in Ragtime, in that Doctorow draws on the technique of pastiche to 
recuperate the historical consciousness, going beyond postmodern fragmentation and 
reification. Jameson argues that 'by turning the past into something which is 
obviously a black simulacrum he suddenly makes us realize that this is the only image 
of the past we have, in truth a projection on the walls of Plato's cave' .116 Jameson 
explains a specific effect of pastiche in such a way that the technique shows the loss 
of history. In Jameson's terms, the loss of history does not mean 'the disappearance of 
images of history' .ll7 Jameson goes on to say that 'it is effectively a way of satisfying 
a chemical craving for historicity with a product which is a substitute for it and which 
114 Peter Nicholls, 'Divergences: Modernism, Postmodemism, Jameson and Lyotard', Critical 
Quarterly, 3 (1991),1-18 (p. 3). 
lIS Ibid. 
116 See Anders Stephanson, 'Regarding Postmodemism: A Conversation with Fredric Jameson', in 
PostmodernismlJamesonlCritique, ed. by Douglas Kellner (Washington: Maisonneuve Press. 1989), p. 
62. 
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blocks it' ,118 In this way, Ragtime can be regarded as 'a seemingly realistic novel', but 
" I' , 1 k,119 J I' m rea Ity a nonrepresentatlOna wor, ameson calms: 
This historical novel can no longer set out to represent the historical past; it can 
only "represent" our ideas and stereotypes about that past (which thereby at once 
becomes "pop history"). Cultural production is thereby driven back inside a 
mental space which is no longer that of the old monadic subject but rather that of 
some degraded collective "objective spirit": it can no longer gaze directly on 
some putative real world, at some reconstruction of a past history which was 
once itself a present; rather, as in Plato's cave, it must trace our mental images of 
h . fi . II 120 t at past upon Its con IIlmg wa s. 
For Jameson, such an effect of pastiche produced by Doctorow's novel is 
nothing less than 'a "realism" that is meant to derive from the shock of grasping that 
confinement and of slowly becoming aware of a new and original historical situation 
in which we are condemned to seek History by way of our own pop images and 
simulacra of that history, which itself remains forever out of reach' ,121 Thus, the 
realism of pastiche is a homeopathic medicine thereby undoing postmodemism 'by 
the methods of postmodernism', 122 Jameson's idea of homeopathic realism seems to 
rely on Sartre's notion of analogon which constitutes the kernel ofSartrean realism. 
For Sartre, analogon is nothing less than a material substitution for the imaginary 
object. Jameson regards the concept of analogon as an emphasis on 'the operation of 
reading analogies off the allegorical object, rather than discovering them 
ontologically, as "realities" in the world' ,123 In this way, Jameson postulates the 
realistic aspect of postmodern art in that such an artistic technique as pastiche shows 
the real through unreal images, 
117 Ibid., p. 60. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 23. 
120 Ibid., p. 25, 
121 Ibid. 
122 Stephanson. 'Regarding Postmodemism', p. 59. 
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However, what Jameson's explanation of the effect of pastiche reveals here is 
contradictory, in the sense that the Sartrean concept of ana/oRon clearly presupposes 
the subject-object dialectic, the very methodology of modem ism. Yet, Jameson's 
formulation is supported by the presupposition that pastiche is a by-product of an 
aesthetic dilemma caused by the death of the subject; Jameson regards the modernist 
category of individual subjectivity as the very condition of aesthetic production. It 
seems to me, however, that this problem only enhances Jameson's ambivalence 
towards postmodernism. 
Without any consideration of the contradictory aspect of the combination of 
Sartre and postmodernism, Jameson defines postmodern art as 'the necessary failure 
of art and the aesthetic, the failure of the new, the imprisonment in the past' .124 Again, 
Jameson's formulation reminds us Sartre's idea of poetry, the idea that 'poetry is a 
case ofthe loser winning' .125 Jameson's adaptation of the loser winning, of course. is 
an inverted version of Sartre; Jameson formulates the winner losing rather than the 
loser winning. Jameson calls this as 'a strange quasi-Sartrean irony' that 'the more 
powerful the vision of some increasingly total system or logic ... the more powerless 
the reader comes to feel'. 126 To put this in another way, even though fully totalising 
postmodem reality. such an attempt cannot preserve the critical distance between 
subject and object. This formulation reinforces Jameson's idea of form, to be 
elaborated in his analysis of postmodernism: crucial is the ideology of form rather 
than content in that form is a symptom of political unconscious in which the absent 
cause of history is symbolically inscribed by figurative language. 
123 Ibid., p. 63. 
124 Jameson, 'Postmodemism and Consumer Society', p. 7. 
125 Sartre, What is Literature?, p. 24. 
126 Jameson, Postmodernism, or. The Cultural Logic l?f Lale Capitalism. p. 5. 
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In this respect, Jameson explains the forms of modernism that' inscri he a new 
sense of the absent global colonial system on the very syntax of poetic language 
itself. 127 For Jameson, the aesthetic aspect of modernism shows that 'expression 
requires the category of the individual monad, but it also shows us the heavy price to 
be paid for that precondition, dramatizing the unhappy paradox that when you 
constitute your individual subjectivity as a self-sutlicient field and a closed realm, you 
thereby shut yourself off from everything else and condemn yourself to the mindless 
solitude of the monad, buried alive and condemned to a prison cell without egress'. I~!\ 
In Jameson's sense, as postmodernism emerges, this self-sufficient monadic 
subjectivism stops existing. Jameson connects this postmodern phenomenon to the 
historical eclipse of the autonomous bourgeois ego that is prompted by the transition 
of the mode of production. Jameson argues that postmodernism implicates the end of 
modernist aesthetic style, 'the end of the distinctive individual brush stroke,.1:!9 
Jameson regards this new component as the death of the subject - the end of the 
bourgeois individualism as such. DO For Jameson, this is symptomatically shown in a 
series of new philosophical narratives which draw a distinctive line between the old 
and the new. This idea is closely combined with Jameson's formulation of 
periodisation. In this respect, observing the philosophical transformation that is 
mainly prompted by French philosophers such as Foucault. Derrida and Deleuze, 
Jameson argues that the notion of post modernism is not 'another word for the 
description of a particular style', but rather 'a periodizing concept whose function is 
to correlate the emergence of a new type of social life and a new economic order'. I-' I 
To verify this historical transition, Jameson adopts Ernest Mandel's formulation of 
127 Ibid., p. 411. 
128 Ibid., p. 15. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Jameson, 'Postmodemism and Consumer Society', p. 5. 
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late capitalism. In this way, Jameson contirms that the new historical stage of 
capitalism, so-called post-industrial or consumer society. the society of the spectacle 
or multinational and global capitalism, has changed the condition of aesthetic 
production. In fact, what is implicit in Jameson's suggestion is that postmodernism 
must be grasped as the cultural logic of economic transition in light of the dialectic of 
form and content, not as the stylistic and aesthetic variation of modernism. 
Therefore, for Jameson postmodernism cannot simply be regarded as 
something that happened only in the sphere of style, because its aesthetic practice is 
accomplished in abolishing the category of subject on which the style of modernism is 
based. Postmodernism emerges from the very ruin of modernist narrative, and can be 
called the symptom of the crisis of modernist representation. Hence, the postmodern 
phenomena as such are referring to something that happened in the dimension of 
socio-economic reality. From this perspective, Jameson looks back to define the old 
aesthetic narratives such as modernism. Here, it is interesting that the way in which 
Jameson delineates the narrative of modernism is inductive; Jameson's definition of 
modernism always already presupposes fully existing postmodernism in our time. In 
Jameson's formulation, postmodernism is a premise which proves the end of 
modernist ideology. No doubt, this simple syllogism also causes Jameson's theoretical 
problem throughout his argument on postmodernism. 
According to Jameson, modernism is the first crisis of representation which 
corresponds to 'classical or market capitalism in terms ofa logic of the grid'. U2 
However, 'the problems of figuration that concern us will only become visible in the 
next stage, the passage from market to monopoly capital, or what Lenin called the 
131 Ibid., p. 3. 
\32 Jameson, Postmodernism. or. The Cultural Logic o/Lale Capitalism, p. 410. 
252 
"stage of imperialism'" .133 This socio-economic condition prompts a contradiction 
'between lived experience and structure, or between a phenomenological description 
of the life of an individual and a more properly structural model of the condition of 
existence of that experience' .134 Jameson's contention proceeds with the 
presupposition that the rift between experience and structure is growing wider. In this 
way, 'the truth of that experience no longer coincides with the place in which it takes 
place' .135 For Jameson, this cultural condition that precipitates the discrepancy 
between experience and its material matrix precisely provides the paradoxical 
situation - 'a situation in which we can say that if indi vidual experience is authentic, 
then it cannot be true: and that if a scientific or cognitive model of the same content is 
true, then it escapes individual experience' .136 
From this perspective, it is evident that modernism must confront a situation 
that imposes the impossibility of formal containment - there is something missing 
from its representation. Therefore, the emergence of postmodernism can be 
considered the result of the deeper crisis of representation which is caused by the 
historical change of socio-economic conditions pushing the gap between experience 
and structure beyond imperial capitalism to late capitalism. In this way, what is 
implicit in Jameson's analysis of the situation is to disclose the disappeared 
something, the absent cause ofthe aesthetic production in Althusserian terms: the 
logic of capital. For Jameson, postmodernism is an impasse of representation which 
results from the new multinational space in which 'not merely the older city but even 
the nation-state itself has ceased to playa central functional and formal role in a 
process that has in a new quantum leap of capital prodigiously expanded beyond 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., p. 411. 
136 Ibid. 
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them, leaving them behind as ruined and archaic remains of earlier stages in the 
development of this mode of production' . 13 7 
Jameson emphasises the nightmarish aspect of postmodem spatiality as 
'symptoms and expressions ofa new and historically original dilemma', in the sense 
that it transforms individual subjects into schizophrenic experiences, that is to say. 'a 
multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the 
still surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable 
decentering of global capital itself .13R In short, both realms of conscious and 
unconscious are always already assimilated with the logic of capital. Therefore. what 
Jameson is interested in in his analysis of postmodemism is not the way in which 
socio-economic structure determines the construction of cultural forms. but rather the 
way in which the mode of production involves the aesthetic production. In this 
respect, Jameson's analysis of post modernism ultimately aims at revealing the last 
stance of cultural production, that is to say, the logic of late capitalism. Precisely 
revolving around the hidden logic of the material phase. cultural production is 
mediated to the socio-economic stance. 
Jameson presupposes that postmodernism is a qualitively ditTerent feature 
from modernism, in the sense that the new spatiality, in which individual subjects lose 
their identities and become fragmented and schizophrenically decentred, 
overwhelmingly dominates the sphere of everyday life. By this transformation. 
"monadic relativism", whereby modernism can produce its unique styles to overcome 
the crisis of representation, is no longer possible, in conditions where the distance 
between representation and its object totally disappears. Seemingly, this desperate 
cultural condition allows the subject to confront only the situation in which 'each 
137 Ibid., p. 412. 
138 Ibid., p. 413. 
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consciousness is a closed world, so that a representation of the social totality now 
must take the [impossible] form of a coexistence of those sealed subjective worlds 
and their peculiar interaction,.139 The modernist formal practice that strives to 
overcome this uncommunicative situation finally reaches the literary value called 
"irony" whose 'philosophical ideology often takes the form of a vulgar appropriation 
of Einstein's theory of relativity' .140 In this way, it is not surprising that Jameson 
simply considers postmodernism as a product of the modernist aesthetic impasse. 
which is caused by the emergence of late capitalist spatiality. The postmodern space is 
a new historical phase in which any possibility of mediation must be vanished. 
Jameson's contention, which substantiates the form of post modernism at the 
level of historical and economic materiality, presupposes that postmodernism is 
another attempt for representation: postmodernism is based on the aesthetic principle 
of realism. To quote Jameson: 
The argument for a certain authenticity in these otherwise patently ideological 
productions depends on the prior proposition that what we have been calling 
postmodern (or multinational) space is not merely a cultural ideology or fantasy 
but has genuine historical (and socioeconomic) reality as a third great original 
expansion of capitalism around the globe ... The distorted and unrctlexive 
attempts of newer cultural production to explore and to express this new space 
must then also, in their own fashion, be considered as so many approaches to the 
representation of (a new) reality (to use a more antiquated language). As 
paradoxical as the terms may seem, they may thus, following a classic 
interpretive option, be read as peculiar new forms of realism (or at least of the 
mimesis of reality), while at the same time they can equally well be analyzed as 
so many attempts to distract and divert us from that reality or to disguise its 
contradictions and resolve them in the guise of various formal mystification. 141 
The ontological presence of post modernism is related to the paradoxical aspect 
of capitalism: the movement of capitalism is negative and positive all at once. In this 
139 Ibid., p. 412. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., p. 49. 
255 
way, Jameson argues that the dialectical consideration of postmodernism as 'progress 
and catastrophe all together' 142 must be demanded. However, as Jamie Morgan 
argues, the way in which Jameson conceptualises postmodernism is quite amhivalent. 
in the sense that he uses this term in two ways: as an actually existing situation and as 
a social theory of such a situation. The problem is that Jameson does not consider the 
gap between these different dimensions. As Morgan argues, 'this entails the fatal error 
of conflation of an irrealist philosophY with the empirical it sets out to analyse'. 1·11 
On this contradictory theoretical basis, Jameson regards postmodernism as a 
desperate pursuit of the mimetic impulse to map out the multinational space. The way 
in which Jameson delineates postmodernism as the products of the mimetic impulse in 
late capitalism raises the question about representation in general. That is to say, 
Jameson retains the category of subject and object, in the sense that the mimetic 
impulse of the subject is still a significant factor in the process of constituting cultural 
politics. In other words, the categories of subject and object effectively provide a 
cultural strategy in a situation in which, in Baudrillard's terms, critical distance totally 
disappears. Yet, it seems to me that Jameson's defence of the categories of suhject 
and object is as contradictory as his ambivalence towards postmodcrnism. Let me 
explain this with Adorno's conceptualisation of the relationship between subject and 
object. 
For Jameson, the postmodern rejection of the distinction between subject and 
object forces the subject to have schizophrenic experiences. However, the problem is 
that Jameson does not properly investigate the way in which the distance between 
subject and object disappears. Is it the consequence of objectifying the subject. or of 
subjectifying the object? Alternatively, is it the identification of subject and object? Is 
142 Ibid., p. 47. 
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it rather the separation of subject and object that Adorno indicates? According to 
Adorno, 'the separation of subject and object is both real and semblance' .144 Stated 
another way, the separation is cognitively real, but not historically; the divided 
category of subject and object is surely related to epistemology. To quote Adorno: 
As soon as it is fixed without mediation, the separation becomes ideology. its 
normal form. Mind then arrogates to itself the status of being absolutely 
independent - which it is not: mind's claim to independence announces its claim 
to domination. Once radically separated from the object. subject reduces the 
object to itself; subject swallows object, forgetting how much it is object 
. If 145 Itse . 
What is implicit in Adorno's argument is that the subject gives rise to the 
death of critical distance by announcing its own independence. In short, the death of 
critical distance is a subjective ideology, an ironic ideology that announces the non-
independence of the subject. Jameson's attempt to combine postmodern ideas and 
Marxism, therefore, does not resolve this problem, but rather produces many 
questionable discourses revolving around postmodernism. In this respect. Best and 
Kellner criticise for the way he adopts the Baudrillardian implosion of the subject-
object dialectic, which results in 'the demise of critical subjectivity and undermines a 
Marxian theory of praxis and a belief in the practical efficacy of the subjcCt'.14h 
For Jameson, postmodernism is an aesthetic symptom that implicitly signifies 
the transformation of the socio-economic reality. Thus, nobody can freely reject the 
category of post modernism, even though he poignantly criticises the phenomena; the 
logic of post modernism already constitutes itself beyond the ethical judgement. 
143 Jamie Morgan, 'Empire Inhuman?: The Social Ontology of Global Theory'. Journal (!lCrilical 
Realism, 2 (2003), 95-126 (p. 97). 
144 Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchw()rds. trans. by 1 tenry W. Pickford 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). p. 246. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory, p. 192. 
257 
Following Baudrillard's conceptualisation of simulacra, Jameson presumes the new 
condition of cultural production in which the multinational spatiality destroys any 
conventional framework of representation. This means that Jameson regards 
postmodemism as evidence of the changed condition of aesthetic production: 
postmodemism symptomatically alludes to the situation in which the holistic 
reflection of realism towards totality is no longer possible. Yet. according to Best and 
Kellner, it is not difficult to find' Jameson's claim that postmodernism is a cultural 
dominant to be overly totalizing in the sense that it exaggerates some tendencies -
such as hyperreality or schizophrenia - which may only be emergent rather than 
dominant' .147 Overwhelmingly influenced by Baudrillardian implosion of subject and 
object, Jameson seems to overestimate the postmodern situation. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to accept the position that Jameson rejects the possible category of 
subjectivity as in the case of Baudrillard. Jameson's coceptualisation of cognitive 
mapping is nothing less than the consequence of such an attempt to solve the problem 
of post modern formulation. In the following, I investigate Jameson's 
conceptualisation of cognitive mapping, and contend that it is a project for the 
constitution of an alternative idea of realism against the theoretical presupposition of 
postmodern thinking. 
7. Cognitive Mapping as a Realist Alternative 
Positing postmodernism as the new aesthetic production which still inscribes 
the mimetic impulse within its form, Jameson plainly argues that 'it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that all affect, all feeling or emotion, all subjectivity. has 
147 Ibid., p. 188. 
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vanished from the newer image,.148 That is to say, there is always the return of the 
repressed in postmodern culture, which is prompted by epistemological claims 
towards totality. In this respect, Jameson understands the death of the subject as the 
end of bourgeois individualism. which supported the idea of autonomous subjectivity, 
dominating a specific historical moment. The death of the autonomous subjectivity 
causes 'a virtual deconstruction of the very aesthetic of expression itself' .149 For 
Jameson, this is the way in which the dilemma of post modernism comes to exist in its 
own right. The postmodern phenomenon necessarily gives rise to the dilemma that the 
subject confronts a self-deconstruction, when producing the aesthetic style without the 
feeling of subjectivity. Jameson's attempt to retain the category of the subject is 
nothing less than Adorno's defence of the dialectic between subject and object. As 
Adorno says, the liberation from the subject is a 'destructive force which incorporates 
men only so much more into the spell of nature' . 150 
For Jameson, the subject is not so much an individual as the collective which 
Lukacs presupposes in his discussion of class consciousness. In this way, cognitive 
mapping is nothing less than the recuperation of collective subjectivity in a situation 
where the postmodern phenomenon dominates the cultural power. That is to say, 
cognitive mapping can be said to be realism in the condition oflate capitalism. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Jameson conceptualises cognitive mapping as the 
'pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some 
new heightened sense of its place in the global system'. 151 In other words, the 
possibility of realism still remains, insofar as a revolutionary subject continuously 
searches for the way in which its epistemological claims obtain the collective 
148 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. p. 10. 
149 Ibid., p. 11. 
ISO Theordor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1(73). p. 
241. 
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subjectivity in late capitalism. This point is made by realist claims in postmodem 
culture that decisively retains the utopian impulse, which is 'something positive in the 
attempt to keep alive the possibility of imagining such a thing' .152 In this sense, the 
condition of possibility of realism is late capitalism as such, which paradoxically 
prompts the crisis of expression, yet, at the same time, strengthens the epistemological 
claims. Therefore, the category of realism cannot be removed from the aesthetic 
horizon, insofar as subjective action pushes the mimetic impulse beyond ideology to 
the utopian cognitive category of reality. This is where Jameson formulates the 
validity of cognitive mapping, thereby retaining the dialectic between subject and 
object in the dominance of postmodemism. 
Regarding the traditional mode of realism as the cultural logic of national 
capitalism. Jameson's contention leads to the political requirement for a proper 
aesthetic methodology to represent the postmodem reality. In this way, he postulates 
cognitive mapping as a reformulation of the classical mode of representation. To 
quote Jameson: 
An aesthetic of cognitive mapping - a pedagogical political culture which seeks 
to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in 
the global system - will necessarily have to respect this now enormously 
complex representational dialectic and invent radically new forms in order to do 
.. . 15 It JustIce. 
The new mode of representation is not a repetition of the old realism; this is 
not 'a call for a retum to some older kind of machinery, some older and more 
transparent national space, or some more traditional and reassuring perspectival or 
151 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 54. 
152 Jameson, 'Cognitive Mapping', in Marxism and the Interpretation O!,Cu/tllre, ed. by Cary Nelson 
and Lawrence Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 356. 
153 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism Ibid., p. 54. 
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mimetic enclave' .154 The dialectic of subject and object, which is based on the 
assumption that there is an independent objectivity outside of the subject, is necessary 
for a refonnulation of the mode of representation. In Jameson's sense, the mode of 
realism is narrative, not the Kantian correspondence of empirical realism, as in the 
case of Lukacs' defence of realism. This idea of realism certainly sheds light on the 
possibility of realism in late capitalism. 
Jameson regards classical realism as the old mode of representation, which is 
invented to map out the national capitalist spatiality in the specific historical moment. 
The different spatiality, which emerges from the multinational spatiality of late 
capitalism, demands a new type of total is at ion, in Jameson's tenns "cognitive 
mapping". Jameson's concept of cognitive mapping would be better viewed as the 
refonnulation of realism, thereby still retaining the category of subject and object. 
Thus, cognitive mapping can be seen as 'a more modernist strategy' .155 This is where 
the way in which Jameson conceptualises representation must be stressed, in the sense 
that Jameson grasps representation as 'the synonym of "figuration" itself, irrespective 
of the latter's historical and ideological fonn' .156 In this respect, the concept of 
cognitive mapping is in opposition to the anti-totalising formula that theoretically 
legitimises poststructuralism and post-Marxism. Stated another way, cognitive 
mapping, which is strategically designed to retain the ideological aspect of Marxism, 
legitimises the discourses of socialism to the degree that those discourses become 
'realistic and serious alternatives for people' .157 
In this way, as Lukacs' realism implicates the category of class consciousness 
that endows the individual with the collective subjectivity that is able to conceive 
IS4 Ibid. 
ISS Ibid., p. 409. 
IS6 Jameson, 'Cognitive Mapping', p. 348. 
IS7Ibid., p. 359. 
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totality, so does Jameson's cognitive mapping as a new pedagogical methodology that 
allows subjects to communicate with each other through the aesthetic figuration of 
multinational spatiality. Cognitive mapping is a Marxist aesthetic for the production 
of a holistic narrative which delineates the expansion of spatiality to the global 
geographical scale. From this standpoint, Jameson affirms that cognitive mapping is 
'nothing but a code word for "class consciousness" - only it proposed the need for 
class consciousness ofa new and hitherto undreamed of kind', while also moving in 
the direction of that new spatiality implicit in the postmodern.1 58 According to 
Jameson's explanation, it is not difficult to see that cognitive mapping is an aesthetic 
attempt, which is tied in with the modern mimetic faculty in Benjamin's terms and the 
mimetic impulse in Adorno's conceptions. Jameson argues that cognitive mapping is 
not the recuperation of classical mimesis: 'the cognitive map is not exactly mimetic in 
that older sense; indeed, the theoretical issues it poses allow us to renew the analysis 
of representation on a higher and much more complex level' .159 
What is implicit in Jameson's argument is that postmodern reality is morc 
difficult to represent than modern reality, because postmodern spatiality has hecome 
more complicated. However, as Best and Kellner point out, the problem is that 'he 
does not consider the possibility that postmodern space is no more difficult to map 
than an earlier modern space' .160 Interestingly, this problem discloses another aspect 
of Jameson's cognitive mapping: Jameson's conceptualisation of cognitive mapping 
can be regarded as a reformulated Marxian idea focusing on the tension between 
representation and reality, which is always intervened in by class struggle. 
Jameson's concern with cognitive mapping is an extension of his 
interpretation of Lukacs. For Jameson, all kinds of cultural production must he 
IS8Ibid., p. 417-18. 
159 Jameson, Pos/modernism, or, the Cultural Logic of La/e Capi/alism, p. 51. 
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explained in relation to the category of narrative. For Jameson, narrative is an 
essential category in aesthetic production, which is independent of ideology or 
Weltanschauung. That is to say, narrative is a necessary systemic condition for the 
comprehension of reality through the dialectic of subject and object. In Jameson's 
sense, the narrative of representation enables us to restore 'the lost unity of social life, 
and demonstrate that widely distant elements of the social totality are ultimately part 
of the same global historical process' .161 Deriving from Lukacs' formulation, Jameson 
posits a broader historical scope in which the crisis of representation repeatedly 
constitutes the aesthetic tendency in different ways. For Lukacs, it must be stressed 
that such aesthetic changes are prompted by epistemological impulse towards totality. 
As in the case of Lukacs, the mimetic or the utopian impulse, the 
epistemological pursuit of total knowledge cannot be removed from the human 
historical horizon; such an action belongs to human nature, insofar as it is an action 
necessary for the maintenance of civilisation. In this way, just as Lukacs regards 
modernism as an aesthetic symptom designating the decline of high capitalism, so 
Jameson's analysis of postmodemism presupposes that the schizophrenic aesthetic 
phenomenon is a new quality, which paradoxically reveals the possibility of 
representation through its aesthetic failure. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Jameson postulates cognitive mapping as a 
pedagogical strategy for the higher form of subjectivity, thereby delineating the 
possible mediation between the aesthetic production and socio-economic conditions, 
in light of the way in which the absent cause involves the cultural articulation. As 
Best and Kellner acknowledge, 'one can interpret the call for cognitive mapping as an 
160 Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory, p. 189. 
161 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 226. 
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answer to the poststructuralist critique of representation' .162 In this sense, cognitive 
mapping can be called an attempt directed against the postmodern issue of the 
ontological circumstance around the individual subject, to compose an aesthetic of 
realism that still retains the subject-object dialectic, the Marxian idea of realism, in 
the field of aesthetic production. 
Even though postmodern cultural production seems to deny the realistic mode 
of aesthetics, the category of realism cannot be abandoned, insofar as the problem of 
aesthetic production requires its own condition. In this sense, Jameson's attempt to 
substantiate the Marxian idea of realism through the formulation of cognitive 
mapping is plausible. This can extend Lukacs' idea of realism to the holistic analysis 
of post modern cultural production. From this standpoint, Jameson entertains the 
utopian desire immanent in postmodernism. Jameson's presupposition can be 
supported by Mike Wayne's analysis of Big Brother, the reality TV show. Wayne 
argues that 'despite the postmodern qualities of Big Brother, it mobilises powerful 
Utopian desires' . 163 For Wayne, this utopianism of Big Brol her is articulated by 'a 
desire for transparency in our relations with individuals and institutions, which the 
capitalist mode of production and its cultural spectacles are structurally quite unable 
to deliver' .164 
What Wayne implicates here is that postmodernism cannot be severed from 
the principle of realism, the drive towards totality. Indeed, Wayne' s analysis shows 
that postmodern cultural production also retains the epistemological dimension of 
realism, an orientation to the real. The cognitive mapping aims to reveal this realistic 
impulse of postmodernism in an aesthetic figuration of postmodern spatiality. In this 
162 Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory, p. 189. 
163 Mike Wayne, Marxism and Media Studies: Key Concepts and Contemporat)' Trends (London: 
Pluto, 2003), p. 151. 
164 Ibid. 
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sense, Jameson's concept of cognitive mapping can be regarded as a realist alternative 
which is valid in postmodern cultural circumstances, in the sense that it can preserve 
the dialectic of subject and object, which ultimately endows artists with the utopian 
impulse towards totality - the continuous pursuit of the truth of late capitalist 
spatiality in a globalised world. Realism is a spectre still hovering over the mode of 
aesthetic and cultural production. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have investigated the aesthetic of realism in its relation to the 
theoretical development of Western Marxism, and sought to revitalise this aesthetic in 
order to articulate an alternative theoretical insight to the relativistic understanding of 
realism in the analysis of the cultural and aesthetic form. This required both accounts 
of the theoretical contexts in which such a Marxian idea of realism - or anti-realism --
was constructed and subsequent examination of the discourses revolving around the 
conceptualisation of representation in general. 
The most important and basic achievement of this study is that by challenging 
the long-lasting preconception of the dichotomy between realism and modernism in 
Western Marxist debates I have been able to produce a theoretical case for the 
plausibility of recuperating the role of an author in aesthetic production. This is not to 
say that the role of the author must be privileged as the priority of creative activity. 
This rather means that the category of mediation between an author and reality, of the 
subject-object dialectic suggested by the Marxian idea of representation. hy which an 
author's drive towards the real plays a key role in his or her involvement in the 
historical process, is still significant for understanding the structure of narrative. 
The contribution of my study lies in the way in which I have attempted to 
reassess the category of realism in light of an author's attitude towards reality, which 
current non-Marxian critical perspectives unwittingly underestimate. In so doing, I 
have applied the Marxian idea of realism to reveal that non-Marxist theories overlook 
the most important aspect of realism, a crucial motivation of aesthetic production. hy 
focusing on the role of a reader rather than an author, the self-referentiality of 
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structure rather than the mediation between the subject and the object. The issue my 
study has raised is that realism is a fundamental and absolute problem of aesthetic 
production; realism is not only a method or a style but also an orientation towards the 
real, which determines an author's attitude to apply a specific artistic technique to the 
object. The reformulated presupposition of realism presented in this thesis allows the 
correction of misconceptions of the Marxian idea of realism, and the rediscovery of its 
theoretical utility for analysing the relationship between cultural form and the mode of 
production. 
Exploring the Marxian idea of realism, my study demonstrated that from 
Lukacs to Jameson there is not only one theoretical source for the various Western 
Marxian formulations of realism: neo-Kantianism and Hegelianism are major non-
Marxian theoretical influences on the Marxian idea of realism. However, there is a 
fundamental difference between the Marxian and the non-Marxian idea of realism. 
The Marxist aesthetic of realism relates a work of art to politics, while non-Marxist 
aesthetics, for example, the neo-Kantian logic of a work of art, replaces politics with 
ethics.) For the Marxist theorists, a work of art can provide a critique of reitication 
and is correlated with the transformation of the mode of production. Different from 
Marxism, neo-Kantianism presents 'the world as not 'given' but 'set as a task".2 In 
this sense, the neo-Kantian tendencies of aesthetic production, including Formalism. 
structuralism and post-structuralism, presuppose the mode of representation as an 
independent system of objective reality. This is the presupposition that I would like to 
question throughout my study. Against such a formulation of representation, I have 
argued that the idea of realism is necessary for the restoration of the political position 
of a work of art. 
I See Craig Brandist, 'Neo-Kantianism in Cultural Theory: Bakhtin. Derrida and Foucault. Radin.ll 
Philosophy, 102 (2000), 6-16 (p. 14). 
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In the course of reconsidering the ideas of realism in Western Marxism and 
other non-Marxian theories, I wanted to prove the way in which realism continuously 
emerges as the very problem of aesthetic and cultural production until now. Nobody 
can easily abolish the category of realism, even when criticising the normative aspect 
of the realistic representational mode. Adorno, who strongly comes up against 
Lukacs' formulation of realism, for instance, does not jettison the epistemological 
dimension of realism and has firm recourse to the subject-object dialectic on which 
Lukacsean realism is grounded. What Adorno really criticises through his anti-
realistic aesthetics is the very identifying principle whereby the su~ject is inverted 
into the object. In other words, Adorno points out that Lukacsean realism cannot solve 
the problem of the reification of subject, but instead is assimilated into the horritic 
realism of administrative society. 
From this perspective, I have attempted to present the nature, scope and 
development of the concept of realism in Western Marxism. Throughout this 
discussion, I would like to examine the aesthetic debates revolving around this 
concept and its ideological foundations. Excluding any political and ideological 
oversimplification, there is a surprising similarity between the idea of realism and the 
idea of anti-realism in Western Marxism. Interestingly, Western Marxists' dehates on 
the problem of realism can be grasped as a symbolic substitute for the real problem: 
that is to say, the idea of anti-realism is little more than a by-product of a disguised 
political opposition to Stalinism and actually existing socialism.3 In this sense, it is 
2 Ibid. 
3 Eugene Lunn's argument alludes to this hidden impetus behind the idea of anti-realism. To quote 
Lunn: 'both Lukacs and Brecht were more or less within the Leninist orbit and equivocated in their 
critiques of Stalinism as a political and social system, a stance which obviously affected their views of 
art ... Benjamin and Adorno, on the other hand. were institutionally related (the latter mor!.! so) to the 
independent, but politically quietist, Institute of Social Research. Their aesthetic debates more distant 
from the Communist movement - were focused on the significance of avant-garde and commercial art 
under Western capitalism'. Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study o/Luktlcs. 
Brecht. Benjamin and Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1982). p. 77 
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not difficult to say that the basic doctrine of anti-realism also presupposes the similar 
idea of realism, the idea that the process of aesthetic production can drive our 
experience beyond the mechanism of reification imposed by the capitalist commodity-
structure. Not surprisingly, this is a common programme supposed by both realistic 
and anti-realistic Western Marxists. 
I reconsidered the issue of realism that Lukacs raises with his adaptation of 
Leninist reflection theory in relation to the Hegelian category of mediation as well as 
to the neo-Kantian conception of the relationship between an individual work of art 
and Weltanschauung. Above all, Lukacs regards mediation as an action whereby the 
reification of form or method can be realised in the process of practice. For Adorno, 
this is the weakest point in Lukacs' formulation of realism; Adorno emphasises the 
way in which the form of the artwork plays a key role in the epistemological 
dimension. This can be called the paradox of realism that Lukacs overlooks in his 
ontological framework of realism. 
Lukacs' formulation of realism clearly presupposes a teleological aspect, 
mainly derived from Lukacs' loyalty to socialism. Consequently. we know that such 
an optimistic view of historical development is nothing less than Lukacs' own 
demand for utopia. There is no doubt that my thesis does not aim at invoking any 
nostalgic mood through its account of such a political and aesthetic project. In my 
study of realism, I wanted to re-examine the theoretical issues of representation in 
general raised by Western Marxist theorists, which are still hovering around the 
problem of aesthetic and cultural production. From the outset, my thesis assumed that 
Lukacs' question as to how works of art exist is a fundamental issue. As has been 
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discussed, many Marxist theorists such as Adorno, Benjamin, Brecht, Sartre and 
Jameson, strive to solve this problem. 
I gave an account of Lukacs' conception of the orientation towards the reaL or 
the drive towards totality, as the kernel of realism, whereby we continuously renew 
the category of reality in response to historical change. as Benjamin and Brecht also 
point out. I argued that Benjamin is one of the most important theorists to raise the 
issue on the social and institutional constitution of experience and subjectivity in the 
process of modernisation. Alongside this. I considered both Brecht's criticism of 
Lukacs and Sartre's criticism of Brecht. which deal with the new issues surrounding 
realism - realism is not only an aesthetic category but also a major issue of pol iticaL 
philosophical and practical dimension. 
Sartre's formulation of analogous realism can be grasped as an attempt to 
remove any suspicion of copy theory in realism. For Sartre, what is important is not 
whether an artistic form correctly corresponds to the real object. but how such an 
artistic form creates a new object. This idea crucially influences Jameson's 
formulation of realism; realism is better understood by the notion of narratiw. 
Entertaining Lukacs' conception of an orientation towards the real, Jameson follows 
the way in which Sartre sees representation as analogous representatives. ]n this way. 
Jameson reformulates Western Marxists' ideas of realism and applies his 
reformulation to the analysis of post modern cultural production. Jameson's 
conception of cognitive mapping is intended to retain the subject-object dialectic and 
its association with the epistemological dimension of realism. No doubt, such a 
pursuit can be achieved not only by an epistemological programme, but also an 
aesthetic programme. in the sense that realism is a continuing venture for the 
perception of reality through aesthetic practice; realism encourages our experience of 
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reality beyond cultural reification to the utopian dimension. In this way. realism must 
now be relocated between utopia and reality like the spectre of communism hovering 
around in the real world. The idea of realism in Western Marxism arises from an 
aesthetic project to realise the utopian impulse towards the real. 
The main reason why I gave an account of realism as an aesthetic project that 
can be linked to Marxism is that there is an urgent demand for the constitution of a 
new SUbjectivity. In addition. the ongoing practical aspect of realism, which retains 
the category of the subject-object dialectic. seems to be valuable for understanding of 
globalised capitalism. In this sense, the theoretical interrogation of the possibility of 
realism is not only a discussion concomitant to Marxism, but also raises important 
questions about aesthetic and cultural production in general. Therefore, a more 
important point is not so much what the correct name is for the spectre of realism as 
how that spectre should be realised. But this seems another project that I will pursue 
after this study. 
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